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Abstract 
 
 
 
The aim of the research undertaken here was to devise a new form of democratic 
government that, according to theoretical criteria, is likely to perform better than 
existing and currently proposed types of liberal democratic government. The task is 
commenced by inspecting structural elements common to these governments for 
liability to cause defective performance. A ‘forward mapping’ of causal chains was 
made from these elements and this indicated three types of behaviour will be 
produced that would cause some neglect of public goods. These behaviours are: 
confusion about who directs the development of public policy; excessive competition 
between political representatives; and excessive compromising of the political 
influence of informed public opinion by uninformed public opinion. This ‘triple 
dysfunction’ hypothesis is tested with two ‘backward mapping’ exercises that start 
from cases of under-provision of public goods to look for causal factors in 
government behaviours or structures. These cases largely concern the management 
of natural resources and as those tests give some support for the hypothesis, more 
tests are carried out by inspecting whether it appears to explain democratic failure in 
another four issues that affect the use of natural resources: population size, global 
warming, unemployment and growth of wants for scarce natural capital. The 
hypothesis is also supported by these tests and in the case of growth of wants this 
support is given by a fairly detailed analysis of how the growth is driven by the 
irresponsibility predicted by triple dysfunction. 
As this hypothesis shows some reliability it is then used to design an institution 
for improving democratic government. This is the ‘People’s Forum’. It is intended to 
counter triple dysfunction by assisting citizens to develop strategic public policy and 
to pressure politicians to enact this. The Forum is compared with three other 
proposals for reforming democratic government that have been put forward in the 
literature. This comparison employs an analytical framework devised for the 
purpose and it indicates that in practice, the Forum is likely to outperform these 
  v 
other designs. That conclusion may be systematically questioned by using the 
framework: by entering into it, revised ratings of the various capabilities of each 
design; by revising the framework itself; or by or by doing both together. 
Performance indicators are suggested for monitoring the progress of any trials that 
are made of the Forum. An argument is made as to why any trial of the Forum needs 
to be carried out over a whole polity and not as small scale experiments. It is 
suggested that some democratic innovations of narrow focus could assist the Forum 
while it also assists them. 
This study offers four contributions to political science: a hypothesis of failure by 
liberal democratic government; an institution to correct this failure; a framework for 
comparing such reforms; and a method for designing institutional innovations. The 
study also contributes to ecological economics by explaining that liberal democracies 
are likely to chronically over allocate natural capital from the ecological system to 
the economic subsystem. 
  vi 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The problem addressed in this thesis is to devise a new form of government for 
provincial, national and possibly multinational applications that is likely to perform 
better than existing or currently envisaged forms of liberal democratic government. 
This requires a theory for the comparative evaluation of different forms or designs of 
government to see whether one design is ‘likely to perform better’ than others. A 
‘new form of government’ could be an existing form with one or more new 
institutions added to it, or an existing form with one or more institutions eliminated 
from it, or a combination of these, or a fundamentally new form of government. An 
empirical comparison of the performance of several forms of government, including 
at least one that has not yet been implemented, would obviously have much to 
contribute to the resolution of the problem addressed by this thesis, but is well 
beyond the scope of a doctoral research project.  
Part 1 reports on an inspection of existing types of provincial and national liberal 
democratic government for dysfunction. The goal of this inspection was to see 
whether better performance is, in principle, possible and what changes might have 
to be made to achieve this. The inspection starts from the basic structure of existing 
liberal democracies to see if generic structural elements are implicated in 
dysfunction. It is concluded that generic structural elements cause three behaviours 
in political agents or principals that should make liberal democratic government fail 
to some degree. There are of course, many predictions and explanations of such 
malfunction that precede this ‘triple dysfunction’ hypothesis, such as the free rider, 
collective action and agent-principal problems analysed by public choice scholars, 
changing interests of citizens and their disengagement from elections and parties, 
and a paucity of discourse by citizens on public policy that deliberative theorists 
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attempt to address. However, the ‘triple dysfunction’ hypothesis is offered as a fairly 
comprehensive but simple concept that analyses failure in terms of the effect of the 
structure of liberal democratic government.  
The hypothesis is subjected to preliminary checks by comparing it with two other 
analyses that work in the opposite direction by tracing causal chains from symptoms 
of government failure toward their origins. More tests are made by seeing if the 
hypothesis appears to explain four other examples of government failure, all of 
which distort the management of natural resources. These examples are public 
policy on population size, on global warming, on unemployment and on growth of 
wants for limited natural capital. The last example gives an ecological economic 
analysis that shows in some detail that triple dysfunction is likely to allow wants for 
private goods to indefinitely erode the availability of natural capital, thereby 
progressively destroying the physical basis of quality of life. This erosion of 
availability is a combination of depletion of natural capital and expansion of wants 
to use it. A basic principle of ecological economics is that the market is not 
competent to macro-allocate natural capital from the ecological system for micro-
allocation by the economic subsystem, so government or some other non-market 
mechanism must do this (Costanza and Daly 1992, 41). The examination made here, 
of liberal democratic management of wants, indicates that these governments are 
likely to fail in this role. 
These preliminary checks of the triple dysfunction hypothesis indicate it has some 
predictive capacity and reliability, so it is used in Part 2 to guide the design of the 
People’s Forum, a new institution to improve the performance of current forms of 
liberal democratic government. The Forum is designed to work for polities of state or 
provincial scale and larger; to be feasible to introduce in the absence of a political 
will for this innovation; and to improve the provision of public goods of any type, 
not just those considered by the preliminary checks. The potential of this design to 
produce good democratic government is compared with that of three other designs 
that have previously been put forward in political science literature as having the 
capacity to either improve these governments or to replace them with another 
democratic form thought likely to perform better. This comparison required some 
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refinement of existing democratic theory in order to produce an adequate evaluation 
framework. In conducting this research, it appeared necessary to use five distinct 
strategies. As this produced a design for a political institution, these strategies 
together with the way they were employed is articulated and put forward as a 
robust method for the design of political institutions. 
 
 
Background 
 
Political scientist Eran Vigoda (2002, 530) has made the following observation of 
democratic government. 
 
Constitutions, legislatures, federal and local structures, as well as electoral institutions are 
in slow but significant decline in many Western societies. They suffer from increasing 
alienation, distrust, and cynicism among citizens; they encourage passivism and raise 
barriers before original individual involvement in state affairs. 
 
Many other scholars also consider that, despite ‚general agreement on the political 
benefits of liberal democracy, there is a widespread sense that its present institutions 
are not operating satisfactorily‛ (Carter and Stokes 2002, 2). British sociologist 
Anthony Giddens (2000, 90) has outlined the problem as follows: 
 
Democracy is spreading around the world< yet in the mature democracies, which the 
rest of the world is supposed to be copying, there is widespread disillusionment with 
democratic processes. In most Western countries, levels of trust in politicians have 
dropped over the past years. Fewer people turn out to vote than used to, particularly in 
the US. More and more people say they are uninterested in parliamentary politics, 
especially among the younger generation. 
 
Concerns about democratic government are expressed not only by scholars, but 
even by some politicians in liberal democracies. Former Vice President of the US, Al 
Gore (2007) has declared that democracy is broken and needs fixing.  
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Senator Bill Bradley (cited in Dalton 2004, 2) gave an alarming assessment of 
American democracy in his farewell speech to Congress. 
 
Democracy is paralyzed not just because politicians are needlessly partisan, although we 
are. The process is broken at a deeper level, and it won’t be fixed by replacing one set of 
elected officials with another... Citizens believe that politicians are controlled: by special 
interests who give them money, by parties which crush their independence, by ambition 
for higher office that makes them hedge their position rather than call it like they really 
see it, and by pollsters who convince them that only focus-group phrases can guarantee 
them victory... Voters distrust government so deeply and so consistently that they are not 
willing to accept the results of virtually any decision made by this political process. 
 
Ex-leader of the Australian Labor Party, Mark Latham (Barns 2007) has urged young 
people not to become politicians. Barry Cohen (2008, 3), Federal Minister for the 
Environment from 1983 to 1987 in the Australian Hawke Government, has lamented 
‚that governments never connect the dots between increasing population numbers 
and the ‘crises’ that daily beset our citizens‛. In looking at the 2006 UN forecast of a 
world population of 9.2 billion by 2050, British MP Boris Johnson (2008) exclaimed:  
 
How the hell can we [t]witter on about tackling global warming, and reducing 
consumption, when we are continuing to add so relentlessly to the number of consumers? 
The answer is politics, and political cowardice< It is time we had a grown-up discussion 
about the optimum quantity of human beings in this country and on this planet. 
 
Many scientists recognize the problems that are neglected or made worse by 
liberal democratic governments. For example, social epidemiologists Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009, 4, 5) express concern at their neglect of inequality. 
 
Mainstream politics no longer taps into these issues [of unsatisfied social needs] and has 
abandoned the attempt to provide a shared vision capable of inspiring us to create a better 
society. As voters, we have lost sight of any collective belief that society could be different. 
Instead of a better society, the only thing that almost everyone strives for is to better their 
own position – as individuals – within the existing society. 
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Economics Commissioner on the UK Sustainable Development Commission, Tim 
Jackson (2009, 167-68) describes liberal democracies as ‚conflicted states‛ with an 
‚institutional schizophrenia‛ that compels them to promote economic growth while 
they struggle to protect public goods from the market. He declares that a ‚new 
vision of governance< is critical.‛   
In the United Kingdom, persistently poor voter turnouts at elections recently 
prompted the Joseph Rowntree Trusts to conduct an inquiry. This reported that 
membership of the three main parties in the UK in 2001 was less than 25 per cent of 
its 1964 level (POWERInquiry 2006, 46 ) and that ‚two separate studies found 
significant aggregate falls in party membership across thirteen and sixteen 
established democracies respectively since the 1950s‛ (POWERInquiry 2006, 51). 
Similarly, Danish political scientists Jorgen Goul Andersen and Jens Hoff (2001) 
found that in the Scandinavian democracies, participation has declined in 
conventional forms of politics, such as turnout at elections and membership of 
parties. However, they also found that, in an informal sense, interest in politics is not 
diminishing because Scandinavians are turning to single issue forms of participation 
and ‚small democracy‛ in the workplace. This turn from party politics to issue 
politics is noted by Sian Kevill (cited in Smith 2005, 96), one of the directors of the 
BBC-iCan website that facilitates citizen involvement on public issue campaigns in 
the UK. ‚People don’t approach politics through party allegiances any more< they 
approach it through an issue, and this site [BBC-iCan] makes it easier for people to 
connect into politics through an issue.‛ Kevill’s view is supported by Australian 
political scientist Judith Brett (2007, 12). 
 
Party identification was once the strongest predictor of how a person would vote, for the 
great majority of the electorate< Partisanship was habitual and it simplified the political 
world< party rhetoric at election time reminded people of their traditional allegiances, 
activating the existing party loyalty that would deliver the vote. The electorate still 
contains such people, but their numbers are declining. Across the western world, 
partisanship is on the wane and electorates are becoming more volatile. People change 
their vote between elections, between state and federal, between lower and upper houses. 
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People identify with a party but vote for another as a protest. Or people identify not much 
with any party but make up their minds once the campaign is underway, based on issues 
and their judgements of the leaders. 
 
In surveying democratic politics in Australia, David Yencken and Nicola Henry 
(2008, 17), have assessed that  
 
Australians are generally satisfied and proud of their democracy, but< There is 
widespread evidence of voter cynicism about politics and politicians in Australia and 
elsewhere. Opinion poll after opinion poll has shown low confidence in the standing of 
politicians and in the confidence of Australians in political institutions< *research shows+ 
a one-third decline of belief in the moral standards of members of parliament over the 
preceding two decades. 
 
Yencken and Henry offer several possible causes of this lack of confidence: a 
blurring of differences between the major parties as each seeks to cater to the 
mainstream majority of voters; the rarity of bipartisan concern for the country, as 
each party declares the others incompetent; the frustrating spectacle of mudslinging 
by politicians; apathy and retreat by citizens worn out and wearied by a myriad of 
issues; and disenchantment with governments that are neither transparent nor 
accountable and that do not facilitate meaningful public participation. 
Robert Reich, who was US Secretary of Labor in the Clinton Administration, has 
made a similar observation for the US. He notes that surveys show a growing sense 
of powerlessness. In 1964, 36 percent of Americans felt ‚public officials don’t care 
much what people like me think‛ (Reich 2007, 5). By 2000 that sentiment was shared 
by more than 60 percent. In 1964, almost two-thirds of Americans believed 
government was run for the benefit of all and only 29 percent said it was ‚run by a 
few big interests looking out only for themselves‛ (Reich 2007, 5). But by 2000, the 
ratio was almost reversed: only 35 percent believed government was run for the 
benefit of all, while more than 60 percent thought it was run by a few big interests.  
Surveying the recent fortunes of democratic government, the founding co-editor 
of The Journal of Democracy Larry Diamond (2009, 20), noted that a ‚wave of 
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liberation began in 1974 in Portugal‛. At this time barely a quarter of the world’s 
states were democratic in the minimal sense of choosing their politicians by regular, 
free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. Over the next twenty years, 
dictatorships were replaced by freely elected governments in southern Europe, then 
in Latin America, followed by East Asia. 
 
Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early ‘90s< spread democracy from Moscow to 
Pretoria< In recent years, however, this mighty tide has receded< *starting+ in 1999, with 
the military coup in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public weary of endemic 
corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and political violence< Many emerging 
democracies were experiencing similar crises<. Thanks to bad governance and popular 
disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 states 
have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past 
nine years – and included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, 
Bangladesh, Thailand< Nigeria and the Philippines (Diamond 2009, 20-21). 
 
Diamond also notes that democratic government is facing difficulties in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Turkey, South Africa and Ukraine. Although there have been some recent 
successes such as Indonesia, Brazil, Ghana and very tentatively, Pakistan. He 
concludes that around 60 democracies are insecure, that many could fail and ‚need 
deep reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions and improve governance‛ 
(Diamond 2009, 22). 
Several organisations provide comparative rankings of the democratic qualities of 
national governments. One of the most respected of these rankings is The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy and it supports Diamond’s claims by 
showing that although almost half of the world’s 167 independent states and two 
territories (excluding 27 micro-states) can currently be considered democracies, only 
30 of these are rated as ‚full democracies‛, while 50 are ‚flawed democracies‛. Of 
the remaining countries, 36 are assessed as ‚hybrid regimes‛ (authoritarian but with 
some democratic features) and 51 as ‚authoritarian regimes‛ (Economist 2008c, 2). 
Similarly, the ranking provided by the US-based non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) Freedom House found a serious reversal in the fortunes of liberal democracy 
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over the past decade, with 2007 being the second year in succession in which 
‚freedom retreated‛ (Economist 2008b, 12). A large part of this retreat has been the 
rapid reversal of democratic reforms made in the aftermath of the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. The Economist (2008c, 12) observes that the recent experience of Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States is not unique: 
  
[there] have been major reversals before – a democratisation wave after the Second World 
War ended with more than 20 countries subsequently sliding back to authoritarianism. 
We are not yet witnessing that sort of rollback, but the threat of backsliding now 
outweighs the possibility of further gains. 
 
The proliferation of evidence of democracies in difficulties is matched by a 
growth of theoretical predictions of problems with democratic government. Public 
choice scholars are prominent in having ‚elaborated a long list of arguments for why 
democracy fails to deliver ‘good’ policy‛ (Leeson 2006, 357). One of the founders of 
this research program, James Buchanan (2003, 8), has observed that in ‚a very real 
sense, public choice became a set of theories of governmental failures.‛ Charles 
Blankart and Gerrit Koester (2006) suggest that this happens much more in public 
choice than in mainstream political science because the scholars in each area ask 
different questions. Hans J. Morgenthau (cited in Blankart and Koester 2006, 189) has 
observed that political science ‚deals with the nature, the accumulation, the 
distribution, the exercise, and the control of power on all levels of social interaction, 
with special emphasis upon the power of the state‛. Blankart and Koester (2006, 190) 
suggest this means that 
 
political scientists ask: What are the institutions and constraints that allow the 
accumulation, distribution, exercise, and control of power here and now – and not under 
some alternative, not yet existing framework? And they focus on the coercive power of 
the state< [But for public choice scholars] the relevant question in constitutional analysis 
is not limited to what effects existing institutions have< public choice focuses on 
suggestions for institutional improvements based on constitutional analysis‛. 
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In the last decade or so, comparative political scientists have implied that many 
democratic governments fail in some ways, for a major purpose of their comparisons 
is to assess which forms of democracy function best. Further recognition by political 
science of such failure is the development over the last three decades, of theory that 
democratic politics would be improved by more public participation, provided that 
it is deliberative. Graham Smith (2001, 72) observes that ‚deliberative democracy is 
fast establishing itself as a new orthodoxy within contemporary democratic theory.‛ 
This research not only implies that democracies malfunction, but that a major cause 
is a deficit of competent input by citizens. This theoretical development has been 
preceded and accompanied by many practical attempts by both concerned citizens 
and political scientists to facilitate constructive political participation by the public. 
Some of these attempts have been simply to increase participation and others have 
included or focused on the facilitation of deliberation. 
In an effort to develop deliberative public input into policy, many types of forums 
have been devised to conduct facilitated deliberation of a specific issue for a limited 
time. A very large forum of this type is that of AmericaSpeaks, which has run one of 
five thousand citizens. Other designs such as Deliberative Polls, consensus 
conferences, citizen juries and citizens’ assemblies convene relatively small groups, 
in order to concentrate on effective deliberation. In the US the National Issues 
Forums of the Kettering Foundation invite citizens to gather in groups up to the size 
of a town hall meeting, to discuss issues framed by carefully written booklets. To 
encourage participation, on-line polling is employed by NGOs such as MoveOn, 
Avaaz, Getup! and the Australian political party Senator On-Line. Participatory 
budgeting was initiated by the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, to enable the public to be 
involved in deciding how to spend their taxes and it is now used in many cities in 
South America, Europe and elsewhere. More generally and in a very diffuse sense, 
public participation is facilitated by the high status accorded by the public and 
politicians to public opinion polls. NGOs such as Greenpeace, The Wilderness 
Society, Amnesty International and many business associations provide 
participation via lobbying services for their members and sympathizers. Since 1970 
the number of lobbyists working in Washington has grown enormously, so that by 
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1999 there were more than 60,000, spending almost two billion dollars a year, while a 
‚similar tide of corporate lobbying has engulfed other global capitals in recent years‛ 
(Reich 2007, 136). All of these activities, whether deliberative or participatory or 
both, are attempts to provoke responses from democratic governments on issues 
concerning public goods. Some of these attempts are intended to promote what 
organisers and lobbyists consider the public good and many are aimed at obtaining 
goods for special interests at the cost of public goods. These actions can all be 
considered to make democracy more participatory, shifting it a little from 
representative towards direct democracy. However, a problem with moving in this 
direction is to make sure that the opportunity to influence government is distributed 
equally to all citizens, so that each can have their democratic say on which public 
goods are provided and on how many of their private goods are to be given up in 
order to do this. Another problem is to make sure that this ‘democratic say’ should 
be informed by deliberation by citizens.  
A different perspective on failure in democratic government is offered by Reich. 
His interpretation of the growing sense of political powerlessness in American 
citizens is not so much that this is a sign that democracy is failing, but that capitalism 
has become extremely good at what it does, so that it has now become 
‚supercapitalism‛ and is therefore increasingly able to assert itself over government. 
He states that the ‚triumph of supercapitalism has led, indirectly and unwittingly, to 
the decline of democracy‛ (Reich 2007, 224). It is argued in Chapter 2 that it would 
be more useful to state this the other way around - that the cause of this decline is 
the failure of democratic government to provide public goods. To provide these 
goods, government usually must compete for resources with those who would use 
them for private goods. Democratic incompetence often allows capitalism to win this 
competition and thereby to grow into ‚supercapitalism‛. This distracts the people 
from public goods, further exacerbating democratic incompetence. 
Several decades ago, eminent economist Fred Hirsch (1977, 18) surveyed the 
interaction of market and politics, noting that 
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the market provides a full range of choice between alternative piecemeal, discrete, 
marginal adjustments, but no facility for selection between alternative states< By 
contrast, the political mechanism, through which preference between alternative states 
could in principle be posed, has not yet developed a satisfactory system for such 
decision< both the market and the political system< cannot deliver on what the public 
takes to be their promise.  
 
Economists Luis Carvalho and Joao Rodrigues (2006, 344) recently observed that the 
‚contradictions touched upon by Hirsch 30 years ago have not yet been surpassed. 
On the contrary they are probably operative in a new phase of capitalism< which 
took root in the 80s and consolidated in the 90s.‛  
So there are signs from many sources that, whether from government failure or 
external forces or both, liberal democracy malfunctions to a serious degree. Perhaps 
the spectacle of these difficulties encourages such authoritarian behaviour as the 
democratic backsliding of Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, the 
repressive control exerted by the Chinese Communist Party and the restrictiveness 
of government in Singapore, which fails to rate as a flawed democracy and is classed 
as a hybrid regime by the Index of Democracy (Economist 2008c, 6). Consistent with 
this rating, the Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Kishore 
Mahbubani (2008 18, 21), gives qualified support to authoritarian government for 
fractious societies by emphasizing that social order contributes more to the freedom 
of citizens than their freedom to express themselves politically. Perhaps a challenge 
for liberal democracy is to reform its structure so that it provides freedom of political 
expression in such a way that social order is maintained or enhanced. 
Many scholars focus on erosion of political support as a major problem for 
democracy. Russell Dalton (2004, 199-200) has described this as a ‚pattern of 
‘dissatisfied democrats’ or ‘critical citizens’ who want to improve the democratic 
process, rather than one of anti-system critics of democracy.‛ This study does not 
focus on dissatisfaction of citizens but on failure of democratic governments to 
govern. It aims to find out whether this happens and if so how it happens, to 
indicate how this type of government might be made to function more effectively. 
This approach might also indicate to some extent why citizens are ‘dissatisfied’ with 
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democratic government and how to reform it to increase their confidence and 
engagement in it. 
 
 
The method used 
 
In 1973 two experts in design and city planning, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber 
recognized serious confusion about goals in public policy. They suggested this had 
arisen because citizens in democracies had started ‚asking for a clarification of 
purposes‛ (1973, 157). This development of confusion about goals appears to 
describe some of the growth discussed above, of widespread frustration with 
democratic government. Rittel and Webber (1973, 160-1, emphasis in original) 
observed that 
 
goal-finding is one of the central functions of planning< Goal-finding is turning out to be 
an extraordinarily obstinate task< Planning problems are inherently wicked< The 
information needed to understand the problem depends on one’s idea for solving it< To 
find the problem is thus the same thing as finding the solution.  
 
Michael Harmon and Richard Mayer (1986, 9) have endorsed this view of 
‚wicked‛ problems: ‚the choice of a definition of such a problem, in fact, typically 
determines its ‘solution’‛. Others have expressed a similar assessment of how to 
tackle any problem, whether it could be classed as ‚wicked‛ or not. For example, 
Albert Einstein observed that the 
 
mere formulation of a problem is far more essential than its solution, which may be 
merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skills. To raise new questions, new 
possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and 
marks real advances in science (QuoteWorld 2008).  
 
Ian Shapiro (2005, 180) has emphasized the relevance of this approach to political 
science: ‚one central task for political theorists should be to identify, criticize, and 
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suggest plausible alternatives to< the specifications of problems< and to do it in 
ways that can spark novel and promising problem-driven research agendas.‛  
This perspective on how to improve the study of politics is complimented by 
another from Jon Bond (2007, 904-5). 
 
The kind of revolution necessary to propel political science to the next level of 
development is a revolution in theory. Sir Isaac Newton’s contribution to the science of 
physics was not the basic research he did, but rather it was his recognition of how to put 
what physicists already knew together into a new overarching theory. I believe it is 
possible that political science has accumulated enough information about how and why 
politics work as they do to support such a synthesis. 
 
These recommendations provide two of five strategies that have been used in this 
project to design reform of liberal democratic government to reduce its dysfunction. 
These strategies are now described. 
 
 
Five strategies for producing an institutional design  
 
The following strategies are all widely and routinely used in research, so they are 
quite unremarkable and it may seem unnecessary to list them. However, the way 
they are used together here constitutes a method for producing an institutional 
design and as such it seems useful to describe it so that others may consider its 
potential. Whether this method is considered effective may be influenced by whether 
the institutional design it produced is shown to work. This design is a democratic 
government that operates with a ‘People’s Forum’, as described in Part 2. 
The first strategy follows Bond’s recommendation to use existing knowledge, so I 
have done no systematic empirical research of my own, but relied largely on the 
interpretations of experts in relevant programs of research. I have also used my own 
political experience and non-academic sources of information where these appeared 
to be helpful and reliable. 
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The second strategy is to try to identify and use only information that is 
necessary and sufficient for the task at hand. This strategy is especially important 
because the task is to solve a very broad problem - that of devising a better form of 
government. If the problem selected was narrowly specialized, this strategy may 
require less emphasis, for solutions of these problems are likely to present fewer 
opportunities for fruitless digression. Researchers of specialized topics usually need 
to look for more detail within a narrow field, whereas those who tackle broad 
problems may need to look for large-scale patterns or general effects. Specialization 
might be expected to cultivate not only skills in focusing on detail, but a 
preoccupation with this. Archon Fung (2007, 443) has pointed out that specialization 
‚has become a segregation of thought that now poses a fundamental obstacle to 
progress in democratic theory‛. David Held (1991, 4) noted that while 
 
specialization need not always lead to the fragmentation of knowledge, this seems to have 
happened in the case of politics and related disciplines... we seem to know more about the 
parts and less about the whole; and we risk knowing very little even about the parts 
because their context and conditions of existence in the whole are eclipsed from view.  
 
Specialization has produced many theoretical models of democracy, but as Graham 
Smith (2009, 10) observes: 
 
No practical design [for a democratic institution] can realistically hope to meet all the 
rigorous demands of any particular theoretical model... While theoretical work often 
proceeds as if it were an exhaustive account of democratic politics, theories offer only a 
partial analysis of our democratic condition< we tend not to develop fully-fledged 
theories of democracy (whatever they would look like). 
 
This problem provokes Mark Warren (2002b, 683) to comment that recent 
innovations in democratic participation have demonstrated ‚that reality is, once 
again, ahead of democratic theory‛. Further discussion of this issue is given below in 
‘Applying the strategies’. 
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In using the first and second strategies, the presentation of data from experiment 
and observation is minimized so that the identification of patterns is not obstructed 
by a narrow focus on details. Pattern recognition by experts with extensive 
knowledge of details is used as much as possible. 
The third strategy was to follow advice on designing institutions for public 
administration from Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (2006, 158). They advocate 
experimentation. 
 
Institutional design is not a simple activity. The nature of institutional design, its process 
and its impact are not very well understood. Institutional design is a process of pushing 
and pulling with uncertain results< research into institutional design is still in its infancy. 
 
Klijn and Koppenjan (2006, 155-156) explain that ‚pushing and pulling‛ is partly 
needed to accommodate the power relations between the parties affected by the 
institution, because how ‚formal decisions in institutional arenas aimed at changing 
network rules will work out in the games played within networks is highly 
uncertain.‛ This means that institutional ‚designs are by definition imperfect and 
should be seen rather as the start of a trajectory of institutional change than as a 
definitive design‛ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006, 156). ‚Pushing‛ is taken here to be the 
design phase and ‚pulling‛ to be the testing of a design. Cycles of these phases must 
be repeated until a design is produced that performs well. 
The fourth strategy is to do the pushing or designing of the third strategy by 
using the insight discussed above that much of the work of producing the solution 
or design may be done by defining the problem. This minimizes the repetition 
involved in the execution of the third strategy by making its design attempts as 
effective as possible. Careful definition of the problem is also required for the 
application of the second strategy of identifying the information that is necessary 
and sufficient to solve it. 
The fifth strategy is to use thought experiments where these may save time and 
expense. This was done in this study for the ‚pulling‛ or testing of the third strategy 
because testing by experimental trials in the real world of politics was not possible at 
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this early stage of the design process. As discussed in Chapter 6/ ‘Initiating and 
running the Forum’ and Chapter 7/ ‘Function 11’, such trials require considerable 
political commitment and/or funding and these resources are beyond the scope of a 
doctoral study. Chapter 2, supported by the rest of Part1, defines the main problem 
as a confusion about who directs the polity that leaves public opinion substantially 
in charge but too disengaged and unaware to do a good job. This definition 
determines the mission of the design, the two strategies it employs to accomplish 
this mission and therefore the broad outline of the design. In Chapter 8 it is indicated 
that this design cannot execute its strategies for a small group, because it uses 
motivations to execute its strategies that can only arise in very large groups. 
However, the analysis and synthesis given here in Parts 1 and 2 are the first steps 
towards a large scale trial; for they describe why an institution is needed and the 
type that appears have some chance of being able to perform the required functions. 
Thought experiment - imagination - is crucial for getting to this stage, because if it 
can, to some extent, simulate the ability of a design to solve a problem, as well as 
redefine a problem to indicate a design that is both feasible to implement and might 
work, then negotiation of the ‚trajectory of institutional change‛ should be 
expedited. This is because much of the ‚pushing and pulling‛ is done conceptually 
before undertaking any of the expensive, time-consuming and risky, real world 
‚pulling‛. 
Collective action theory should facilitate the execution of the fourth strategy, the 
definition of the problem of collective action that is to be solved. However, as Elinor 
Ostrom (2007, 203) points out, experimentation is necessary because collective action 
theory is in need of considerable further development. 
 
[A] key lesson of research on collective action theory is recognizing the complex linkages 
among variables at multiple levels that together affect individual reputations, trust, and 
reciprocity as these, in turn, affect levels of cooperation and joint benefits. Conducting 
empirical research is thus extremely challenging< The reason that experimental research 
has become such an important method for testing theory is that it is a method for 
controlling the setting of many variables while changing only one or two variables at a 
time< Instead of looking at all of the potential variables, one needs to focus in on a well-
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defined but narrow chain of relationships< One can then conduct analysis of a limited set 
of variables that are posited to have a strong causal relationship< the theory of collective 
action is not only one of the most important subjects for political scientists, it is also one of 
the most challenging. 
 
Ostrom’s view emphasizes the need for the third strategy proposed here: we must 
push and pull by designing and testing until we get it right. As noted above, testing 
solutions to the problem selected here cannot be effective with small groups, so it 
must be done by the fifth strategy of thought experiment to do the pulling or testing 
of the third strategy of pushing and pulling (which also is aided by the fourth 
strategy of defining the problem to indicate the most effective push or design). 
Pushing and pulling is continued until it yields a solution-design that appears 
promising enough to warrant the cost of a trial in the real world of the politics of 
very large groups. 
 
 
Applying the strategies 
 
The application of these five strategies to produce an institutional design 
commenced with using the first two to gather information. In retrospect, it appears 
that I recognized a probability of democratic dysfunction from information gathered 
from my involvement in two types of work. One was my occupation as a bureaucrat 
- a government forester engaged in planning the management of a range of natural 
resources. The other area of work was my private pursuit of environmental 
concerns, which included campaigning on issues, political organizing and running 
for election to the state legislature. As democratic dysfunction became apparent from 
both perspectives, I started to try to find out how this might be rectified by using the 
fourth strategy of defining the problem. I would have then tested this definition and 
the type of solution it implied with the fifth strategy of thought experiment: 
imagining whether the indicated solution appeared both feasible to implement and 
likely to work. If this mental simulation implied that this solution would not work or 
was impossible or very difficult to implement, then I would have made another 
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attempt (the third strategy of repetition) at a definition (the fourth strategy) to try to 
indicate a more effective type of solution. The evidence showing that I had worked 
in this way was that I had simultaneously produced a definition of the problem and 
a design for the solution. This was not initially apparent, for it was only the design 
that seemed to have been devised, for this was written down (see Part 2) well before 
the problem was defined on paper (see Part 1). However, when the definition was 
done, the ease of doing it showed that, whether it was right or wrong, it was well 
formed in my mind. The third strategy of ‚pushing and pulling‛ had produced both 
a definition of the problem and a design for the solution. The definition included a 
classification of the characteristics of policy issues that appeared to be part of the 
problem and these are described in Chapter 4. 
The push and pull of designing institutions can be thought of as an interaction of 
data with theory that begins when sufficient data are gathered to indicate the 
existence of a problem. The problem is then defined, which is an explanation and as 
theories are explanations, the definition of a problem may be close to being a theory 
of its cause. If the definition and the theory it implies indicates a design solution that 
we observe to be impossible to apply, we now have more data, which instructs us to 
try to redefine/ re-theorize the problem in a more helpful way. Redefinition may 
require more data to be gathered. If the new definition/ theory implies another 
design solution that can be tested, then this becomes the next step. Such a test might 
be any or all of three types: first, a thought experiment as noted above, which may be 
inconclusive as it has limited capacity to produce new reliable data; second, an 
inspection of the performance and operating environment of existing institutions 
that resemble this solution and its environment; and third, establishing the 
institution that appears to be the solution and running it to see if it works. Such tests 
may indicate that the design is flawed and if so, that data may be used to guide 
another redefinition of the problem.  
‚Pushing and pulling‛ is thus a cycle of gathering data (pulling), then defining/ 
theorizing/ solution design (pushing), then gathering more data by testing the design 
(pulling) and so on until a design is found that works well enough. The difficulty of 
‚pulling‛ or testing theories/designs in political science appears to have enforced a 
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neglect of testing, so that for example in democratic theory, ever finer details are 
often investigated without testing the theory against the real world to see if these 
details are significant. This is the ‚fundamental obstacle to progress in democratic 
theory‛ (Fung 2007, 443) of unproductive specialization discussed above in the 
description of my second strategy of institutional design. Bond has also noticed this, 
as quoted above: ‚it is possible that political science has accumulated enough 
information about how and why politics work as they do‛. Difficulty in recognizing 
whether information is significant can arise when it describes phenomena that have 
poorly understood  interactions with other phenomena. This difficulty may be 
exacerbated if information cannot be quantified. Neglect of testing may also obscure 
the significance of a theory by allowing theory to focus on applying a particular 
method of problem solving, rather than on solving the problem. Donald Green and 
Ian Shapiro (1994; also Shapiro 2005)) consider that rational choice theory often 
makes this mistake. Strong preferences for particular methods, such as mathematical 
analysis or the use of assumptions from neo-classical economics may distort the 
scholar’s perception of a problem to make it amenable to these methods. However 
this may mean that the problem that is recognized is of little significance. This 
distortion of perception may be revealed by testing the proposed solution, for if this 
is shown to fail or to produce an inconsequential success then the problem is likely 
to be re-evaluated, so that it is more carefully defined or replaced with one that is 
more significant. Green and Shapiro’s stipulation that research must be problem-
driven is expressed by my fourth strategy of careful definition of the problem. The 
third strategy of ‚pushing and pulling‛ assists this fourth strategy by checking that 
the problem is well-defined. In turn, the fourth strategy assists the second strategy 
because accurate definition of the problem indicates what information is necessary 
and sufficient to solve it. 
This suggestion of a method for designing institutions is made to try to ameliorate 
a deficiency in the theory of institutional design. In The Theory of Institutional Design 
Robert Goodin (1996, 31) notes a ‚paucity of literature specifically on design issues‛ 
and that edition reflects this as none of its ten articles focus on how to produce 
designs. Seven of them basically discuss what designs should be able to do (Goodin, 
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Pettit, Coram, Hardin, Luban, Brennan and Dryzek) and the other three give 
descriptions of designs, of what they do and of what happens to them (Offe, Shepsle 
and Klein). Graham Smith’s (2009) Democratic Innovations looks at what designs do 
and offers an analytical framework for assessing these capabilities. One of several 
capabilities identified by Goodin (1996, 40) as desirable is that we should ‚design 
our institutions in such a way as to be flexible< to admit of ‘learning by doing’ and 
to evolve over time. Thus, we might say revisability is one important principle of 
institutional design‛. This might seem equivalent to my third strategy of redefining/ 
re-theorizing/ redesigning, then testing followed by more defining and so on, but as 
this is a strategy for producing designs it is quite different from specifying the 
desired capability of designs. Goodin’s ‘revisability’ allows for a new design to be 
produced by modifying one if it fails to work well enough, but as my third strategy 
is a way to produce designs it permits a more fundamental approach. It invites a 
design that does not perform well enough to be replaced by another that is produced 
by redefining the problem it is intended to correct. This may mean the new design is 
so different it could not be produced by modifying the design it replaces. 
With the exception of its first strategy, my method for designing institutions may 
also have potential to ameliorate the problem observed by Held, Fung, Smith and 
others, of specialization obstructing progress in theory in some social sciences. My 
second to fifth strategies call for: careful definition of the problem being addressed in 
order to set up a theory of cause that indicates a solution; using this definition to 
identify the information that is necessary and sufficient to solve the problem; 
following up the defining/ theorizing/ solution design phase with a testing phase 
and repeating these two phases until the testing indicates an adequate solution; and 
doing this testing with thought experiment if necessary, which will often be the case 
in the social sciences. Thought experiment may seem too uncontrolled and subject to 
the imagination of the researcher to be useful, but it should make the researcher look 
outside her specialization to consider the ‚context and conditions of existence in the 
whole‛ (Held 1991, 4) in which her research is intended to be relevant and to 
produce results that are significant. 
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An interdisciplinary approach 
 
This work draws on several fields of study, using concepts, theories and evidence 
from biology, ethology, political science, public choice, ecological and neo-classical 
economics, history and the evolutionary, social and cognitive branches of 
psychology. As indicated by my first and second strategies for designing political 
institutions, this search was largely for those generalizations and conclusions offered 
by experts that appear necessary and sufficient for devising a form of government 
that is likely to perform better than existing liberal democratic types. 
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Part 1 
 
 
Diagnosing dysfunction 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Democratic dysfunction from fundamental 
structure 
 
 
 
Possible causes of dysfunction in liberal democratic governments are sought here 
by inspecting the basic structure of these systems. Any that are identified at this level 
would be expected to cause other dysfunctions at higher levels in the political 
process. This focus on basic structure may therefore discover sites for remedies of 
dysfunction that are systemic, for corrections at this level could permeate along 
causal chains throughout the whole system. If remedies are not feasible to 
implement at fundamental causal levels, consequent parts of the causal chain may be 
inspected for sites that are more amenable to correction. If such interventions also 
seem impossible or difficult, then remedies may be restricted to the direct alleviation 
of symptoms. The findings of this ‚forward mapping‛ (Head and Alford 2008) 
procedure are compared later in this chapter with those of two backward mappings 
that take symptoms of government failure and follow their causes back through 
causal chains to try to find a feasible site for correction. These case studies are of the 
neglect of the long term in Australia and repetitive environmental mismanagement 
in the US. The first causes identified in such backward mappings are the least likely 
to be fundamental and the correction of these is therefore least likely to produce 
systemic solutions. However, if backward mapping is taken far enough, it may 
provide an independent indication of whether a forward mapping of dysfunction is 
accurate. 
 
 
  24 
The function of democratic government 
 
A search for dysfunction in the governments of liberal democracies must start 
with a clear idea of what the function of this type of government is. Primarily, it is to 
govern a state, as discussed below. Further, as a government that is democratic, it 
must enable the people to do this. If it is to be classed as liberal, this may be 
determined by the five criteria specified by David Beetham (1992, 41-2): the 
provision of freedoms such as expression, movement and association; the separation 
of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; representative 
assembly as ‚the most effective device for reconciling the requirements of popular 
control and political equality with the exigencies of time and the conditions of the 
modern territorial state‛; a ‚limited ‚ function, in that the state does not restrict 
private goods unless this is necessary to provide for the public good; and ‚that the 
only criterion for the public good is what the people, freely organized, will choose‛. 
Beetham’s definition of liberal democracy incorporates his notion of two basic 
ingredients of democracy, popular control and political equality of citizens as they 
exert this control (Saward 1998, 9). As discussed in Chapter 6/ ‘Evaluating 
democratic institutions’, Robert Dahl has interpreted political equality as equality of 
opportunity for control rather than as equality of exercised control and I interpret 
this equality of opportunity to be required by justice rather than by the competence 
of most citizens to exert this control with wisdom, which is Dahl’s reasoning (cited in 
Saward (1998, 17). Michael Saward (2000, 51, 52) takes the definition of democracy 
further than Beetham and others, stating it to be: ‚necessary correspondence 
between acts of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with 
respect to those acts.‛ This emphasizes that democracy is ‚responsive rule‛, but as 
this is also conveyed by defining democracy as government by the people, this 
simpler definition will be used here. 
It is stated above that the primary function of a liberal democratic government is 
to ‘govern a state’. To define the meaning of ‘govern a state’ I follow Mancur Olson’s 
(1965, 15) assessment that the ‚fundamental function‛ of a state is to provide public 
goods. Michael Taylor (1987, 1) also observed that the ‚most persuasive justification 
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of the state is founded on the argument that, without it, people would not 
successfully cooperate in realizing their common interests and in particular would 
not provide themselves with certain public goods.‛ This is not to suggest that 
governments provide only public or collective goods. They often provide individual 
goods like electric power, for example by selling such goods on the market as private 
firms do. However if it is necessary for a government to do this, it is because it is 
providing a public good, such as preventing market failures (like monopoly 
exploitation, or inability to raise the capital to develop a commercially viable 
production of a private good that would be useful to many citizens) or a minimal 
level of equality of access to medical services and education. It is therefore assumed 
here that to ‘govern a state’ means to provide public goods. It is also assumed that 
the only reason citizens need governments is to provide public goods, a notion that 
is supported by Beetham’s fourth criterion of the ‚limited‛ state. The aim of this 
investigation may therefore be restated as: to see how well liberal democratic 
governments provide public goods and if this appears defective, to see what might 
be done to improve it. 
The meaning of ‘public good’ must therefore be clear. Their defining characteristic 
is that they are available to all members of a ‘public’: they are goods or services that 
are ‘non-excludable’ in their consumption or use by the members of that public. Two 
examples of publics are the citizens of a state and all of humanity. Public goods may 
or may not be ‘divisible’ (often termed ‘rival’), which is the property that their use by 
some diminishes the quantity available for use by others. If they are indivisible they 
are referred to as pure public goods. Public goods may be material things such as 
roads, street signs, lighthouses, bridges and clean air; and they may also be more or 
less abstract things such as national security, domestic security (including law 
enforcement and the system of property rights), the level of trust between citizens, 
and opportunities for citizens such as the opportunity to earn income and to use 
public schools and national parks. The wide provision of opportunity is essential if a 
democracy is to be considered liberal, for this produces freedom and equality for its 
citizens. In contrast to public goods, private goods are excludable, which means their 
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availability may be controlled by an individual or an entity - the owner of the private 
good. 
Some scholars doubt the proposal that the sole function of government is to 
provide public goods and that its effectiveness must be assessed by how well it does 
this. For example, John Gerring and Strom Thacker (2008, 168-170) are sceptical 
because (a) it seems difficult to determine which public goods are worth providing 
and in what quantity and quality; and (b) few public goods are enjoyed equally by 
all members of a polity. Their first observation does not mean that democratic 
government must not be evaluated in terms of its provision of public goods, just that 
it is difficult to do this. This is because it is citizens who must make the evaluation 
and this poses problems of collective action and social choice. Their second problem 
does not appear to be relevant. Public goods are non-excludable, so they present the 
opportunity for all to use them and they are still public goods if only a few use this 
opportunity. 
A crucial feature of issues about the provision, protection or elimination of public 
goods is that these issues usually involve private goods as well. For example the 
provision of a national defence force, a pure public good, requires the taxing of each 
citizen, which is a reduction of their disposable income, a private good. Another 
example is the river damming proposal discussed in Chapter 5 under the heading of 
‘The scarcity multiplier’, where the protection of the public goods of beautiful 
scenery, a population of rare native animals and opportunities for river-based 
recreation compete with the provision of the private goods of water rights, hydro-
electricity and the employment and income that these create. Even the provision of 
the public good of minimizing collisions on roads requires the restriction of a private 
good – the personal freedom to drive on whichever side of the road one might feel 
like at the time. This compound nature of most public goods issues means that a 
government making a choice on these is likely to be choosing between private and 
public goods. The production or protection of one usually restricts the production or 
protection of the other. In this competition for existence, private goods usually have 
the advantage because demands for these are facilitated by the market, by self-
interest and by the speed and decisiveness with which an individual or an entity can 
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choose them. The challenge for democracies is to make their collective choices 
equally easy, quick and decisive, otherwise crucial public goods may be foregone for 
the production of private goods. 
As discussed above, the first part of this investigation is to assess how well 
democracies enable citizens to provide themselves with public goods. To do this we 
must start by inspecting the competence of their governments in identifying and 
choosing public goods. In a democracy such a choice is a ‘social choice’, a choice 
made by the members of a group. Social choice may be direct, via some form of 
aggregation of the choices of all citizens, or indirect, through choices made by their 
representatives. The direct form might seem to require each citizen declaring (by 
voting) their order of preferences for the options on offer and then amalgamating 
these preference orderings into one social preference ordering for the whole society 
by some process that is considered fair and equitable to all concerned. 
To assess the adequacy of direct or indirect social choice by liberal democratic 
governments we must investigate primarily whether these governments are likely to 
(a) recognize those issues where social choices really need to be made, (b) make good 
choices on these issues, and (c) be able to implement their choices to create or 
maintain the chosen public goods. To perform in these respects government must be 
able to make its social choices prevail, where it considers this necessary, over any 
individual choices (independent decisions of individuals or entities) for private 
goods that conflict with these social choices. It should be noted that ‘government’ 
does not include the market economy as this system is not concerned with making 
social choices of public goods for the whole society. The market economy comprises 
institutions facilitating individual choice of private goods. On the other hand, 
government is the apparatus that makes and implements choices of public goods for 
the members of the group it governs. A corporation is an entity that is a group 
comprising employees, shareholders, managers and directors so it needs its own 
government (a board of directors and CEO) to make choices of ‘public goods’ for 
that group. Although these are choices of public goods for those within that group, 
the same choices are choices of private goods for that group as far as the greater 
group (such as the state or nation) is concerned. The subgroup here is an entity as far 
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as the greater group is concerned. Part of the social choice task of democratic 
national government is to decide whether to regulate the activities of entities within 
the nation such as individual citizens and corporations so that their individual 
choices of private goods (which is what they are from the perspective of the nation) 
contribute to, or do not unduly interfere with, public goods that the government 
considers necessary for the nation. If national governments have difficulty in doing 
this, then to that extent they are dysfunctional. 
From this it may be seen that a term such as ‘capitalist democracy’ refers to two 
different systems. The first is the market economy, a system for facilitating 
individual choice of private goods; and the second is government, a system for 
making social choices of public goods for a group such as a nation. Such hybrid 
terms may encourage different institutions and their functions to be confused with 
each other. The widespread occurrence of such confusion and the importance of 
minimizing it were emphasized by Reich (2007, 224-25) as he concluded his 
argument that democratic government has been overwhelmed by capitalism: ‚the 
two spheres must be kept distinct.‛ A democratic government must be clearly 
understood as an organization run by the members of a group to provide public 
goods for those members. One very important public good is the market economy. 
This is ‘public’ because it is available for any citizen to use: it is a non-excludable 
good. Part of the job of democratic government is to make sure, if citizens want a 
market economy, that it exists and operates effectively. 
The quite different functions of government and market mean that a failure to 
prevent public goods being excessively damaged by pursuits of private goods is a 
failure of government to control these pursuits. This is not a failure of the market. As 
Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus (cited in Shaw 2002, 6-7, their emphasis) 
have pointed out: ‚Before we race off to our federal, state or local legislature, we 
should pause to recognize that there are government failures as well as market failures‛. 
An example of confusion about the roles of government and the market is the 
statement by economist Nicholas Stern (2007, viii) that anthropogenic global 
warming is ‚the greatest market failure the world has ever seen‛. However, as 
markets are not structured to provide public goods, they cannot be regarded as 
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failing in this case. Instead it is government that has failed to protect public goods 
from the activities of the market, perhaps primarily because there is no global 
government that might control the global market that produces greenhouse gases. 
Perhaps there is a tendency to blame markets for deficiencies in public goods 
because it seems easier to correct markets than governments. This is especially the 
case for a global public good for which there is no global government to be held 
responsible. 
The different functions of market economies and governments may be further 
clarified by considering the meaning of ‘economics’. The eminent British economist 
Lionel Robbins (1935, 16, 24) defined economics as ‚the science which studies human 
behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses.‛ This definition is widely accepted. As it covers ends and means that may be 
private or public goods, it views economics as encompassing both market economics 
and the part of political science that studies the effectiveness of government in 
choosing public goods. Much of this part of political science is the research program 
of public choice. As public choice uses the methods of economics it may be described 
as the study of the behaviour of systems (governments) that facilitate the choice of 
public goods as ends, by using scarce means that have alternative uses and may be 
private or public goods. Market economics studies the behaviour of systems 
(markets) that facilitate the choice of private goods as ends, by using scarce means 
that have alternative uses and may be private or public goods. This delegation of 
functions between governments and markets gives the former the responsibility of 
choosing whether public goods may be consumed to produce private goods. As 
Robbins’ definition of economics makes it a study of choice, then economics does not 
cover that part of political science concerned with power, which tends to be the focus 
of mainstream political science as discussed in Chapter 1. As economics studies 
choice, it is very closely related to ethics, so it is not surprising that the father of 
modern economics, Adam Smith, was a professor of moral philosophy. Amartya Sen 
(1987) emphasizes that the helpfulness of economics depends on the validity of the 
system of ethics that it uses and on the thoroughness with which it is based on this 
system. 
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Two requirements for human welfare (and even survival) make it necessary that 
government has the power to implement its choices of public goods. One arises from 
the social nature of humans. People must live in groups, so certain public goods, 
such as trust, equality, security and sanitary conditions are necessary for them to 
function productively in these situations. The other requirement is that physical 
limits to material public goods such as natural capital and ecosystem services mean 
that if groups grow then many of these resources may either develop some scarcity 
or their scarcity may increase. This means that choices must be made about which of 
these public goods may be converted to private goods and also how scarce - in a per 
capita sense - they should be allowed to become even if they are not converted into 
private goods. These choices may influence, and also be influenced by, another 
collective choice: the future size of the group. Government neglect to make these 
choices is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Social choice by democratic government 
 
A process that appears fundamental to the performance of democratic 
government is that, in order for a group to make choices of public goods, the 
preferences of the members of the group for these goods must be combined in a way 
that is fair. As noted above, such a procedure, known as a social welfare function, 
must translate the individual choice orderings of members into one social ordering 
for that group. In 1951, Kenneth Arrow produced a theorem proving that no single 
function can perform this translation in a satisfactory way. This led to the 
‚conclusion that democracy is meaningless or that it can only be defended in the 
most minimalist terms, in that it merely ensures that governments can sometimes be 
removed‛ (McGann 2006, 9). Arrow specified six criteria as necessary to assure the 
fair representation of voters’ views in the result produced by a social welfare 
function. It is now recognized that the impossibility of such a function fulfilling all 
these criteria as it produces a social choice is of limited significance. This is because 
reliance on a social welfare function oversimplifies democratic social choice by 
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ignoring interpersonal comparisons of utility. It ignores the possibility that a good 
may be more important to some people than to others. If interpersonal comparisons 
are systematically incorporated into social choice then Arrow’s impossibility and 
other similar results are avoided (Sen 1999). One element of this process is to 
democratically construct the menu of political choices before people express their 
preferences for the choices that are then on offer. The menu construction involves the 
sorting out, or deliberation, of what the issue really is and then what the important 
and realistic options are, on that issue. Only after citizens do this are they in a 
position to state their personal preference orderings and use a social welfare function 
to produce a social choice. 
The democratic deliberation that produces the menu of choices requires public 
goods to be distinguished from private goods so that the former can be clearly 
recognized and weighed by citizens against each other and against competing 
private goods. However the distinctions between public and private goods may be 
obscure for citizens on many issues, so a great deal of disputation may occur before a 
widespread appreciation emerges that what was, for example, considered a private 
good or a bundle of these, actually includes important public goods. Slavery 
illustrates this problem. In Britain and America this issue generated much confusion, 
argument and strife over a very long time before a widespread appreciation 
developed that slaves as well as other citizens, should all have the same liberties and 
that these freedoms were public goods. The idea of human equality as a public good 
has now been extended widely in democratic societies (but not completely in many 
cases) across race, sexual orientation, gender, religion and opportunity. The 
provision of this public good requires the elimination of a private good: the personal 
freedom of a citizen to discriminate against others. 
If a public opinion that public goods are at stake develops as an issue, citizens in a 
democracy must then select a menu which covers the most important choices 
involving these goods. Elmer Schattschneider (1960) has emphasized that politics is 
primarily conflict, not choice, and that a central objective of the battle is to define the 
alternatives for choice, for whoever succeeds in this has the advantage. Such struggle 
tends to eventually resolve all political choices into a contest between two 
  32 
alternatives. This avoids Arrovian impossibilities because these do not arise when a 
social welfare function is applied to a menu of only two choices. Albert Weale (1992, 
215, 227), endorses such political contest instead of total reliance on a social welfare 
function, provided that the contest takes the form of public debate and deliberation. 
He observes that effective social choice should not be seen 
 
as a process of preference aggregation, in which there is a mapping from a set of 
individual orderings to a social ordering, but as a process of dialogue in which reasons are 
exchanged between participants in a process that is perceived to be a joint search for 
consensus< [This procedure would work] not with fixed preferences to be amalgamated, 
but with preferences that were altered or modified as competing reasons were advanced 
in the course of discussion< There are other values that we expect political institutions to 
satisfy apart from efficient preference amalgamation; for example, procedural fairness, 
lack of corruption and tolerable problem-solving capacity. 
 
As Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard (1994, 61) observe, mathematical procedures 
such as that employed by Arrow ‚should help to design voting systems to elect 
politicians, rather than to choose policies‛. 
With these requirements for social choice in mind, the consequences of five 
fundamental features of liberal democracies are now inspected, to see whether they 
inhibit effective social choice of public goods. These features are common elements 
of representative systems. They are: the regular holding of elections, the frequency 
with which these are held, eligibility of incumbents for re-election, universal 
franchise and equality of the vote. In liberal democracies, these elements of electoral 
structure function within a recognition that citizens are fundamentally free and 
equal. This includes equality before the law, protection of minorities, the right to 
private property and privacy; and freedom for speech, assembly, the media and the 
formation and operation of independent political parties. 
In the following three sections of this chapter it is proposed that these five 
elements of electoral structure tend to create dysfunction in liberal democratic 
government by producing significant confusion, conflict and ignorance. Three of the 
five elements produce some confusion about whether politicians or citizens are in 
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charge of government, which limits the incentive for either party to fully shoulder 
responsibilities for public goods. The same three elements also produce pervasive, 
intense competition between politicians, which further cripples the provision of 
public goods because it distracts politicians from being fully responsible for public 
goods. The other two elements of electoral structure compel politicians to follow 
constituencies in which informed public opinion is compromised with narrow or ill-
informed public opinion. Politicians therefore make social choices that reflect some 
ignorance. 
 
 
Ambiguous delegation 
 
It is proposed that democracies are seriously plagued by uncertainty about who is 
leading the polity and that this is caused by ambiguity in their system of delegation. 
The significance of this is fundamental. Any group of people will fail to look after its 
interests if its members are not allocated specific responsibilities for each of these 
interests or areas of interest. Such failure in delegation will allow members to neglect 
to provide some public goods for their group, while those they choose to provide 
may be over-provided or inappropriately prioritized and scheduled. The primary 
delegation that is essential for any group to avoid such problems is its appointment 
of leadership, for this can then delegate the other responsibilities and authorities for 
providing public goods. When a group acquires effective leadership it immediately 
gains another public good: it avoids damaging struggles for power. Because of its 
systemic influence on the welfare of the group, even minor ambiguity about who is 
delegated to lead will create deficits in public goods and if these are fundamental, 
such as cooperation and unity, the group itself may collapse. 
Uncertainty about leadership appears to produce failure by groups that was 
pointed out by Olson (1965), although he did not describe the cause in this way. He 
stated that large groups will not provide themselves with important public goods, 
even if every member of the group sees the need for these and how to obtain them, if 
there is no ‘selective incentive’ for each member to try to provide them. A selective 
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incentive is a personal reward, delivered only to those individuals who contribute to 
the provision. Such failure of large groups to provide public goods may be broadly 
ascribed to two causes. The first is that if members who act on their own, or even 
some who act together, are too few to provide such a good, then they will see little 
point in acting. In a large group this may prevent action because its size makes it 
difficult for members to communicate with each other, so they tend to remain 
isolated. But if they have selective incentives to act on their own, they will and the 
aggregate result of all or most members doing this may be enough to provide the 
public good. As discussed below, the communication problem in large groups may 
be overcome by strong leadership, enabling selective incentives to be delivered. In 
recent years the problem of communication has tended to be reduced by the rapid 
development of technology ( Lupia and Sin 2003). 
The second cause of members of large groups failing to produce public goods is 
that if one member does this she only gets the same benefit as every one else, but she 
has done all the work. Aware of this, she is tempted to wait for others to make the 
effort so that she can enjoy the good without having to contribute. Every member of 
a large group may do the same because the behaviour of each will hardly be noticed 
by the rest, so no public good is produced. The strong human trait of ‘sucker 
aversion’ may play a role here (Hibbing and Alford 2004; Orbell et al. 2004), as well 
as the temptation to free ride. There is considerable cross-disciplinary empirical 
evidence of a human predisposition to avoid ‚being played for a sucker‛ (Smith 
2006, 1015). Both sucker aversion and the inclination to free ride may be overridden 
by employing selective incentives for members to make a contribution. Strong 
leadership may provide these incentives, because as Olson (1965) observed, these 
may take the form of social sanctions and social rewards. Leadership may stimulate 
an intra-group awareness that makes it more likely that if a member free-rides, he 
will feel guilty about it or suffer the disdain of fellow members through being seen 
to ignore the leader’s call for contributions. Leadership may also prevent sucker 
aversion by indicating to each member that there is a probability that most will act 
together, so contributors will not be suckers. Strong leadership may therefore 
provide intra-group communication that assists large groups to feel and act like 
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small ones. If this is to solve the problem of collective action in large groups 
leadership must be powerful, but in democracies leadership is confused by the 
people having a large influence in choosing the policies of their group, as if they 
were its board of directors. If this collective leadership is to be strong enough to give 
selective incentives to the people it must be clearly seen by the people and they must 
see it as legitimate. For the people to recognize clearly that it is they who broadly 
direct government policy, they must not be thinking it is done by cabinets, prime 
ministers or presidents. And for citizens to see that their direction is legitimate, they 
must see that it is wise. 
As noted in the previous section, the function of the directors of liberal 
democracies may be split into three parts: (a) to recognize public goods that are, or 
may become, important; (b) to make good social choices of these goods; and (c) to 
implement these choices. In order to perform these functions, all modern 
democracies have elections in which the people appoint representatives to devise 
laws and policies that produce public goods. This is done because it is far too 
difficult for the people to do it themselves. This raises the issue of whether a 
representative is a trustee or a delegate. Trustees are trusted: they are given 
autonomy to deliberate and to act for the common good, as they see it. Delegates are 
not granted autonomy: they must reflect the wishes of their constituents. As Iris 
Marion Young points out, good representation requires both approaches, together 
with continuing communication between citizens and representatives. 
 
The representative’s responsibility is not simply to express a mandate, but to participate 
in discussion and debate with other representatives, listen to their questions, appeals, 
stories, and arguments, and with them try to arrive at wise and just decisions< The 
responsibility of the representative is not simply to tell citizens how she has enacted a 
mandate they authorized or served their interests, but as much to persuade them of the 
rightness of her judgement< Strong communicative democracy, however, also requires 
some processes and procedures where constituents call representatives to account over 
and above reauthorizing them [by means of re-election] (Young 2000, 131-132). 
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In order to see how this communication might be improved, the current incentives 
for both parties to communicate are briefly reviewed. 
Because representatives are selected by frequent elections and incumbents are 
usually eligible to run for re-election, democracies place new candidates and 
incumbents in a position where their primary incentive is usually to get elected or re-
elected. This differs to a significant degree from the incentive they need to execute 
the three tasks demanded by good government: those of recognizing, choosing and 
producing public goods. To the extent that electors appoint trustees, they transfer to 
the politicians they elect the responsibility and authority to execute these tasks. So 
electors may not think much about them. If their representatives act accordingly, as 
trustees, and think seriously about issues, they are likely to develop views that are 
more sagacious than those of most electors, who will then not appreciate the 
utterances and actions of representatives that reflect their dutifully developed 
sophistication. Such incomprehension by voters would make them hostile to trustee 
politicians, who would lose votes at the next election. Politicians will therefore 
allocate a lower priority to the three tasks of good government than to the task of 
performing as good delegates for electors. In this role they are concerned to show 
they are carrying out the wishes of electors and are reluctant to admit that this 
means they are not fully focused on the three tasks of government. Also, they are 
usually doing some of these tasks, if only because it may be consistent with acting as 
delegates. With their strong focus on re-election, politicians will be reluctant to ask 
the people to think more carefully about public policy when the people have largely 
given this task to them, as trustees. This reluctance is reinforced by the awareness of 
politicians that most citizens want leaders and politicians know that they appear to 
be in this position. They therefore have an incentive to pretend to lead: so they 
follow citizens by providing them with an appearance of the leadership they want. 
It might be expected that this confusion, of citizens wanting and thinking they 
have leaders while it is they themselves who direct government, might be 
compensated for by the expert knowledge and professional behaviour of public 
servants, but bureaucrats, even if they are fully benevolent toward the public 
interest, have limited freedom to act. If their expertise indicates a need for policy that 
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runs counter to strongly held mass public opinion, they will be tempted not to 
recommend that policy to their political masters. As upper echelon bureaucrats are 
selected by politicians, the bureaucracy wants to offer advice that politicians can 
implement without endangering their re-election. So bureaucrats are unable to 
influence very significant areas of policy and this allows the confusion about who 
directs the polity to make government negligent: nobody does a thorough job of 
recognizing, choosing and providing public goods. Parts of the task fall through a 
crack in the system that is here called ambiguity in the delegation of responsibility 
and authority. This crack is produced when the system of delegation makes 
candidates face elections, for this coerces them to present themselves as good 
delegates and trustees, which encourages pretence because citizens may not know 
enough about some public goods to realise what a good trustee may have to do. The 
crack is opened wider by the eligibility of incumbents for re-election and further 
again by the frequency of elections. A politician’s performance in the last few years 
of a term of office is likely to be influenced by the state of public opinion that he or 
she anticipates for the looming election. This influence on incumbents will cover 
more of their term if this is short. If incumbency is limited to one term only, or if 
representatives were elected for terms of say thirty years instead of six or less, the 
responsibility of elected politicians to act as trustees and fully attend to the three 
tasks of government would be clear. This would reduce their accountability to the 
electorate, but as discussed below in ‘Failure of accountability’, the system of 
accountability is defective so this is not as costly as it might seem. 
Because ambiguity in delegation not only produces some incompetence in 
democracies, but also as noted above, an element of deception by their politicians, 
electorally representative democracies arouse the distrust of electors. It appears that 
ambiguous delegation causes what Paul Whiteley (2004, 7) calls the ‚paradox of 
trust‛. This is the flouting of the classical Greek ‚elected principle‛ that citizens will 
trust representatives they can throw out more than those they cannot. According to 
this, citizens should trust people who are elected and the institutions they run, more 
than those that are not based on elections. However, some surveys in Britain have 
shown the opposite to be true, with low public trust in politicians and only modest 
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trust in government and the House of Commons, compared with high trust in the 
courts and the public service (Whiteley 2004, 7). Ambiguity in delegation indicates 
there is no paradox at all, for it is very likely to make those who delegate 
responsibility and authority suspicious of their delegates. 
Democracy is described above as being directed by citizens, whereas the 
conventional terms are popular control and popular rule. Referring to citizens as 
providing ‘direction’ and acting as ‘directors’ emphasizes that they determine 
strategic, or long term goals that will be realized many years or several generations 
into the future. As discussed below in ‘Ignorant directors’ and ‘Unconscious 
directors’, citizens provide this direction rather thoughtlessly, because it is done by 
politicians following the often unexamined attitudes and values of citizens. 
Examples of the failure in policy that this produces are given later: in this chapter 
under ‘Two backward mapping analyses of democratic failure’, in Chapter 4 under 
‘Three cases of externalization of responsibility by liberal democratic governments’ 
and also in Chapter 5. With citizens directing, politicians are left with middle level 
management: choosing ways and means of moving in the directions given by 
citizens. So politicians are essentially restricted to ‘tactical’ policy that goes several 
years into the future, together with short term ‘operational’ policy that covers the 
next year or two. 
Many scholars interpret democratic delegation somewhat differently from the 
way it is presented above. Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 79) describe their approach 
by stating that the people, as democratic ‘principals’, employ elections to delegate 
their authority to ‘agents’ (representatives) and that this delegation succeeds (or 
fails) when an agent’s actions improve (or reduce) a principal’s welfare. However, 
the interpretation presented here is that principals attempt, by means of regular 
elections, to delegate to agents the responsibility to make decisions on the provision 
of public goods, together with the authority to execute this responsibility. On this 
interpretation, delegation succeeds (or fails) when the agent executes (or fails to 
execute) the responsibility that was delegated. This approach means that clear 
specification of responsibility is necessary if the success of its delegation is to be 
judged. The approach used by Lupia and McCubbins focuses on the need for 
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principals to be able to make sure that agents act for their welfare, so the 
‚democratic dilemma‛ that they see is the difficulty for principals to do this when 
they have limited information about the intentions and performance of agents. 
However this problem is not as fundamental as the need to clearly specify the 
responsibility that is delegated. Lack of clarity about this not only makes the 
delegation fail to the extent that the agent does not know which specific 
responsibility to execute, but the lack of this specification deprives the principals of 
criteria for them to judge whether their agents are performing successfully. 
Lack of clarity in delegation occurs in two ways when frequent elections are 
employed to delegate responsibility and authority. One is an uncertainty about 
whether any delegation has really been achieved, because the prospect of the 
principals exercising authority (and responsibility) at the next election means they 
exert much authority (and responsibility) between elections. The other vagueness is 
that if responsibility and authority are regarded as being successfully transferred to 
agents, but the area of this responsibility and authority is not well specified, it is then 
uncertain what types of public goods the agents are to attend to and whether the 
principals retain responsibility for some types. As discussed below in ‘Citizens as 
directors’, the attitudes and values of citizens have a pervasive influence on public 
policy in democracies, so it appears that in these polities the principals retain a 
significant area of responsibility and authority over this policy. This retention sets 
limits to the area of policy in which politicians may exercise responsibility and 
authority. As noted above, when democratic agents are elected, what appears to be 
accomplished is that their principals have delegated responsibility and authority for 
operational and tactical policy and retained much of the responsibility and authority 
for strategic policy. As strategic policy establishes limits for, and otherwise guides, 
tactical and operation policy, elections fail to delegate to agents a very significant 
part of the responsibility and authority for public policy. The lack of public 
specificity of what has not been delegated produces much of its ambiguity. The 
strong influence of ambiguity in delegation is illustrated by the failures in strategic 
policy noted above as being discussed later in this chapter and also in Chapters 4 
and 5. The confusion about who directs in a democracy, which is caused by 
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ambiguity in delegation, is now investigated in some detail, by looking at who the 
real directors are, how well informed they are, what their state of knowledge does to 
the directions they produce, how aware they are of their role, what their competence 
does to democratic accountability and whether ambiguity in delegation is a 
constructive definition of a significant problem. 
 
 
Citizens as directors 
 
Although the ambiguity of democratic delegation means that neither citizens nor 
politicians perceive a clear responsibility to direct government policy, many 
observers in the US conclude, in effect, that citizens are the directors, because a 
‚defining feature of democracy is government responsiveness to citizens’ 
preferences‛ (Druckman 2006, 405). Michael Xenos (2005, 164) observes: ‚Politicians 
and candidates are remarkably responsive to public sentiment< *because citizens 
who are] politically uninformed and apathetic< nonetheless occasionally engage in 
the active disciplining of representatives through electoral rewards and 
punishments‛. Paul Burstein (2003, 29) states that ‚public opinion influences policy 
most of the time, often strongly. Responsiveness appears to increase with salience, 
and public opinion matters even in the face of activities by interest organizations, 
political parties, and political and economic elites.‛ James Druckman (2006, 406, 408) 
notes that 
 
presidents will make appeals for policies when the public already supports the president’s 
position< particularly on domestic issues< [T]he bottom line is that public opinion 
affects the direction of policy< the president does not manipulate public preferences by 
going public; rather he highlights certain issues, making them salient, and as a result, 
public opinion subsequently has an impact on these issues (because Congress follows this 
opinion on these issues).  
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James Stimson has investigated the political influence of citizens in Tides of 
Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics. His assessment is summarized 
by Mark Brewer (2005, 632): 
 
The bottom line of this book is that public opinion, specifically, public opinion change, is 
the most important factor in American politics. Political conflicts and strategies are 
dictated in good measure by its shapes and contours. Political elites (at least astute ones) 
are attentive of it and responsive to it. Policy formation is dependent on it, and policy 
outputs are ultimately reflective of it. In short, Stimson argues that public opinion drives 
American politics, and that political change is the result of shifts in public opinion. 
For Stimson, not all opinion change is the same. Sometimes, opinion change is fast and 
responsive, such as the spikes in presidential approval immediately after a national crisis 
or the fluctuations in presidential horserace polls during election campaigns. Other 
change is so slow as to be almost glacial or tidal in pace (hence, the "tides" of the title) and 
occurs in such small increments that it is almost always overlooked as it is occurring. In 
other instances, opinion change falls somewhere between these two types. Each type is 
important here. 
  
These observations identify the public as the board of directors in democracies, 
which of course is what elections and their frequency (relative to the human life-
span) are intended to ensure. Ilya Somin (2000, 147, 153) notes that although some 
researchers find that public opinion is followed much less slavishly than the views 
expressed above, ‚the case studies they themselves rely on show that public opinion 
constrains policy makers more than they claim.‛ He concludes that ‚flouting centrist 
public opinion poses severe risks for politicians< [raising] the danger that close 
adherence to ill-informed public opinion might lead to disastrous, internally 
contradictory policies.‛ 
Some of the differences among scholars on the political influence of public 
opinion may arise because the influence of public opinion on issues of strong interest 
to most citizens is greater than that on issues that are peripheral to the personal 
concerns of the majority. However, as Burstein (2003, 29) has observed, claims that 
political responsiveness ‚varies across issues rest on very little evidence.‛ He 
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therefore advocates ‚developing indexes of general public opinion across a very 
wide range of issues‛, noting that ‚serious work on this problem has barely begun‛ 
(Burstein 2003, 38). The conclusion to be drawn is that public opinion is very 
influential in liberal democracies. Politicians tend to conform to this directorship by 
restricting their ‘leadership’ to actions that do not clash with the values and strongly 
held opinions of the public. 
Somewhat counter intuitively, more evidence of directorship by the people 
appears to be provided by Graham Smith (2009 17, 18, emphasis in original). 
 
Evidence from consultation exercises suggests that the deep scepticism expressed by 
citizens about their capacity to affect the decision-making process is often justified< Janet 
Newman and her colleagues argue there is often an orientation towards ‘enabling the 
public to operate within the norms set by the bureaucracy... a process of possible 
incorporation of the lay public into official institutions’< While public policy may praise 
the virtues of participation (and may even make it a statutory requirement), evidence 
suggests that organisational and professional resistance to participation is often an 
obstacle for successful engagement< It is not unusual to find the belief amongst agency 
officials that citizen involvement is not suitable for strategic level decisions‛. 
 
If directorship by the people is taking place largely unconsciously, or at least 
unreflectively, through the electoral process as would be expected from ambiguous 
delegation, then when public authorities ask for input from citizens on specific 
projects or policy areas, these authorities will be constrained by the broad 
directorship of the mass public to ignore any contrary recommendations from such 
consultations because the power of these is too limited, either because the 
consultation is made by a subsection of the mass public, or because it is restricted to 
policy areas that are subservient to those controlled by the directorship of the mass 
public, or because both factors operate together. What agency officials regard as 
strategic policy may in fact be tactical policy, for much strategic policy is set by the 
prevailing attitudes and assumptions of citizens. Politicians usually must accept this 
strategic policy: both they and their bureaucrats may not be aware of it or see much 
of it as axiomatic rather than as strategic policy that they choose. 
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Ignorant directors 
 
Directorship by citizens is perversely strengthened by their well documented 
reluctance to deliberate policy and to participate in politics (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002). Because most citizens pay little attention to public policy it is very 
difficult for politicians to lead by attempting to develop or change the views of 
citizens on policy. The people are thereby left in charge, because politicians are 
responsive to their opinions. Stephen Bennett (2006, 120), has described this general 
disinterest in policy and politics in emphatic terms: ‚Low levels of political 
information among the mass public have been observed again and again.‛ Jeffrey 
Friedman describes this as ‚one of the strongest findings that have been produced 
by any social science – possibly the strongest‛ (cited in Bennett 2006, 120). In 1964, 
Philip E. Converse made the first attempt to statistically describe the competence of 
citizens to offer sensible advice on affairs of state with his paper ‚The Nature of 
Belief Systems in Mass Publics‛. Bennett (2006, 105) notes that this research served 
‚to overwhelmingly confirm the worst fears of< democratic skeptics‛. Somin (2006, 
255) notes that these observations remain valid: ‚More than 40 years after the 
pioneering work of Philip Converse, political ignorance remains as widespread as 
ever.‛ Many others agree (Hardin 2006; Kinder 2006 and Zaller 1992). Friedman 
assesses the current significance of the work done by Converse and his colleagues at 
the University of Michigan in the following terms. 
 
Subsequent research, inspired by the work of the Michigan school has amply borne out its 
‚bleak‛ findings. Whether the question is what the government does, what it is 
Constitutionally authorized to do, what new policies are being proposed, or what reasons 
are being offered for them, most people have no idea how to answer accurately<  
Most of this scholarship establishes that the public lacks the most elementary political 
information. It is paradoxical, then, that nothing more dramatically brought public 
ignorance home to public opinion scholars than Converse’s paper, which focused on the 
public’s ignorance of relatively esoteric knowledge: knowledge of political ideology< 
  44 
The chief prescriptive implication is, I believe, that the will of the people is so woefully 
uninformed that one might wonder about the propriety of enacting that will into law 
(Friedman 2006, iv, v). 
 
Larry Bartels (1996, 194) has observed that the ‚political ignorance of the 
American voter is one of the best documented features of contemporary politics, but 
the political significance of this is far from clear.‛ Voter competence depends not 
only on their levels of information but on how they use the information they have. 
Analysts have suggested that a mass public of fairly uninformed citizens could act as 
it they were well-informed through two processes. One is that the statistical 
aggregation of their choices may cause the uninformed votes to cancel each other - if 
the uninformed error is random - so that informed votes decide the issue. The other 
is that uninformed voters use heuristics (cues or information shortcuts) as labour 
saving devices to guide their vote. Merely by observing the opinions of like-minded 
citizens or groups, a citizen can vote the way she would if she were fully informed. 
Empirical studies (Lupia 1994; Bartels 1996) have shown that in some cases, voters 
can use heuristics as substitutes for being well informed while in others, neither 
heuristics nor cancelling ignorance by the aggregation of votes can compensate for 
voter ignorance. 
 
The right question to ask is not whether heuristics always (or never) yield competent 
decisions, because we know the answer is no. The right question to ask is about the 
conditions under which use of particular proxies is necessary or sufficient for competent 
voting (Lupia 2006, 229). 
 
Heuristics may fail when elites do not understand an issue well (Lupia and 
Johnston 2001, 203), perhaps because of partisan bias, or insufficient public debate 
and deliberation, or a lack of information. Bias or lack of debate may mean there has 
been inadequate demand for information, so more investigation is needed as well as 
subsequent public discourse to process the information it produces. Where 
politicians are the elites or proxies, citizen ignorance may constrain them to have 
partisan attitudes and limited understandings of issues in order to attract votes. An 
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illustration of how this has distorted and constrained public debate on the desirable 
size of population for Australia is given in Chapter 4/ Three cases of 
externalization</ ‘Size of population’. The importance of good information has been 
noted by Doris Graber (2006, 176): 
 
Decision quality is very much constrained by the information available to decision makers 
at the mass as well as at the elite level. When that information is incomplete or wrong, it 
may be very difficult for mass publics and even elites to detect the inaccuracies and 
discover the truth< *for example,] the question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 
 
In addition to the issue of optimum size of population, three others that are 
difficult for both elites and citizens to debate are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
These are global warming, unemployment and wants for scarce natural capital. 
Elites and citizens may not clearly recognize these issues and if they do they may not 
understand them well enough to make good choices of the public goods involved. 
Six causes of such ignorance by citizens are now suggested. These are all ways in 
which public goods tend to be ignored in favour of private goods, so that as they 
compete for the resources to provide them, public goods are neglected and private 
goods produced. Three of these biases are fairly stable over time, but the other three 
tend to be exacerbated by positive feedback. Chapter 4 adds to this understanding of 
the causes of ignorance of public goods by describing how some characteristics of 
the issues concerning them make it difficult for citizens to recognize these issues and 
think about them. The result is a chronic public ignorance of many issues that 
constrains politicians to undersupply some crucial public goods. 
 
Fairly stable causes of citizen ignorance of public goods 
 
The relative ease, urgency and effectiveness of the choice of private goods 
In a democracy, the choice of a private good is much easier than the choice of a 
public good because the latter requires social choice while the former only needs the 
decision of one person or entity, that is, individual choice. The non-excludability of 
public goods requires the members of a democracy to discuss each public issue to try 
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to understand what private and public goods are competing, to decide what 
tradeoffs they want between these goods and then to aggregate their preferences in 
some way. In contrast, the individual choice of private goods is merely the choice of 
a person or an entity to either do-it-yourself, or purchase, or not. Purchasing is 
facilitated by the market, as its ‘invisible hand’ automatically elicits supplies and 
computes prices. This process also gives an impression that private goods have a 
very definite value - their price - but price actually registers exchange power rather 
than value. In contrast, those public goods that have to be purchased are not priced 
directly to consumers because they are non-excludable, so their value appears vague 
and thereby perhaps inconsequential. Moreover, many public goods are not priced 
as they are freely available to all from nature or society, so their value and even their 
existence tend to be overlooked. The urgency of looking after oneself with many 
excludable goods such as food, shelter, clothing, entertainment, recreation and 
medical care adds to the attraction of individual choice. In addition to these 
seductions of private goods and the individual choice that secures them, people are 
decisive in individual choice, whereas in social choice they know they are non-
decisive, being merely one of thousands or millions of people voting together to 
choose or reject a non-excludable good (Brennan and Lomasky 1989, 49-50). As 
Anthony Downs (1957) noted, it is therefore rational for the voter to remain ignorant 
of issues concerning public goods. In these ways, the comparative ease, urgency and 
effectiveness of the individual choice of private goods encourage people to focus on 
choosing these instead of public goods. This tendency is generated by attractions 
created by the excludability of private goods. It is permitted because citizens are 
encouraged by the first primary democratic dysfunction - confusion about who 
directs government - to neglect their democratic responsibility to carefully consider 
and choose fundamental public goods. 
 
Citizens’ fear of being suckered by free-riders 
The strength of sucker aversion in the human psyche was noted above. This 
predisposition can have a powerful effect on the provision of public goods because 
their non-excludability may lead some people to consider that because this makes 
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them vulnerable to free riding, private goods must be preferable. They may think 
that the ‚higher the proportion of resources that are allocated in a market way, 
where there’s no escape from paying for what you get and getting what you pay for, 
the more just and efficient the economy is likely to be‛ (Stretton and Orchard 1994, 
55-56). This motivation for overvaluing private goods is also facilitated by confusion 
about directorship, for this allows citizens to neglect their responsibility to carefully 
consider needs for public goods. 
 
Citizens’ fear of being suckered by government incompetence 
Any observation by citizens of incompetence by democratic government will 
teach them to have little confidence in its ability to deliver. They may then see the 
market as more reliable and so focus more on securing private goods. This attitude 
will further erode the competence of democratic government and may make it a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Again, confusion about who directs government gives citizens 
the freedom to take this attitude. 
Whether Americans’ experience of bungling has produced scepticism of the 
capacity of government to produce public goods or whether other factors cause it, 
this source of bias towards private goods is strikingly influential in the United States. 
American economics journalist Robert Kuttner (2008, 75) describes it as an 
‚undertow‛ on US government. ‚Regulation is still widely considered a pejorative 
word. Obama< must hose away a prevailing ideology in which large government 
endeavours are deemed to be outmoded by modern markets‛. Kuttner (2008, 75-76) 
notes several popular American expressions of this ideology: ‚Government is 
generally perverse or incompetent< Tax cuts are one of the few benefits that 
governments can reliably deliver< Private markets invariably work better than 
government< [and] Democrats need to talk more like Republicans‛. Within the last 
four decades, three presidents have expressed this mindset: Jimmy Carter - 
‚Government cannot solve our problems, it can’t set our goals, it cannot define our 
vision‛; Bill Clinton - ‚We know big government does not have all the answers<. 
The era of big government is over‛; and Ronald Reagan - ‚In this present crisis, 
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government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem‛ (Kuttner 
2008, 87-88). 
Reluctance to correct financial markets is another rejection by US citizens of 
solutions from government. Joseph Stiglitz (2009, 46) assesses that ‚confidence in 
financial markets will not be restored unless governments take a stronger role in 
regulating financial institutions< Even former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, the 
high priest of deregulation, admits he went too far.‛ Amartya Sen has given similar 
advice (2009). At George Mason University on 8 January, 2009, President-elect 
Barack Obama appeared to see that the pervasiveness of the ‚undertow‛ required a 
statement of the obvious: ‚Only government can break the cycle[s] that are crippling 
our economy‛ (FederalNewsService 2009). 
 
Relatively dynamic causes of citizen ignorance of public goods 
 
Distraction by status rivalry 
Economist Eban Goodstein (2005, 218-219) has observed that ‚when relative 
consumption becomes important< people tend to overvalue increases in private 
consumption (given the negative externalities imposed on others), and undervalue 
noncompetitive public goods‛. Some of the externalities he refers to are the costs of 
status rivalry. Richard Layard (2005, 7, 44) has described this rivalry in the following 
way: ‚Our wants are not given< We are heavily driven by the desire to keep up 
with other people. This leads to a status race, which is self-defeating since if I do 
better, someone else must do worse.‛ Doing better provokes retaliation, counter 
response and more retaliation, so status rivalry may escalate personal consumption 
indefinitely through positive feedback. 
Status rivalry becomes widespread in society when people become well provided 
in basic needs such as shelter, food, security and companionship. They can then 
afford to focus more on comparing their private goods with those of their 
neighbours and their ‚relative consumption becomes important‛. Citizens in 
democracies are assisted to overlook the public costs of such positional competition 
by confusion about who takes care of public goods. As citizens expect their 
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politicians to do this they tend not to notice when they themselves are damaging 
public goods with their rivalry. So the choice of private goods takes priority and 
some public goods suffer. 
 
Distraction by adaptation 
Another overvaluation of private goods arises from a common failure by people 
to anticipate a second psychological response: that their satisfaction with private 
goods also depends on how well they are doing relative to what they are used to 
(Layard 2005, 42, 48). This is known as adaptation or habituation. It operates 
vigorously on some things, but not on others such as the pleasures of friendship and 
sex, and the miseries of unpredictable loud noises, widowhood and caring for 
someone with Alzheimer’s disease. Layard (2005, 49) observes that the ‚things we 
get used to most easily and most take for granted are our material possessions‛. 
Adaptation therefore escalates our desires for private rather than public goods. One 
expression of adaptation is that the level of income that people feel they require is 
usually not much below what they currently have. For example, over the period 1952 
to 1987, the income that US citizens considered they required increased by 70% of 
their increase in real income (Layard 2005, 42-3). Another expression is given by 
survey results showing that if one’s real income rises by a dollar then after a while 
one’s required income has risen by at least 40 cents (Layard 2005, 49). As with status 
rivalry, adaptation tends to re-establish wants after an increase in supply of private 
goods, which produces a tendency for positive feedback in the valuing of private 
goods and a corresponding escalation in the neglect of public goods. This feedback is 
also encouraged by confusion about who directs public policy as citizens are left free 
to ignore the impacts of their adaptation on the provision of public goods. 
 
Distraction by advertising 
Half a century ago John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) pointed to sales promotion as 
another cause of neglect of public goods, which he called a ‚problem of social 
balance‛. He criticized a lack of  
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satisfactory relationship between the supply of privately produced goods and services 
and those of the state< The problem of social balance is ubiquitous, and frequently it is 
obtrusive‛< *Every+ corner of the public psyche is canvassed by some of the nation’s 
most talented citizens to see if the desire for some merchantable product can be cultivated. 
No similar process operates on behalf of the non-merchantable services of the state 
(Galbraith 1958, 198, 202-203). 
 
 ‚Social balance‛ is a straightforward concept for comparing private purchases 
with those ‚non-merchantable services of the state‛ that are paid for by taxes, such 
as law enforcement, defence and the construction and maintenance of roads and 
bridges,. However, the advertising of private goods is also likely to make many 
citizens neglect or undervalue public goods that are not funded, but which are also 
in competition with private goods because the production of both depends on the 
same resources. Natural capital is such a resource, for example biodiversity, 
wilderness, natural scenery, a stable climate and clean air, seas, rivers and lakes. 
When such resources are increasingly used to produce private goods they become 
scarcer and may thereby acquire prices. These prices rise with further increases in 
scarcities that are caused by increases in rates of use, or by depletion, or by both 
combined. 
Galbraith’s ‚problem of social balance‛ is an under provision of public goods in 
which the advertising industry focuses citizens on private goods, compelling 
democratic government to do the same. The advertising industry is permitted to 
distort government in this way because the first primary dysfunction, confusion 
about directorship, leaves citizens feeling free of obligations to carefully focus on 
public goods. 
In common with status rivalry and adaptation, advertising tends to escalate wants 
for private goods through positive feedback. By increasing sales, advertising 
provides more funds for more advertising to further increase sales and so on. 
Galbraith (1958, 124) called this feedback the ‚dependence effect‛ a cycle in which 
‚wants are increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied‛. Sales 
promotion works by encouraging status rivalry and adaptation, so the three 
mechanisms form a feedback complex in which two positive feedbacks, status 
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rivalry and adaptation, are boosted by sales promotion, which may boost itself 
through positive feedback. 
These six incentives for citizens to neglect public goods all work by making 
private goods appear more attractive. As is noted for each incentive, citizens allow 
themselves to be swayed by them because they are confused about their role of 
directing democratic government. This is now examined more closely. 
 
 
Unconscious directors 
 
The ambiguity of delegation produced by frequent elections leaves citizens partly, 
even largely unaware of their position as directors of government. As we have seen, 
this leaves them feeling free to want private goods, often with little sense that they 
should consider compromising these desires to allow the production or protection of 
public goods. Politicians are pressured by these private wants to make social choices 
that tend to be aggregations of choices of private goods rather than aggregations of 
choices of public goods. Over time, some public goods such as the environment will 
be progressively destroyed to provide the resources for private goods. In trying to 
correct this problem it should help if we can understand whether the lack of 
consciousness by citizens of their role as directors is deep and whether there are 
factors that contribute to it in addition to ambiguity of delegation. We may then 
better judge the urgency of altering circumstances and how this should be done, to 
make citizens more aware and responsible as directors of their government. It is 
suggested that five causes may produce this unconsciousness. 
The first is that the delegation of authority and responsibility from citizens to 
politicians by means of elections is a very public, formal act in which most people 
are involved, so they tend to assume it does this and that the delegation is completed 
until the next election is held. Democratic systems that hold popular elections of 
presidents are likely to add to this cause of unconsciousness. 
The second cause of citizens being unconscious of their directorship is that they 
may see a strong need for this to be transferred from them to delegates. Citizens 
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generally recognize that they do not have the time, expertise, institutions, facilities, 
interest and incentives for them to competently identify and choose public goods. As 
citizens can see the need for delegating this work they will welcome delegation and 
may thereby overlook that it still leaves much of the job with them. 
The third cause is that politicians give the appearance that it is they who direct 
public policy. They do this mainly by making and implementing many decisions. 
However, as they have to face elections frequently, their decisions tend to be within 
the boundaries of the opinion of the general public - or if they exceed these, then 
they tend to be within the bounds of the opinion of their constituency - or if they 
exceed these limits on particular issues, then politicians attempt to counter the 
electoral cost with policies on other issues that satisfy more urgent desires of their 
constituency. This appearance of leadership by politicians is reinforced when they 
are called ‘leaders’ by the people, by journalists and by politicians themselves. It 
would be more helpful if representatives in democracies were never referred to as 
leaders, for they largely follow the electorate. A large part of the reason why this 
mistake is so persistently made is given by the fourth cause of citizens’ 
unconsciousness of their directorship. 
The fourth cause has a similarity with the second: it is another case of citizens 
wanting to imagine that politicians are leading. However the origin of this want is 
different in this case. It arises not in the practical need for specialists to handle a 
complex job, but in human nature. It appears to be a genetic predisposition to have a 
leader for one’s group. It can therefore be pervasive and powerful, so it is discussed 
here at some length. 
Primate ethologist Frans de Waal (2005, 232), has described humans as ‚Janus-
headed‛: we are egalitarian, but with a desire to control and dominate. This means 
that we ‚often permit certain men to act as first among equals. The keyword here is 
‘permit’, because the whole group will guard against abuses‛ (de Waal 2005, 78-9). 
De Waal (2005, 232-3) also describes this nature as a ‚bipolar‛ balance of egalitarian 
and hierarchical dispositions which makes people both dependent on, and sensitive 
to, hierarchies. The dependency arises from the need for harmony, which requires 
stability, which depends on a well-acknowledged social order. This requirement 
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produces the paradox ‚that although positions within a hierarchy are born from 
contest, the hierarchical structure itself, once established, eliminates the need for 
further conflict‛ (de Waal 2005, 64). Our need for a well-acknowledged social order 
means that we ‚crave hierarchical transparency‛ (de Waal 2005, 64). This 
interpretation means that we not only ‘permit’ a dominant individual to lead, but we 
have an instinctive desire for leaders who are strong, reliable and good for the 
group. These observations fit with the ideas of social psychologists Stephen Reicher, 
Alexander Haslam and Michael Platow (2007, 24), who observe that leadership is 
‚the ability to shape what followers actually want to do‛ (their emphasis), making it 
partly a bottom-up process. This is a democratic citizen’s view of what leadership 
should be, so democracy appears congruent with the innate human need to have a 
leader, but only one who gives priority to the interests of the group. This makes the 
group the real leader, while the ostensible ‘leader’ is a symbol of this. The need to 
have a symbolic leader is very powerful because part of each person’s sense of self is 
their ‚social identity‛ as defined by their group, which is in turn partly defined by 
strong leadership (Reicher et al 2007, 25). So the ‚wise leader is not simply attuned to 
making identities real but also helps followers experience identities as real‛ (Reicher 
et al 2007, 29). The best leaders are therefore prototypical of the group, exemplifying 
‚what makes the group distinct from and superior to rival groups‛ (Reicher et al 
2007, 26). 
The idea that most people in groups instinctively and strongly want a leader is 
supported by models based on evolutionary psychology. Humans are social animals 
and fall into the zoological category of ‚obligatorily gregarious‛ (de Waal 2005, 231). 
We have an innate desire to form groups and to join groups, a survival strategy that 
we have had for millions of years, perhaps even before we became a separate species 
from the ape that evolved into the orang-utan, which is not particularly gregarious. 
Evolutionary psychology indicates that the pressures of this group life acted on our 
ancestors to select predispositions for individuals to adopt social roles, such as 
leading, or following a dominant individual who leads in the interests of the group 
(Alford and Hibbing 2004; Barkow et al. 1992; Dugatkin et al 2003; Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003; Keltner and Haidt 2003; Smith et al 2007; van Vugt et al 2008). 
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Psychologists Mark van Vugt, Robert Hogan and Robert Kaiser (2008, 186) suggest 
that human ‚populations contain individuals with genotypes predisposing them to 
either leadership or followership‛. The latter will be the more prevalent in any 
population because any ‚increase in the frequency of leader genotypes reduces the 
payoffs for this strategy – because many would-be leaders compete and fail to 
coordinate – thus selecting against leader genotypes‛ (van Vugt et al 2008, 186). On 
this reasoning, most members of a group will have a predisposition to want a leader. 
Van Vugt and his colleagues (2008, 187-88) argue that this predisposition evolved 
over 2.5 million years of Pleistocene hunter-gatherer life in small groups of 50-150 
individuals, creating an innate preference for reversed dominance hierarchy. This is 
a democratic style in which leadership is desired but is evaluated by group members 
‚against egalitarian ‘hunter-gatherer’ standards such as fairness, integrity, 
competence, good judgment, generosity, humility, and concern for others‛ (van Vugt 
et al 2008, 188). In the small groups typical of the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation (EEA) (Thornhill 1997), intra-group communication was easy and 
effective, allowing members to make these evaluations in order to approve a suitable 
leader. The difficulty of intra-group communication in large groups means that such 
evaluations in these circumstances will tend to be superficial, so predispositions to 
lead and follow may be expressed with poor collective judgement. The physical 
activation of the predisposition to follow has been observed by Uffe Schjoedt (2010) 
and colleagues with functional magnetic resonance imaging. When a person listens 
to someone they regard as authoritative and trustworthy, they shut down parts of 
their prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices. These sections of the brain play key 
roles in vigilance and scepticism when judging the importance and truth of what 
others say and their deactivation motivates the person to follow a leader. Subjects 
who do not regard the speaker as being charismatic do not have this response. 
Although these tests were done using religious authority figures, Schjoedt speculates 
that the deactivation should also be stimulated by listening to people such as 
doctors, parents and politicians. 
Van Vugt and his colleagues (2008) suggest that in the current world, 
predispositions to lead and follow make leader-follower patterns emerge more 
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quickly in circumstances resembling adaptive problems of the EEA, such as internal 
group conflict and external threats such as natural disasters or attacks on the group. 
In such emergencies, followers will readily defer to the decisions of a single 
individual because in these situations the interests of leaders and followers 
converge. Natural selection in the EEA appears to have produced predispositions for 
followers to prefer different leaders depending on the problem they face, for 
example US voters tend to choose hawkish presidents when threatened by war and 
‚show an increased preference for charismatic leaders and a decreased preference 
for participative leaders when reminded of their own mortality‛ (van Vugt et al 
2008, 189). As van Vugt and his colleagues (2008, 191) express it, leadership ‚in the 
ancestral environment was fluid, distributional and situational.‛  
When decisive leadership is especially important for a democracy and citizens 
lack institutions to help them perform this role, the fluidity of their need for a leader 
will rise to the occasion. This may be happening in Russia. The confusion, stress and 
corruption of attempting to replace communism with democracy and capitalism 
appears to have made Vladimir Putin and his autocratic administration popular with 
many Russians. As Ellen Carnaghan (2007, 64) observes,  
 
emerging democracies are vulnerable, not because unprepared citizens do not like 
democracy as they understand it, but because many average citizens do not understand 
the intricacies of democratic practice well enough< The fate of democracy in Russia 
remains vulnerable, then, in part as the result of actions by people in power who do not 
seem to value democratic institutions, but also because citizens may not sufficiently 
appreciate the opportunities that democracy provides to protect the future they want. 
 
In democracies in which citizens directly elect their head of government, their 
unconsciousness of their position of directorship may be especially deep because the 
first reason for citizens to be unconscious of their role of leadership may synergize 
with the fourth. The direct and highly ritualized selection of a supreme leader 
thoroughly satisfies citizens’ predisposition to be led, encouraging them to abdicate 
their democratic responsibility to rule. Historian Dana Nelson (2008) describes this 
effect in Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People. She 
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asks Americans to imagine an alternative: a system that is more democratic because 
the people direct the legislature and the executive by doing it consciously. Not only 
may the ambiguity of delegation be greater in presidential democracies than in other 
types, but the huge amount of money required for presidential campaigns helps the 
wealthy to influence the president, making government even less democratic. Barack 
Obama’s campaign showed that the internet may be used to counter this effect, but 
such facilitation of small donations to presidential contests brings millions of 
ordinary citizens into more intimate contact with that process, so it may strengthen 
ambiguity of delegation by reinforcing the prospect that a new president will relieve 
citizens of their responsibility to govern themselves. Parliamentary systems in which 
the head of government is chosen by politicians may allow the people more freedom 
to see that it is they who must govern, for this head is merely a representative of 
their representatives. 
Presidential campaigns can be emotionally engaging, drawing many citizens into 
politics with great enthusiasm. But this participation is strikingly focused on the 
emotional appeal of personalities, so the pros and cons of issues are neglected and 
public deliberation is minimal. When a new president is elected, the opinions and 
attitudes of the people are likely to be little more developed than before and the new 
‘leader’ must then basically follow these or be replaced a few years later by one who 
does. 
A fifth cause of citizen unconsciousness of their directorship may be that many of 
them consider it is not them, nor politicians, but special interests who occupy this 
position. Some of these have huge financial resources or large memberships or other 
forms of power that they use to deliver votes or other favours to those politicians 
who produce policies, laws and programs in return. The scale of the lobbying 
industry is obvious evidence of the power of special interests. 
To summarize then, there may be five ways in which citizens of liberal 
democracies are kept unconscious of their responsibilities as directors: 1, politicians 
appear to be appointed to this position; 2, citizens want politicians to direct because 
they do not have the time or resources to do it; 3, politicians often appear to direct 
public policy; 4, citizens want politicians to direct them as most are genetically 
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predisposed to follow a leader; and 5, special interests appear to dictate policy to 
politicians. 
If democracies are to function effectively, this unconsciousness must be dispelled, 
for as long as we have regular elections, electors are the ultimate authority. Citizens 
determine the strategic goals for society, while politicians choose the relative details 
of tactical and operational policy. It is essential that both parties clearly recognize 
this, for it is only then that each can try to do a good job. 
 
 
Failure of accountability 
 
As we have seen, the political ignorance of citizens means that their directorship 
of a democracy will, to some extent, make it irresponsible. Another way of 
describing this is that the accountability provided by elections, of politicians to 
citizens, is faulty because citizens are too ignorant and politically inactive to use it 
wisely. Over time, this irresponsibility may register in some way with many citizens, 
despite their political ignorance, for each will be affected by deficiencies in public 
goods. The legitimacy of government could then suffer, so that when it does manage 
to produce good policy it cannot muster the political will to implement it, which is 
likely to further damage its legitimacy as adverse consequences ensue.  
Unconscious directorship by citizens will also damage the legitimacy of 
government. When citizens tend not to fully realize that they perform this role, when 
they lack institutions to help them direct and when they also expect to be led, they 
are open to others taking advantage of their power as directors. The stage is set for 
the manipulation of public policy by special interests. Public perception that this is 
happening then damages the legitimacy of politicians and government, so that 
citizens become further disengaged. This may feedback to escalate illegitimacy. 
Talented, public minded, principled citizens may be discouraged from trying to 
improve their country’s policies by becoming well-informed electors, or by offering 
themselves as political candidates, or by working constructively as bureaucrats. Such 
alienation may at times flare into the outrage and protest of civil disobedience. 
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Unconscious directorship by citizens means that even in public goods issues 
where special interests are not motivated to prevail, the result may still be 
dysfunctional, for policy is likely to express the concerns of citizens who, through 
‘rational ignorance’ (Downs 1957) and because they have delegated policy work to 
politicians, are focused on private goods. It seems likely that such malfunction was 
observed by Richard Clarke (2004, 238-9), who was National Security Coordinator 
for US presidents Clinton and G.W.Bush. ‚America, alas, seems only to respond well 
to disasters, to be undistracted by warnings. Our country seems unable to do all that 
must be done until there has been some awful calamity that validates the importance 
of the threat‛. Clarke was referring to the management of national security, but his 
observation applies to other public issues in the US such as the National Health 
Service, global warming, the global financial crisis and also foreign affairs, as 
discussed in ‘Excessive competition’ below. The Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi 
Annan (2006) appeared to agree with Clarke’s assessment when he declared at the 
Nairobi Climate Change Conference that, as we consider how to proceed beyond the 
Kyoto Protocol, ‚there remains a frightening lack of leadership.‛  
 
 
Objections 
 
The suggestion that liberal democratic governments will malfunction because of 
ambiguity in the delegation that creates them may be objected to by observing that 
malfunctions are commonly caused by powerful actors outside the government, who 
use it to gain private goods at the expense of public goods. If we choose to view 
these manipulators as being responsible for the failure of government we are 
assuming that we need not design governments to be capable of governing in the 
real world, where self-interest as well as benevolence influences affairs. This view 
also implies that blaming manipulators can make the government they control stop 
them. 
The argument that the views of electors and the performance of politicians are 
often manipulated by special interests with wealth or other power may not reject the 
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idea that ambiguous delegation occurs, but see the fundamental problem as that of 
manipulation by special interests. However, if blaming these interests succeeds in 
halting their connivances, electors would still have incompetent views on public 
affairs, not least because ambiguity in delegation means they are not clearly asked to 
carefully consider public goods. Moreover, the only way this blaming could stop 
manipulation would be if it aroused citizens to the point where they are taking 
charge by demanding that their representatives outlaw it. But citizens ‘taking charge’ 
is what the ambiguous delegation view of the cause of democratic dysfunction calls 
for. As regular, frequent elections fail to fully delegate management from citizens to 
politicians, citizens are left holding the ultimate democratic responsibility to govern. 
They are directing, so as long as frequent elections are employed, citizens must 
somehow engage with the job and consciously, carefully do it. 
The idea that ambiguity in delegation produces confusion about who is directing 
public policy appears to explain the observation by Claus Offe (1996, vii-viii) that 
neither political agents (whether organizations, groups or individuals) nor spectators 
‚seem to have a very clear notion about their distinctive domain of action... What 
turns out to be surprisingly and essentially contested is the answer to the question 
‚who is in charge?‛ 
 
 
Excessive competition 
 
In democracies, the competitive device of open election is used to generate 
vigour, ideas, accountability, balance and justice. The competition is between 
politicians and it is made almost continuous by holding elections every few years, 
usually somewhere between three and six years. This periodicity is described above 
as frequent because each cycle is a small part of the human life span, ensuring that 
elections pose a constantly perceived threat to incumbent politicians who are eligible 
for re-election. Politicians therefore tend to focus on gaining and holding office 
rather than on choosing good policy. 
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Competition between politicians 
  
Ian Marsh and David Yencken (2004, 82) observe that in Australian politics, 
competition between politicians for votes has progressed to the degree that the 
‚familiar competitive two party system is now itself a principal obstacle< to wise 
policy choices.‛ They describe some of this competition as ‚fake adversarialism‛. 
 
If the government declares a contentious issue to be white, and public opinion is divided 
or uncertain, the Opposition almost invariably declares it to be black. Yet in government, 
the Opposition may often have supported a similar approach< It happens because, when 
public opinion is divided or uncertain, rewards accrue to leaders who champion 
contrasting alternatives, even if they are hollow or only manufactured for political 
impact< The present system is distorted by the way electoral incentives trump attention 
to arguments based on considerations of merit and prudence. (Marsh and Yencken 2004, 
32-33) 
 
One way in which this behaviour is encouraged is that the competitive 
environment of electoral politics tends to select for politicians with a combative 
attitude (Leeson 2006). It also teaches this attitude to them as they campaign for 
office and as they perform as representatives. So politicians in democracies tend to 
see problems in terms of foes to be vanquished. They may want to defeat those who 
draw attention to problems or who appear to be causing problems, rather than 
wanting to understand why these people are behaving in such ways. So they may 
intensify rather than resolve antagonisms and conflicts. A report by The Economist 
magazine illustrates this tendency. 
 
For two months, Kenya, East Africa’s most prosperous and supposedly stable country, 
hovered on the brink of self-immolation as two warring factions ripped the country apart 
after a disputed election at the end of 2007. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of 
the United Nations was brought in to try to resolve the conflict... As ethnic violence raged 
nearby, negotiators from the two sides would sometimes almost come to blows 
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themselves as Mr. Annan tried to find common ground between them< Rival politicians 
can be brought into open conflict by elections, such as in Kenya, or now in Zimbabwe 
(Economist 2008a, 67). 
 
In World On Fire, Amy Chua (2003) describes how competition from the 
democratic electoral process may inflame competition in the form of long-
suppressed hatred against a market-dominant prosperous ethnic minority. Examples 
are the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Croats in parts of the former Yugoslavia, the 1965 attacks 
on the Chinese minority in Indonesia and the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994. 
Such eruptions show the difficulties that democracy can produce in societies with 
strong latent or active competition. 
Another example of combativeness in democratic politicians is provided by US 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. In Us vs. Them: How a Half Century of 
Conservatism Has Undermined America’s Security, Peter Scoblic (2008) sympathetically 
describes Reagan’s shift from denunciation to negotiation in talks on nuclear arms 
reduction with the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. This 
moderation of competitiveness was no doubt facilitated by Reagan’s strong 
confidence in his ability to relate effectively on a personal, face-to-face basis. But 
Scoblic (cited in Power 2008, 68) observes it had previously not ‚even occurred‛ to 
Reagan 
 
that adopting a war-fighting strategy, beginning with a widespread missile defense 
program, researching a missile shield, while increasing the military budget by 35 per cent, 
starting a new bomber program, deploying a new ICBM, and deploying missiles in 
Europe could be construed as threatening. 
 
Samantha Power (2008, 68) writes: 
 
Scoblic’s account becomes most chilling at the end, when the same conservative voices 
that had long preferred confrontation to cooperation – such as Dick Cheney and Donald 
Rumsfeld – actually become dominant players in George W. Bush’s executive branch. On 
January 21, 2000, a year before he would move into the White House, Bush said: 
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When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world. And we knew exactly who the ‚they’ 
were. It was us versus them, and it was clear who ‚them‛ was. Today we’re not sure 
who the ‚they‛ are but we know they’re there.  
Having suffered through what one diplomat called the ‚enemy deprivation syndrome of 
the 1990s,‛ September 11 gave hard-line conservatives an opportunity to apply their pre-
hatched theories; and from the start they sought to unshackle the United States from 
international agreements and to reduce reliance on diplomatic engagement. 
 
Although Scoblic and Power are criticising conservatives, the fact that 
conservatives wield such influence in American politics means these analysts are 
criticising much of the character of American democracy. The affinity of a large 
section of this polity for combative politicians was illustrated when Republican vice-
presidential candidate Sarah Palin described herself as a pit bull with lipstick, to 
enthusiastic applause from her audience (Scott and Bennett 2008). 
The combativeness of many elected politicians means that they tend to be 
predominantly focused on winning: so they are often impatient with rules or 
principles that might hobble their efforts in any current dispute. They will be 
inclined to neglect to develop, discuss and urge the implementation of principles 
that could produce more constructive behaviour by all players. It might therefore be 
expected that politicians from democracies would fail to attempt to provide 
international leadership in establishing effective global institutions to enforce such 
principles as laws. Evidence for this weakness may lie in the absence of a world 
governing body that can devise just global laws and interpret and enforce them. Half 
of the 167 nations around the world are more or less democratic and although only 
30 are ‚full‛ democracies (Economist 2008c), they are relatively wealthy and 
powerful but show no interest in using their influence to try to reform or replace the 
United Nations with a more democratic and effective global administration. It is 
obviously difficult for them to achieve this when they must gain the acceptance of 
authoritarian regimes such as those of China and Russia, but the lack of effort 
toward this goal is noteworthy. Two examples of democracies neglecting to advocate 
a global principle of justice are the support by the UK and the US for self-
determination in the cases of Northern Ireland and Kosovo respectively, and the 
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abandonment of this rule by these powers in the case of Georgia versus Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia in August 2008. 
Electoral competition in democracies creates factions and limits the openness and 
honesty of politicians because, as discussed above, they are tempted to pander to the 
ignorance of electors rather than risk alienating them with sophisticated policies. 
This pandering not only skews voting in legislatures, but also inhibits the 
development of public opinion by restricting and distorting the input of politicians 
to public debate. Instead of discussing issues in a constructive manner, they often 
denigrate political opponents, pretend with fake adversarialism and give evasive, 
self-serving responses to questions by journalists. Such behaviour hinders the 
development of public opinion and amounts to politicians wilfully constraining their 
provision and protection of public goods. Some of this corruption is obvious to many 
citizens, helping to produce the ‚paradox of trust‛ described above. 
In Australia, the combativeness cultivated in politicians by their competitive 
environment appears to produce several prominent features of state and federal 
politics. One is an obsessive interest by the public in who is to lead political parties, 
whether in opposition or in government. This risks obstructing democratic 
government in two ways: it diverts citizens from being aware that it is they who 
direct government and it focuses their attention on personalities rather than on 
discussing issues, so the public opinion that politicians largely follow is not 
encouraged to develop. Another result of combativeness is also found in Australia: a 
rigid insistence by politicians that government is formed virtually exclusively from 
the party with the most members in the legislature, so that when the two major 
parties are equal in number a minor party may exert unrepresentative influence – a 
‘balance of power’ situation. This insistence on opposition politics prevents much of 
the opinion of the public from being represented and deprives the government of 
much of the talent in the legislature. It is accompanied by parties trying to destroy 
each other’s public image rather than trying to negotiate for good policy. Opposition 
politics tempts governments to seek electoral advantage over the opposition by 
using public money to sell their policies to the public, especially before elections. An 
alternative to opposition politics is to make the whole legislature the government, 
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but this is anathema to most legislators because their competitive attitude makes 
them very intolerant of opposing views and groups. This attitude is fuelled by their 
need to attract votes with simple, strong signals of party image. The same 
intolerance may also make the internal affairs of each party a fractious business. 
Abolition of opposition politics would not eliminate competition but moderate it to a 
more constructive intensity, for politicians would still compete with each other to 
propose the best ideas for policy and to gain positions of status and influence within 
the legislature. This way of operating would give politicians less cause to compete 
with each other via personal attacks, though perhaps this might sporadically 
reappear as light entertainment rather than as a necessary public part of the job. The 
consensual democracies of Scandinavia demonstrate there is no absolute 
requirement that electoral democracy must be oppositional, for they commonly have 
governments comprising coalitions of minority parties. 
Former US Vice President Al Gore (2007) points out that the costliness of 
television advertising exerts extreme pressure on US politicians to raise money. The 
expense of this campaign tool not only makes politicians more susceptible to passing 
legislation for lobbyists who pay, but it corrupts in another way: television 
promotions are usually made very brief for impact and to minimize cost. Brevity 
gives impact by eliminating balance and rational argument, leading the viewer to 
absorb a message without thought and just by impression. Payments for legislation 
pose temptations for both lobbyists and politicians to use this money for personal 
financial gain as well as for political campaigns. The Abramoff Indian lobbying 
scandal illustrates the complexity and scale of such corruption. It erupted over work 
performed by political lobbyists Jack Abramoff, Ralph E. Reed Jr., Grover Norquist 
and Michael Scanlon on Indian casino gambling interests for fees of an estimated 
US$85 million. Abramoff and Scanlon grossly overbilled their clients and 
orchestrated lobbying against them in order to force more payments for counter-
lobbying services. The lobbyists were accused of illegally giving gifts and making 
campaign donations to legislators in return for legislative action. Representative Bob 
Ney (R-OH) and two aides to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) were 
directly implicated. Both Ney and DeLay were forced to give up their Republican 
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leadership posts. Ney was sentenced to thirty months in prison and Abramoff to five 
years, ten months (Schmidt et al 2005). The fact that they were caught makes it seem 
as if democracy worked, but the case also illustrates how the competitive pressures 
of electoral politics help special interests to buy legislation. 
Corporations may, in effect, also buy legislation or government projects by 
rewarding a representative who favours them by establishing a business in that 
legislator’s district to improve their electoral prospects, or by offering a post-political 
career as an executive or consultant (Freedland 2007, 20). Such favours may be 
delivered by politicians introducing bills, lobbying, logrolling, making earmarks and 
introducing tax credits. Log-rolling is the bartering for votes to support a bill by its 
proponent undertaking to vote in return to support the bills of other legislators, or 
the bundling together of diverse measures into a single package to broaden their 
basis of support. Earmarking is the insertion into an appropriations bill of a special 
provision that favours one constituent or a very narrow group (Kirkpatrick 2006; 
Kuttner 2008). It is permitted by the legislator who proposes that bill in order to get 
votes for it or to allow that legislator to insert earmarks in the bills of other 
representatives in return for the favour. Tax credits create similar corruption of 
legislation. As Robert Kuttner (2008, 96) points out, these ploys ‚are hardly ever 
subjected to normal legislative hearings; rather, deals are cut behind closed doors 
and the general public only learns of the intended beneficiary afterward, if ever.‛ 
Pork barrelling is another attempt to pay for favours in which representatives bribe 
electors for votes by spending public funds or locating business developments in 
their electorate. Policies and programs are often dictated by the interest groups able 
to lobby for, or buy them through such deals, rather than by the strengths of 
arguments for and against policies, as judged on their merits, either directly by the 
public or through their representatives. As a result, Chalmers Johnson (cited in 
Freedland 2007, 20), retired professor of international relations at the University of 
California-San Diego, concludes that in the US, ‚the legislative branch of our 
government is broken‛. 
Such manipulation of electoral and legislative affairs could be reduced by 
legislation, but wealthy interests pursuing private goods make this virtually 
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impossible to enact. Public choice theorist Gordon Tullock (1993, 39-40), has 
described this type of behaviour as 
 
the crucial weakness of democracy< *a+ bias of the political process in favour of voters 
who are concentrated and well-informed on issues that are significantly relevant to them 
and against voters who are dispersed and ill-informed on issues that are less directly 
relevant.... [This is how] special interests penetrate in order to rent-seek, to the general 
detriment of society as a whole. 
 
But special interests are only able to ‚penetrate‛ because of self-interested 
motivations of politicians, such as desires for financial reward or success in 
competing for office. For the latter, politicians need funds and other help with 
campaigning, including ‘pork’. 
Public choice theory has much to say about these problems but it is viewed by 
some scholars as unproductive because it tries to predict political behaviour from 
rational utility maximization by actors such as voters, politicians and lobbyists, 
while ignoring other motivations. Public choice research thus tends to see political 
behaviour as self-interested. However, this may be broadly accurate for politicians 
because they face competition that threatens to put them out of politics. For this 
situation, Peter Leeson (2006, 357, 364) has given a theoretical demonstration that 
 
even when policymakers are partially benevolent towards the public, they are still led to 
cater to special interests and society fares no better off than if politicians were strictly self-
interested. Political agent benevolence is thus an all-or-nothing proposition. Unless 
benevolence is total, policy looks the same< Despite its departure from motivational 
realism, if we get the same results with partial political agent benevolence as we do with 
zero, the standard public choice assumption is vindicated predictively. 
 
Leeson’s analysis is based on competition between political agents for votes from 
citizens. The latter generally pay inadequate attention to public issues, so each agent 
must be at least as willing as her competitors to ignore public welfare in order to 
pander to public ignorance and to special interests who may deliver votes. As 
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Leeson (2006, 357) writes: the ‚absence of an effective enforcement mechanism for 
punishing politicians who cater to special interests gives political agents strong 
reason to doubt the commitment of their fellow statesmen to the public welfare‛. 
Leeson’s analysis indicates that this doubt will make politicians produce defective 
public policy as they compete with each other for votes. 
In the last few decades, competition between politicians has been intensified by 
the media dramatizing it and manufacturing it in order to gain commercial 
advantage. Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman (2001) claim that this sensationalism 
has developed because a weakening of traditional social ties such as political parties, 
the nuclear family, mainstream religion, the workplace and social class has caused 
public opinion to become more fickle. 
 
Relations between journalists and politicians have been transformed as a result. Given the 
fluidity and fickleness of public opinion, news coverage matters enormously to politicians 
and their advisors. They consider they are engaged in a daily competitive struggle to 
influence and control popular perceptions of key political events and issues through the 
major mass media. They aim therefore to permeate and dominate the news agenda so far 
as possible.  
But political journalists have not taken such attempts to narrow and determine their 
news choices lying down. Wherever possible, they impose their own interpretive frames 
on politicians’ statements and initiatives, limiting the latter to compressed quotes and 
soundbites. They concentrate on issues that politicians cannot keep under control, ones 
that reporters can run and break open doors with and apply conventional news values to. 
They put a spotlight on any weaknesses, failings, and blunders that the professionalised 
politicians may happen to commit. In particular, they continually ‘unmask’ politicians’ 
publicity efforts, often saying more about the PR motives behind them than about the 
substantive pro’s and con’s of their records and proposals< The logic of this is like 
submitting political communication to the ravages of a shoal of piranha fish< Thus, in 
democracies where measures across a series of recent election campaigns are available, the 
balance of the evidence shows that media coverage of politics is diminishing in amount 
and becoming more ‘mediated’ (dominated more by journalists and their frames of 
reference), more focused on power tactics at the expense of issue substance, and more 
negative (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 9, 10, 11).  
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Commercial competition does more than exacerbate the competitiveness of 
democratic politics through the activities of the media. It is also a pervasive influence 
on the lives and attitudes of all citizens in democracies, for they must continually 
cope with and contribute to commercial competition as they consume and work. In 
some personalities this may encourage an ethos of looking for advantage to the 
limits set by law, so that ethical judgment is neglected and self-interest is followed to 
excess. Australian examples of this are given by Bob Burton’s (2007) Inside Spin: The 
dark underbelly of the PR industry. The title of the autobiography of Australian Labor 
Party numbers man, Graham Richardson (1994), expresses a similar view of 
democratic politics: Whatever It Takes. Perhaps their training or experience in 
adversarial behaviour is why lawyers and business men often do well in democratic 
politics. 
Competition between politicians may also be accentuated by ambiguity of 
delegation. As this produces confusion about who directs government it invites 
politicians to compete with each other for this position of ultimate power. But as it is 
the people who fundamentally perform this role in democracies, politicians are 
largely restricted to giving an impression of competing with each other for it. They 
will do this in order to gain status and also to gain votes by impressing electors with 
their leadership qualities. They will therefore advocate what looks like strategic 
policy and they will strive for dominance in the legislature or the executive. If 
electors need any convincing that government is directed by politicians, their 
observation of this behaviour should do it. If there was no ambiguity in delegation, 
politicians would be a little more restricted in their area of competition: they would 
be confined to competing for election to the legislature, for factional influence and 
for leadership of their party. 
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Reducing excesses of competition between politicians 
 
Two approaches may be employed to reduce the damage done to policy and 
public goods by competitive struggles between politicians. One is to produce as 
much policy as possible without having politicians do it, which may be achieved by 
helping citizens to be more effective as the directors of government. If they are to do 
this job it must be made as simple and as powerful as possible, so it should be 
restricted to determining strategic policy. This approach not only takes strategic 
policy out of the hands of politicians but guides the subordinate policy they are left 
with, because strategy determines the broad directions and limits for all other policy. 
The new institution proposed in Part 2 is designed to work in this way. 
The other approach is to minimize the competition between politicians. Here 
again, eliminating the confusion about who leads the polity is essential. If the 
delegation of responsibilities is made unambiguous, then the competition between 
politicians might be reduced in two stages. The first is that this clarification of 
responsibilities would confront electors - the ‘principals’ in democracies - with the 
fact that it is up to them to devise the rules to regulate competition between 
politicians, the ‘agents’ of the principals. One cannot expect politicians to do this, 
because as a general rule, regulators are more objective and effective when they 
regulate others, rather than themselves. Any improvement in the responsibility of 
political agents that is achieved through regulation by their principals may then 
produce the second stage of control: politicians being more responsible about 
considering and accepting any further changes to political structures that could 
remove incentives for them to compete with each other. 
 
 
Excessive compromise 
 
The ‚most famous objection to democracy, immortalized by Plato, is that 
democratic decisions are likely to be worse than decisions made by those better 
qualified by virtue of their knowledge‛ (Warren 2002a, 192). Liberal democracy 
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ensures that this problem will be ever-present through its universal franchise with 
one vote per person and equal power for each vote. One vote per person means one 
vote for one objective; for example in presidential systems each elector has one vote 
for a presidential candidate and also one vote for a member of each legislative body 
such as a house of representatives or a senate. In mixed member proportional 
electoral systems such as in New Zealand, Bolivia, Germany and Italy, the elector 
has one vote for a member of a legislature and also one vote for a party. 
One vote of equal power for each citizen ensures that high ideals, imagination 
and informed or cultivated tastes are blended with low aims, insensitivities and 
disengagement in the public opinion that representatives and parties respond to 
with their policies and legislation. So competence is heavily compromised and the 
public goods that politicians deliver reflect average ideals and involvement. English 
philosopher John Lucas (1976, 254) evinced great concern about this, writing that 
where 
 
a democracy altogether rejects the aristocratic principle, and regards it as undemocratic 
for anyone to acknowledge anyone else as his superior in artistic taste< artistic creativity 
is stunted, and the whole of society is submerged in a tide of tasteless mediocrity. 
 
It is not only artistic taste that is overruled in this way. Public goods whose values 
become appreciated through close personal involvement or some other form of 
education or learning are strongly affected in this way. Examples are public goods 
necessary for particular lifestyles, forms of recreation, environmental quality, human 
rights and responsible foreign policy. An example of a public good necessary for 
good foreign policy is given by the following comments by Samantha Power (2008) 
on American foreign policy. The public good in this case is the competence of public 
opinion on foreign policy. 
 
Bush's stated goals were to strengthen the US military, bring stability to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, combat terrorism, prevent rogue states and militants from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, and promote democracy around the world. In each case, two terms of 
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Republican rule have been disastrous for US national security. The question is: Have 
American voters noticed? 
Joe Biden has. In an interview with MSNBC, Senator Biden, the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, was asked whether Democrats could be trusted on national 
security. He erupted: 
 
I refuse to sit back like we did in 2000 and 2004. This administration is the worst 
administration in American foreign policy in modern history - maybe ever. The idea that 
they are competent to continue to conduct our foreign policy, to make us more secure 
and make Israel secure, is preposterous... Every single thing they've touched has been a 
near disaster. 
 
Poll data show that voters are in fact beginning to share Biden's view and at last question 
Republicans' reliability on national security. On Election Day in 2004 exit polls showed 
that a majority of voters (49–44 percent) believed that the war in Iraq had made the 
country less safe. Yet those same exit polls gave Bush an 18-percent edge in handling national 
security (Power 2008, 68, emphasis added). 
 
In this account, Power observes that the average voter is not well informed about 
public policy, is slow to learn and that the US government performs at about the 
same level. So rather than being partisan she is giving examples of behaviours by 
principals and agents in democracies that have long been identified by empirical 
studies, as noted above in ‘Citizens as directors’ and ‘Ignorant directors’. 
The problem of excessive compromise was indicated earlier in this chapter by 
observing that the accountability of politicians to electors is defective because the 
ignorance of the majority in liberal democracies means that the general public is 
often an incompetent judge of the performance of their representatives. Excessive 
compromise may be reduced by eliminating ambiguity in delegation to make the 
people more aware that they direct their government. They should then be more 
concerned to find ways of minimizing this compromise, for example by skewing the 
system of representation so that it preferentially represents the views of those in 
their community who are more likely to have informed, sensitive and sensible views. 
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Triple dysfunction 
 
The dysfunctional tendencies of liberal democracies discussed above are 
summarized by Figure 1. This describes them as three primary dysfunctions that 
produce two secondary dysfunctions, which in turn produce a tertiary dysfunction, 
under-provision of public goods. This view of democratic failure is called the triple 
dysfunction hypothesis, in reference to the three primary dysfunctions. The five  
elements of the electoral process that are proposed to cause these primary 
dysfunctions are separated into two groups in Figure 1 to indicate their differing 
effects. The upper group comprises elections, their frequency and the eligibility of 
incumbents to run for re-election; the lower group is universal franchise and equality 
of the vote. The upper group produces ambiguity in the delegation of authority and 
responsibility, causing some confusion about whether electors or politicians are the 
directors of the polity. It also creates competition between politicians that interferes 
with the formulation and implementation of good policy. These two primary 
dysfunctions are indicated to interact by two arrows that are drawn thin, meaning 
that these effects may be slight. The downwards arrow indicates that excesses of 
competitive struggle may be exacerbated because confusion about directorship 
widens the scope for political agents to compete with each other. Without this 
confusion they would compete primarily for election to the legislature and to a lesser 
degree for dominance over each other for factional political influence and party 
leadership. Confusion over whether it is electors or politicians who are the directors 
may amplify this competition between politicians by inviting them to compete with 
each other for directorship of the polity as well. The thin arrow that points up from 
‘Excessive competition<’ to ‘Confusion of directorship’ indicates that the need for 
politicians to compete for votes encourages them to act as if they are the directors in 
order to impress electors, which may encourage these principals to neglect to carry 
out their democratic role of directorship. Any such effect would add to the confusion 
about who directs government. 
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Figure 1 
  Triple dysfunction hypothesis 
 
Elements of  Government dysfunctions 
the electoral 
process    
 Primary dysfunctions Secondary Tertiary   
 
 Elections. 1 Ambiguous Confusion of 
 Frequency delegation directorship 1 Irrespon- 1 Deficiencies 
   of elections.    -sibility in policy & 
 Eligibility of 2 Excessive competition  legitimacy: 
   Incumbents.     between politicians  i.e. public  
     goods under-  
 Universal     provided 
   franchise.  3 Excessive  compromise over 2 Ignorance   
 Equality of policy 
   the vote. 
 
 
The third primary dysfunction is that universal franchise and equality of the vote 
make the polity compromise knowledge, ideas and sensitivity with ignorance and 
indifference. As described above under ‘Excessive compromise’, this effect is also 
encouraged by confusion about directorship. If the system of delegation was very 
clear that the people are the directors, they would be more likely to minimize any 
compromising of their wisdom with their ignorance in the expression of public 
opinion and its influence on public policy. As this impact of confusion about 
directorship may be limited it is indicated here by a thin arrow. Excesses in 
compromise are also affected by competition between politicians because this 
coerces them to express and enact the views of the majority of their constituents, 
regardless of the wisdom of these views, in order to secure electoral support. This 
effect is shown by an arrow from ‘Excessive competition<’ to ‘Excessive 
compromise<’. It is drawn thin to minimize emphasis, because the same effect is 
also indicated by the thick arrow pointing to ‘Excessive compromise<’ from 
‘Universal franchise’ and ‘Equality of the vote’. 
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Confused directorship and excessive competition are expected to produce the 
secondary dysfunction of an element of irresponsibility in democratic government. 
Confusion about who directs will do this by preventing electors and those they elect 
from being clear about which group has the responsibility to deliberate and develop 
strategic policy. So both groups tend to leave these choices up to the other. If one 
group does try to assume responsibility, the ambiguity obscures whether that group 
should address strategic, tactical or operational policy, so irresponsibility still tends 
to occur. Competition between politicians for both directorship and electoral success 
will also encourage irresponsibility by focusing them on choosing policies that 
appeal to the ignorance of a largely disengaged electorate. The same effect is also 
described as the third primary dysfunction of excessive compromise producing the 
other secondary dysfunction: a degree of ignorance in the behaviour of the polity. 
These tendencies towards irresponsibility and ignorance mean that democratic 
governments will to some extent fail to function. In other words, as explained earlier 
in this chapter under ‘The function of democratic government’, they will under-
provide public goods. This is noted in Figure 1 as a tertiary dysfunction. 
The two-way vertical influence between the secondary dysfunctions indicates that 
irresponsibility and ignorance each tend to strengthen the other. It should be noted 
that Figure 1 indicates tendencies of the political system, not complete 
irresponsibility and ignorance. It thus offers at least a partial model of deficiencies in 
the behaviour of democratic governments. It also indicates that confusion about who 
directs is probably the major problem. 
 
 
Two backward mapping analyses of democratic failure 
 
The prediction of democratic failure given above follows the systems analysis 
approach of forward (or consequence) mapping (Head and Alford 2008, 16). It starts 
from basic democratic structure, assesses the type of behaviour this should produce 
in democratic government and then further follows causal chains to see what 
additional consequences may be anticipated. This mapping is now compared with 
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two cases of backward (or causal) mapping, in which an adverse consequence is 
inspected to see what may have caused it and then probable causes of this cause are 
deduced and so on back along causal chains, perhaps as far as initial factors. The first 
case of backward mapping investigates causes of neglect of the long-term in 
Australian politics and the second asks why environmental policy problems recur in 
the US. 
 
 
Neglect of the long term in Australian politics  
 
Marsh and Yencken (2004) have inquired into neglect of the long term by 
Australian politics, citing symptoms such as salinity, land degradation, deteriorating 
rivers, the effects of globalisation on employment, inadequacy of research and 
innovation, public cynicism about politics, massive expansion of foreign debt, 
problems in the health and development of children and youth, energy issues and 
greenhouse emissions. Environmental scientists David Mercer and Peter Marden 
(2006) agree with this concern. ‚There is little doubt that Australian politics has 
failed to grapple with the challenges posed by a post-sustainable development 
society. The unwillingness of liberal democracy to resolve environmental problems 
has been recognized for a considerable time‛. Political scientist Judith Brett has 
backed this assessment with an inspection of Prime Minister John Howard’s legacy 
of federal government in Australia. She suggested his performance on global 
warming, related environmental issues and dependence on oil, made him 
 
similar to the now faceless and nameless men who condemned Galileo for claiming that 
the world went round the sun< after ten years in power we know far more about how he 
sees the past 100 years than how he sees the next (Brett 2006). 
 
Marsh and Yencken (2004, 31-41) diagnose the causes of neglect of long term 
issues by Australian liberal democracy as threefold: ‚fake adversarialism‛; 
limitations of the policy-forming structure; and limitations in the availability of 
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information. As they start with symptoms and then look for causes, their analysis 
tends to focus on those which are most immediately responsible for the neglect. The 
fundamental changes required to produce lasting corrections of the neglect of long 
term issues therefore tend to escape attention. Marsh and Yencken (2004, 83) appear 
to acknowledge this in their closing two sentences. ‚All these changes will be in vain 
if they do not lead to effective action. There is therefore a final requirement - political 
leadership of vision, courage and conviction‛. This conclusion agrees with the 
diagnosis of forward mapping: that leadership is confused and therefore to some 
extent deficient. The cause of this confusion - frequent elections that are open to 
incumbents - is recognized by Marsh and Yencken (2004). They observe that the first 
of their three causes of policy neglect, fake adversarialism,  
 
arises from the dynamics of the electoral contest between parties< The present system is 
distorted by the way electoral incentives trump attention to arguments based on 
considerations of merit and prudence< electoral needs have required public contention 
between the major parties. Issues have been distorted or fabricated to create the 
appearance of difference or to undermine opponents (Marsh and Yencken 2004, 31, 32-33). 
 
This means we may replace ‚fake adversarialism‛ with a more fundamental cause, 
‚the dynamics of the electoral contest‛, the operative parts of which have been 
suggested above to be ambiguous delegation and excesses in competition and 
compromise. 
To explain their second cause of neglect, ‚limitations of the policy-forming 
structure‛, Marsh and Yencken observe that the ‚inability to create a public 
conversation about longer-term issues is partly caused by the dynamics of electoral 
competition between the major parties. It is also caused by a number of 
organisational features of the formal policy-making structure‛ (2004, 35, emphasis 
added). They list these organisational features as (a) work overload created by the 
restricted size of the policy-making executive; (b) lack of access for interest groups; 
(c) inability of the policy-making system to create interest coalitions around longer-
term issues; and (d) weak working relationships between the Federal and State 
governments. Feature (b) here refers to a lack of formal access structured for fairness 
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to all stakeholders, not a lack of the underhand access for special interests discussed 
above under ‘Excessive competition’. Marsh and Yencken do not remark that their 
four organizational features (a) to (d), are also likely to be largely caused by ‚the 
dynamics of the electoral contest‛. This happens as follows. The restricted size of the 
executive referred to in (a) is  likely to be a response to the electoral imperative of 
being seen to provide strong, decisive leadership free of drawn-out internal 
argument, an imperative that arises from ambiguous delegation and excessive 
competition between politicians (‚the dynamics of the electoral contest‛). Problems 
(b) and (c) may be responses by politicians to the electoral imperative to be seen to be 
catering to the broad mass of voters, so they appear to be cases of excessive 
compromise. Politicians are reluctant to confuse their simplistic appeal to 
disengaged electors by appearing to cooperate with minority opinions, however 
benevolent to the public interest these might be, because these minority opinions are 
not understood by the mass of voters. Finally, problem (d) arises because Federal-
State conflict is almost obligatory for politicians wanting to demonstrate their 
allegiance to their constituents and impress them with their leadership qualities. 
Such demonstrations are driven by excessive competition and permitted by the 
ambiguity of delegation. We may thus alter most of Marsh and Yencken’s second 
cause of neglect of the long term from ‚limitations of the policy-forming structure‛ 
to ‚dynamics of the electoral contest‛ and in turn alter this to ambiguous delegation 
plus excesses in competition and compromise. So their second cause of neglect of the 
long term appears to have the same roots as their first. 
Their third cause of neglect, ‚limitations to the availability of information‛ may 
also be largely ascribed to the same more basic cause, ‚dynamics of the electoral 
contest‛, which in this case, is the influence of ambiguous delegation. To see this we 
may start with Marsh and Yencken’s observation that, with the exception of well 
established regimes of economic reporting at every level of Australian government, 
the reporting of trends and conditions is inadequate, especially in social reporting. 
They (2004, 38) point out that these deficiencies mean ‚issues are buried, neglected 
by the media and given scant attention by politicians‛, but they do not mention that 
these deficiencies are likely to be caused by a lack of demand for information, which 
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in turn would be caused by a lack of interest from the public. But such disinterest is 
what one would expect from ambiguous delegation, for this allows citizens to think 
they have given the entire task of choosing public goods to politicians, so they can 
focus on their private goods, including their purchasing power. Analysts, media and 
government respond to this strong interest of the public in business and the 
economy by providing the relevant information. 
Marsh and Yencken (2004, 40) observe that the limitations they postulate as 
causing neglect of the long term, ‚political, organisational and information 
limitations< are widely acknowledged as the cause of present public disaffection 
with the major parties. They are at the root of public cynicism about politics.‛ 
However, as indicated above, inspection for possible causes of these causes appears 
to show more fundamental causation: the democratic structures of frequent 
elections, eligibility of incumbents, universal franchise and equal vote, which 
produce ambiguity in delegation, excessive competition and ignorance from 
compromise. Marsh and Yencken’s analysis amounts to an exhortation to politicians 
or to the disengaged electorate or to anyone who might have influence, to fix each 
deficiency. This seems unlikely to work for several reasons. One is that few citizens 
are listening, as discussed above under ‘Leadership by citizens’. Another is the 
number of defects to be corrected. A third problem is that of making any corrections 
continue to work. If an underlying cause such as poor structure is not corrected or 
countered by a new, permanent institution, it will prevail by continuing to exert its 
effects. The reforms suggested by Marsh and Yencken are likely to be ignored or fail 
because the existing electoral structure provides little incentive for citizens and 
politicians to support them. As these authors themselves recognize, the crux is 
leadership, so the major task is to make this effective and to do it in a way that is 
self-maintaining. We must consider whether we can clarify leadership roles by 
eliminating ambiguity in delegation. 
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Recurrence of environmental policy failures 
 
Steven Yaffee (1997) has studied incompetence in administrative performance on 
ecosystem management in the US. In Table 1 below, he ascribes several types of 
policy failure to five behavioural biases of humans and human institutions. Yaffee 
proposes that the solutions listed in the right hand column may eliminate these 
biases and thereby produce better policy. This analysis was focused mainly on 
repetitive mismanagement of the northern spotted owl, but it recognizes similar 
behavioural biases in attempts to manage other species such as the red- cockaded 
woodpecker, black footed ferret, California condor, whooping crane, grizzly bear, 
gray wolf and whales. The method used here is backward or causal mapping as it 
starts by identifying policy failures (‘policy problems’) and inspects these for likely 
causes. 
To compare the forward mapping of the triple dysfunction analysis with Yaffee’s 
approach, each of his biases (‘Behavioural bias’) and suggested corrections for these  
 (‘Solutions’) is followed in the table by a bracketed comment of L, C and I. These 
letters indicate that the relevant behavioural bias or solution identified by Yaffee is 
equivalent to one or more of the dysfunctions or solutions suggested by forward 
mapping. In these bracketed comments, D stands for directorship (so under  
 ‘Behavioural bias’, D is confusion about who directs and under ‘Solutions’, D is clear 
responsibility for direction); C is for competition (so under ‘Behavioural bias’, C is 
excessive competition; and under ‘Solutions’, C is the moderation of competition, for 
example by cooperation); and I is for ignorance by the polity (so under ‘Behavioural 
bias’, I is ignorance from excessive compromise; and under ‘Solutions’, I is 
dissemination of information and greater political influence for those citizens who 
are relatively well informed). From comments D, C and I in Table1, it can be seen 
that Yaffee’s biases and solutions tend to be covered by the dysfunctions and 
solutions suggested by forward mapping. Moreover, the fundamental structural 
reform recommended by forward mapping appears necessary if the actions that 
Yaffee’s ‘Solutions’ call for are to be systemically driven and given permanent  
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Table 1.   
The behavioural biases that generate environmental policy problems and 
suggested solutions (based on Yaffee 1997, 330) 
 
Behavioural 
bias 
Policy problems Solutions 
Short term  
rationality  
outcompetes  
long-term  
rationality 
(D, C, I) 
Poor long term  
direction 
Learn about the future. (D, I) 
Bind ourselves to the future through  
directives, information and ‚fixers‛. (D) 
Promote innovation and experimentation. (D) 
Find creative ways to meet both short-term  
and long-term objectives. (D) 
Competition  
supplants  
cooperation 
(D, C, I) 
Impasses; inferior  
solutions 
Develop processes that promote sharing and  
develop trust and relationships. (D, C) 
Protect those who may be exploited. (D, C) 
Focus on super-ordinate goals. (D, C) 
Be firm on ends; flexible on means. (D, C) 
Fragmentation of  
interests and 
values 
(D, C) 
Impasses; inferior  
solutions 
Promote discourse & values ratification. (D, 
C) 
Build political concurrence. (D, C) 
Promote education of the public. (I)  
Fragmentation of 
responsibilities  
and authorities 
(D, C) 
Slow, inconclusive  
decision-making;  
diminished 
account- 
ability; piecemeal  
solutions 
Foster leadership. (D) 
Create coordinating mechanisms. (D, C)  
Structure incentives. (D) 
Develop clear measures of success and an  
ability to monitor performance. (D) 
Fragmentation of 
information and 
knowledge 
(I) 
Inferior solutions Promote information flows within and  
between organizations. (D, C, I) 
Invest in better data bases. (D, I) 
Build centres of up-to-date expertise. (D, I) 
Use data negotiation. (C) 
 
 
incentives to be maintained. 
Yaffee’s backward mapping shows a number of policy problems being caused by 
five behavioural biases, so that at least fifteen different types of corrective measure 
are listed in the ‘Solutions’ column. Forward mapping produces a simpler set of 
solutions by suggesting that a multitude of policy problems are caused by just two 
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secondary dysfunctions, irresponsibility and ignorance. These, in turn are caused by 
three primary dysfunctions that are caused by the electoral process. Table 1 indicates 
that confused directorship (D) probably has the most dysfunctional effect of the 
three primary dysfunctions, so the most useful single solution might be to eliminate 
the ambiguity which causes it. This is also the conclusion reached in comparing 
Marsh and Yencken’s backward mapping with the forward mapping analysis. 
In comparing backward with forward mapping, it appears that the latter has two 
advantages. One is that its starting point of identifying fundamental structural 
problems immediately suggests systemic solutions in the form of either changes to 
basic democratic structures or new institutions. The other advantage is that, as it 
focuses on fundamentals, forward mapping is likely to identify a smaller set of 
remedial actions. 
 
 
Summary and implications 
 
Triple dysfunction is a structurally induced tendency for democratic governments 
to fail to internalize responsibility for the provision of public goods. This hypothesis 
blames irresponsibility on the structure or system of democratic government, rather 
than on politicians, bureaucrats, citizens or other actors. It suggests two strategies for 
correction. Either the democratic delegation of directorship from the people to 
politicians is completed by making the latter the absolute rulers, or the nature of the 
incomplete delegation is made explicit, so there is no ambiguity for politicians and 
citizens. A third strategy, that of making the people the absolute rulers in all levels of 
public policy is impractical because citizens do not have the time to devote to this. 
Some form of representation is necessary. The first strategy of making politicians the 
absolute rulers or directors calls for eliminating the frequency of elections, either by 
greatly lengthening the interval between elections, to say twenty years or more, or 
by eliminating elections altogether, for example by selecting representatives by lot. 
This strategy eliminates much of the accountability of politicians to the electorate, so 
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it risks the quality of public policy. For this reason it is also extremely difficult to get 
citizens to accept the strategy. 
For the second strategy of making the incomplete delegation specific, the people 
and their politicians must be continually reminded of their respective responsibilities 
under current systems of electoral delegation. As these systems leave electors in the 
position of directors, they can only produce good public policy if they realize they 
must determine the broad objectives that they want for public goods and if 
politicians know they are restricted to choosing the relative details of how to achieve 
those objectives. Under this strategy, politicians must regard themselves as 
executives or managers for electors who are their directors and they should not call 
themselves leaders. It is unlikely that these roles will be permanently clarified by 
merely describing them. Most citizens would not hear the descriptions and in any 
case would soon forget them. Some politicians will ignore descriptions that demote 
them from leader to manager. Descriptions will also do little to help either citizens or 
politicians to perform these functions. But new institutions may be able to both 
continually remind citizens and politicians of their roles and assist them to perform 
in these different ways. 
In respect of the citizen’s job of director, Diana Mutz (2006, 150) cautions that 
deliberation and active political participation are seriously incompatible activities. A 
citizen who participates vigorously is unlikely to deliberate much and one who 
deliberates much is unlikely to be an active participant. Mutz gives two mechanisms 
for this effect: that the crosscutting exposure to policy issues that deliberation 
produces creates ambivalence about political decisions, which inhibits action; and 
crosscutting exposure heightens awareness of the potential for involvement in 
controversy, which also deters many from participation. In addition to these, I 
suggest two other effects. Paying attention to crosscutting arguments takes time and 
energy, so one then has less of these for participation. This attention also demands 
and cultivates an analytical or reflective attitude, which is the antithesis of the 
impulsive, action-demanding mood needed for participation. The difficulty of 
producing both deliberation and participation in the same citizen must be overcome 
to some extent by any institution that seeks to execute the second strategy outlined 
  83 
above: guiding citizens, first to deliberate strategic policy and then to participate by 
instructing their politicians to execute their findings. 
The corruption of the democratic system of social choice described here means 
that the individual choice of private goods is very often able to take advantage of 
weakness in social choice and overrule it. A major way this occurs is that citizens 
find it rewarding to avoid the ineffectuality and frustration of the muddled system 
of social choice by focusing on individual choice. The market is adept at encouraging 
them to do this, as Reich (2007) describes in Supercapitalism. So people focus on ‘me, 
now’, their narcissism grows, private wealth flourishes (for those who can get it) and 
the public domain decays. Sociologist Michael Pusey (2003, 183) is deeply troubled 
by this progression, noting that with  
 
economic reform has come a thinning of democracy and an induced retreat of the people 
into a purely private sphere of caring only for one’s own, of mood states, of consumption, 
of recuperation, of therapy, and incommunicable anger at what is being done to them. 
 
After many years of social research in Australia, psychologist Hugh Mackay 
(2004, 7-8) observes that Australians have become  
 
[i]nfinitely more snobbish, infinitely more stratified, with a much stronger sense of there 
being a wealth class< who think they’re there, they’ve made it, we deserve to be here, 
we’ve got to look after our children and those people well that’s just how it is< nothing to 
do with us. 
 
Mackay’s (2004, 7) conclusion is that we need a much more ‚compassionate, 
harmonious, generous, accommodating society, paying excessive regard to the 
disadvantaged, the poor, the unintelligent.‛ Triple dysfunction is a way of seeing 
why many democracies are in this crisis and others appear to be drifting towards it. 
In Chapter 6 this diagnosis is used to prescribe a remedy. Before this is offered, the 
next three chapters investigate the accuracy of the diagnosis. In Chapter 3, the 
performances of some liberal democracies with structures and cultures that 
minimize triple dysfunction are inspected and compared with one that cultivates it. 
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Chapter 4 looks at the characteristics of issues that make triple dysfunction liable to 
produce serious mismanagement, exemplifying this with three issues that have some 
of these characteristics. The diagnosis of Part 1 is concluded in Chapter 5 with a 
more detailed inquiry into the way in which a fourth issue is mismanaged by triple 
dysfunction, that of human wants for scarce natural capital. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Susceptibility to dysfunction:  
Types of democracy 
 
 
 
As the triple dysfunction hypothesis predicts that a major cause of under 
provision of public goods is confusion about whether citizens or politicians direct 
this provision, it indicates that under provision should be less pronounced in polities 
that facilitate overt, deliberative directorship by electors. Some democracies tend to 
do this with features such as: proportional representation of multi-member 
electorates (Milner 2002, 89); not having a popularly elected head of government 
such as a president; and having a consensual political tradition. This tradition 
includes governing with coalitions of minority parties and a culture of making social 
choice by discussion and negotiation among all interested citizens rather than an 
exclusive focus on power and winning. Citizen initiated referenda assist by 
emphasising the directorship of the people, but neglect deliberation. The 
Netherlands and the Nordic countries have many of these structures and 
characteristics (Arter 1999, 151-55) and they rank at the top of The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (Economist 2008c). The Nordic nations have 
been described as state-friendly societies with society-friendly states (Grenstad et al. 
2006, 122). 
Danish political sociologist Jorgen Goul Andersen (2007) was a member of a 
project investigating power and democracy in Denmark from 1978 to 1982. He has 
observed that among the committee of parliamentarians initiating this project ‚there 
clearly was a feeling of losing power, and more generally< that there are increasing 
threats to the democratic idyll in the Nordic countries.‛ This feeling was endorsed by 
that investigation, for which the ‚most original result< probably was the finding 
  86 
that wherever we sought to measure power perceptions, we always found the 
feeling that ‘power belongs to the others’‛. This echoes the triple dysfunction view, 
that a major problem is confusion about who directs. A subsequent study of power 
and democracy in Denmark in 1998-2004 produced mixed results, but identified 
problems of declining political party membership, a growing gap between a 
competent and resourceful majority and a marginalized minority that is becoming 
more disadvantaged, increasing influence of the media, and a transfer of power from 
the political to the judicial system (Christiansen and Togeby 2006). A similar study 
was carried out in Norway from 1998 to 2003 and its chair, Øyvind Østerud (cited in 
Gjessing 2003, 1), concluded that democracy ‚as a chain from elections to decisions is 
weakened all the way< Parties don’t mobilize many voters any more, and young 
people are less active than before, so the trend is likely to gather pace‛. Together 
with Per Selle (2006, 564-5), Østerud observed that ‚the Norwegian political system 
is becoming less distinct‛ as large scale ideological movements decline and interest 
grows ‚in smaller and nimbler associations better at catering for individual needs 
and wishes, but also less able to plug members into the central decision-making 
institutions‛. Along with other developments, these have been interpreted as 
revealing no general civic decline (Listhaug and Gronflaten 2007, 272), but as Selle 
and Østerud indicate, they appear to weaken the political role of the people. 
In 1969, Swedish prime minister Olof Palme (cited in Oliver 1987, xviii) observed 
that ‚Sweden is to a considerable degree a study circle democracy.‛ Study circles are 
self-organizing groups of 5-20 citizens who choose to meet several times to learn 
about an issue. This is done in a democratic manner aiming at freedom of choice, 
critical thinking and exchange of ideas and knowledge. These groups meet 
throughout Scandinavia, in some European countries and have been introduced to 
the US, Australia and a few developing countries. Study circles have operated for a 
century in Sweden, where they are financially supported by government and reflect 
a fierce commitment by the people to the use of adult education for social change 
(Oliver 1987, xv, xvii). 
Swedish political scientists Johannes Lindvall and Bo Rothstein (2006, 48) have 
noted that a 1985-1990 study concluded that their polity was ‚turning into a new 
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kind of democracy, more ‘individualistic’ and more similar to political systems 
elsewhere‛. Ten years after this investigation, its assessment was endorsed by a large 
Swedish government commission led by politicians, which called for the 
strengthening of civic society, more responsiveness by political institutions and a 
more ‚participatory democracy with deliberative qualities‛ (Lindvall and Rothstein 
2006, 60). Lindvall and Rothstein argue that in Sweden there are  
 
troubling indications for the operation of democracy< One common, if maybe simple 
view of the democratic ideal is that the state should do what the people want it to do. 
With the development of ideological state apparatuses, Swedish democracy looks more 
like a society where the state decides what the people ought to think and do< The system 
still spins, but it spins backwards< The question for the future is whether the strong state 
will be replaced by some new model that provides the necessary focal points for debates 
on public policy, or whether stable norms will remain absent due to an inherently obscure 
division of labour within Sweden’s policy-making and administrative structures (Lindvall 
and Rothstein 2006, 47, 61, 47). 
 
Triple dysfunction of course, suggests that this ‚inherently obscure division of 
labour‛ is the ambiguity of the delegation performed by the electoral system. 
Despite this, it seems that the ‚strong state‛ in Sweden is supported by a relatively 
sophisticated public. For example: 
 
Sweden has long implemented one of the most progressive energy policies in Europe. The 
national government enacted one of the world’s first carbon taxes in 1990. Ministers 
announced further ambitions last week through a plan that would increase renewable 
energy production to 50 per cent by 2020, transition the Swedish vehicle fleet to fossil fuel 
independence by 2030, and reach complete carbon neutrality by 2050 (Ben Block 2009, 1). 
  
Political scientist at the University of Iceland, Svanur Kristjánsson (2004, 172, 153) 
observes that the semi-presidential constitutional framework in his country makes 
the role of the voter complex. Together with the decline of the party system and its 
membership, this means that active citizen control of government has all but 
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disappeared. Instead, politicians cater to a fickle electorate, which means that they 
restrict their policy development to a narrow focus on economic stability and 
growth. Kristj{nsson’s (2004, 153) ‚conclusion is that the Icelandic system of 
governance has become a rather messy and complicated political arrangement, 
thereby resembling the situation in other modern democracies.‛ 
Looking at the results of the Power and Democracy projects for Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, Andersen (2007) observes that by comparison with other 
democracies they remain quite healthy and from what was known at that stage it 
would be surprising if the current study on Finland did not largely support this 
picture. He described the Nordic countries as having strong representative 
democracies that rest on a solid popular base with high and equally distributed 
political participation, with capable mass-based parties and people’s movements. 
They have rich economies with solidary wage policies that ensure redistribution for 
a high degree of economic equality. Gender equality is highly developed and the 
regulation of business to make it comply with social goals is strong. Levels of 
political literacy, political engagement, electoral turnout and trust in politicians are 
mostly high. 
However, in agreement with the Danish parliamentarians, Andersen (2007) notes 
signs of trouble: declines in party membership, electoral turnout and political trust; 
increased electoral volatility; weakening of voluntary associations; excessively 
competitive behaviour among the media; concentration of economic wealth and 
power; and an increase in the importance of the market, not only relative to the state 
(both internally and internationally) but in the management of the state. Some of this 
growth of market power is indicated by lowered ambitions for macro-economic 
steering and fewer instruments available to government for economic regulation. As 
Andersen and Hoff (2001, 75) observed six years before, in some ways ‚the period of 
Scandinavian exceptionalism is coming to an end.‛ Andersen (2007) points out that 
the decline of parties raises questions: What is to replace this linkage between 
citizens and political decision-makers? Are there new forms of participation building 
up to replace those which decline? He suggests there is a need in Scandinavia for a 
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public debate on new democratic criteria for citizen participation, dialogue, 
deliberation and government responsiveness. 
This sketch of democracy in Scandinavia indicates that triple dysfunction also 
occcurs here, but to a much lesser degree than in many other democracies, 
presumably because the characteristics listed in the opening of this section tend to 
prevent them. Proportional representation, non-presidential governance (except for 
Finland and to some extent Iceland) and consensual cultures all tend to make the 
people realize that they are the directors of the polity. In addition to the Nordic 
countries having less confusion about who directs government than most other 
democracies, there also tends to be less competition between politicians because 
their political institutions and cultures support a more cooperative style of politics. 
Moreover, compromise over policy may not be as damaging as elsewhere because 
less confusion over directorship means that citizens feel more in charge of the 
development of policy, so there is considerable popular and political support for 
institutions that can help them think constructively about this, such as consensus 
conferences and study circles. 
 
 
The case of the United States 
 
The structure and performance of federal government in the United States 
provide contrasts with the Nordic democracies that appear to illustrate triple 
dysfunction. In respect of government performance, economist Jeffrey Sachs (2009, 
20-22) expresses grave concerns. 
 
When you compare the US with Canada, Western Europe and Japan, the news is sobering. 
Its child-poverty and infant-mortality rates are the highest, its life expectancy is the 
lowest, its budget deficit as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is the highest, and its 
15-year-olds rank among the lowest on tests of math and science. 
A big difference between the US and the rest of the rich world is that for the past 30 
years or so, Americans consistently rejected ‚government solutions‛ to the problems of 
health, poverty, education and the environment<  
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In the past 50 years, arguing for tax increases to fund the expansion of federal programs 
has been a political death wish< Jimmy Carter failed to close the deficit through higher 
taxes in the late 1970s. And Ronald Reagan made tax cuts the down payment on every 
election since. 
 
In concluding a similar list of deficiencies for the US, economics journalist Jeff 
Madrick (cited in Parker 2009, 40) alleges that these ‚facts amount to about as 
conclusive a proof as history provides that the ideology applied in this generation 
has failed.‛ Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins sees the strong religious belief 
in America as a style of thinking that is a problem, not only for this country’s future, 
but for the world. ‚In a Gallup poll 44 per cent of the American people said that they 
believe the world is less than 10,000 years old‛ (Dawkins, cited in K. Muir 2008, 17). 
As these problems are under provisions of public goods, it appears that US 
government is failing to a serious extent. British political scientist Anthony King 
(1997) takes this view and ascribes it to an especially strong need for American 
politicians to focus on campaigning for election rather than on governing. King 
describes Americans as ‚hyperdemocrats‛, partly because they very closely hold 
their representatives accountable and partly because of their pride in their political 
system. They emphasize the accountability of representatives in three ways: with 
very short two-year terms of office for members of the House of Representatives; by 
selecting candidates for election via direct primaries; and through weak support for 
politicians by parties, which makes elections very candidate-centred. As discussed in 
Chapter 2/ Ambiguous delegation/ ‘Ignorant directors’, most voters do not have a 
good grasp of many policy issues, so their tight control over their members of the 
House of Representatives is liable to produce poor public policy. This is 
compounded by the enormous personal expense of campaigning, for this focuses 
candidates on raising funds by pleasing wealthy special interests. The other aspect of 
the hyperdemocratic attitude of US citizens is that 
 
as everyone who visits the United States quickly realizes, they are< inordinately proud of 
their government, or at least of their system of government. Far more than people in other 
countries, Americans are brought up to idolize, almost literally, both their governmental 
  91 
system, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and the 
heroes of American political history (King 2000, 85). 
  
Historian Dana Nelson (2008) has investigated this attitude by focusing on the 
importance and power of US presidents. Noting that this is accorded by citizens and 
cultivated by presidents themselves, she calls it ‚presidentialism‛. She argues that 
presidentialism diminishes democracy by encouraging citizens to limit their 
participation to choosing their next chief. When Americans feel a need for better 
government, their tendency is to look for a better president, rather than to find ways 
of improving the quality of their own opinions on issues. It would also seem that a 
relative absence in the US of two major characteristics of the Nordic democracies 
adds to this confusion about democratic directorship. These are the absence of 
proportional representation and an approach to politics that is less diverse and less 
open-minded than that of the Nordic countries, as it lacks a left wing and is less 
consensual. 
Another cause of government failure in the US is likely to be the strong American 
emphasis on the production and consumption of private goods. This is facilitated by 
democratic confusion about who directs government because that leaves citizens free 
to focus on private goods. As noted in Chapter 2/ ‘The function of democracies’, 
private and public goods compete with each other for resources, so confusion about 
who directs the choice of public goods will encourage the choice and production of 
private goods instead. The US history of colonization, displacement and destruction 
of American Indians, of slavery and of exploitation of abundant natural resources 
appears to have fostered an individualistic, materialistic and competitive culture, 
producing the most enterprising and vigorous market economy in the world. As 
King (2000, 81) observes, there 
 
are few countries in the world whose collective ideology is more pro-business that that of 
the United States and where the climate of opinion is more favourable to free-enterprise 
capitalism. Yet American businesspeople – an immensely influential force in American 
society – do not love their government< This underlying suspicion and mistrust extends 
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well beyond the large corporate sector and is also deeply embedded in the small business 
and entrepreneurial psyche. 
 
Kuttner (2008, 75) also notes the prevalence of this feeling and the damage it may 
do to democratic governance 
  
Obama is constrained by a fiscal climate of opinion in which right-thinking people are 
supposed to be more alarmed about budgetary threats than about either the risks of 
another depression or a continued slow decline in the economic security and opportunity 
of most Americans. Regulation is still widely considered a pejorative word< large 
government endeavours are deemed to be outmoded by modern markets<   
 
While presidentialism encourages US citizens to neglect their democratic role of 
considering and choosing public goods, many citizens encourage their government 
to do the same. King (2000, 97-98) observes that much mistrust of federal 
government has ‚extreme intensity< of anger, frustration and betrayal‛. This 
mistrust has been reported as driving the Tea Party movement of 2009-2010 (von 
Drehle 2010). Some of it may arise from US citizens feeling robbed by government 
because their reliance on politicians, especially the president, means that they lack 
practice at perceiving needs for public goods, so the taxation needed for effective 
government seem excessive. Another cause of mistrust is offered by King (2000, 91). 
 
In short, a major reason for declining trust in government in the United States since the 
1960s has almost certainly been that a significant proportion of those at the head of the 
government have proved untrustworthy. They have cumulatively deprived the American 
presidency of much of its dignity. 
 
This effect is likely to be decisive, cutting through the usual disengagement of most 
citizens on issues and politics, because as Susan Pharr (2000, 201) points out, 
 
misconduct reports are likely to trigger what cognitive psychologists call ‚hot cognitions,‛ 
judgments that carry powerful emotions, facilitating the retention of such reports< And 
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indeed, empirically speaking, we know that across class, educational, and age lines, 
people tend to be remarkably aware of major misconduct cases, often far more than they 
are about many other domains of government action or policy. 
 
The US appears to be in a difficult position. Government failure is evident and 
widely acknowledged, but the countermeasures that appear necessary are, to say the 
least, difficult to implement. Those indicated by King and Nelson are: lengthen terms 
of office for the House of Representatives; strengthen the role of parties by replacing 
primaries with candidate selection by party caucuses and by allowing parties to 
contribute more funds to their candidates’ campaigns; and finally, replace the 
presidential system with a head of government that is not elected by the people but 
by their representatives. The last change should help to shift the public image of 
responsibility for deliberating public policy from political representatives towards 
citizens, but to go further and assist citizens to effectively deliberate public policy, 
new institutions are needed that not only help but encourage them to do this. This 
list of changes is formidable. The abolition of the US presidency seems the last thing 
that the well cultivated awe of this office would countenance. Moreover, few 
proposals of new institutions for nationwide deliberation by citizens have been 
made. These are surveyed in Part 2. 
  94 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Susceptibility to dysfunction: 
Types of issue and three examples 
 
 
 
The triple dysfunction hypothesis only looks at trouble and does not attempt to 
indicate the positive contributions of the five elements of the electoral process that it 
works from. This search for weakness is crucial because, as observed in Chapter 2/ 
‘The function of democracies’, private and public goods usually compete with each 
other for the resources required to provide them. These resources may be human, 
manufactured or natural and any failure by government may be taken advantage of 
by interests that want them for private goods, resulting in under provision of public 
goods. 
To begin to see how pronounced triple dysfunction might be and to help 
recognize the situations where it would be costly, possible characteristics of public 
goods issues are now suggested as being likely to produce some failure of 
democratic responsibility towards these goods. This responsibility includes careful 
consideration of the interests of external states, groups and individuals, if only 
because any lack of this may invite reprisal. 
 
 
Issue characteristics that create problems for liberal democratic 
government 
 
It is suggested that the following eight characteristics that may be found in issues 
concerning public goods are likely to cause liberal democratic governments to 
neglect or mismanage these goods. The first five characteristics are suggested to have 
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this effect because of the tendency of democratic governments to be ignorant. The 
last three – pervasiveness, competitiveness and externalizability – are suggested to 
evoke dysfunction even if these governments are well-informed, because they are 
likely to lack the high degree of responsibility required to effectively address issues 
that have one or more of these three characteristics. The more of the eight 
characteristics that occur in any one issue, the more it will tend to be mismanaged or 
ignored by democratic governments. 
 
1. Complexity 
Issues with this characteristic may have long causal chains, feedback loops, or be 
part of an interrelated web of issues. Social and ecological systems are rich in 
feedback and web structure, but as politicians tend to use short, linear thinking for 
easy comprehension by electors (H. Muir 2008, 41), their ‘solutions’ to social and 
environmental issues may make them worse (Forrester 1971; Yaffee 1997). 
 
2. Abstraction  
Constructive social, economic, environmental and international policies may be 
ignored by politicians focused on concrete monuments to achievement such as 
buildings, bridges, trade profits and quick employment, because the visual, 
monetary, or personal impact of these impresses constituents (Bennett 2008, 2-3). 
Abstract problems such as the development of equality, trust, community solidarity, 
public rationality and education tend to be too cerebral for easy communication to a 
largely disengaged electorate. Problems of risk are abstract when presented in 
statistical terms, so people and societies are inclined to ignore events with low short-
term probability even if this becomes very high or certain over the longer run. 
Psychologist Elke Weber (cited in Bennett 2008, 2) states that for ‚most of us, risk is 
not a statistic. Risk is a feeling< If I feel scared, that overshadows any amount of 
pallid statistical information.‛ Abstract risks can therefore lead to disastrous inaction 
if they have high stakes, such as with nuclear proliferation, terrorism, hurricanes, 
floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, pandemics, peak oil, global warming and space 
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weather events such as coronal mass ejections (for a discussion of these see Brooks 
2009). 
 
3. Obscurity  
Obscurity describes situations that societies have no previous experience of, or 
they have forgotten, or as Weber (cited in Bennett 2008, 3) observes, they do not 
recognize because humans have not evolved an innate response to the situation, 
through lack of evolutionary experience. Lack of recognition may also occur because 
electors not focused on governance do not recognize the issue as a public goods 
problem. Another form of obscurity is imperceptibility of the development of the 
problem, such as in ‘landscape amnesia’ and ‘creeping normalcy’ (Diamond 2005, 
chapter 14), also referred to as the ‘boiling frog syndrome’. Lack of an obvious 
threshold or deadline for action may also amount to obscurity. Climate change 
presents this type of vagueness. An example of creeping normalcy being overthrown 
by a threshold to produce an active democratic social choice is given by the issue of 
whether to dam the Franklin River in Tasmania for hydro-electricity. The physical 
start of dam construction scheduled for late 1982 presented citizens with a dramatic 
deadline that galvanized civil disobedience that ultimately protected the river. It 
spurred into action a very direct democratic social choice by the people that may 
otherwise not have been made.  
Another galvanizing effect in the Franklin River dam issue was the fact that the 
crisis was directly attributable to people. These can easily be demonised, such as 
business people asking for cheap electricity (‘greedy capitalists’) and politicians and 
engineers wanting to build monuments to themselves (‘hubris’, ‘empire-building’, 
obsolete thinking by ‘political dinosaurs’). Paul Slovic (cited in Bennett 2008, 3-4) 
provides another example of this emotional responsiveness to human actors by 
contrasting the muted response to Hurricane Katrina with the far more significant 
and long lasting response to September 11. Katrina seemed like an act of nature and 
therefore failed to trigger our millennia-old fear of having our homes and lives 
invaded by strangers that was evoked by September 11. Evolutionary psychologists 
point out that a major part of our environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) was 
  97 
a social existence of dependence on, and vulnerability to, other people. This situation 
created an ‚evolutionary ‘ratchet’‛ or ‚evolutionary arms race between 
manipulation and mindreading‛ (Orbell et al. 2004, 3, 13) that produced ‚the 
extraordinary sensitivity humans have to other humans‛ (Smith 2006, 1021). As this 
sensitivity to others appears to be ‚a predisposition ‘hardwired’ into our biology‛ 
(Smith 2006, 1016) it will express itself in democracies if their governments have 
trouble producing better judgments. As we have seen, democratic polities have a 
tendency to be irresponsible and ignorant, so this often allows the instincts of the 
people to prevail without their appropriateness for that issue being examined. 
Conversely, the appropriateness of action may not be examined if human 
predispositions are not aroused by that issue. Such an issue therefore has some 
obscurity for humans. Global warming appears to be of this type, as noted by 
Andrew Simms. 
 
In their inability to take action commensurate with the scale and timeframe of the climate 
problem, the *UK+ government is mocked< by Britain’s own history< The challenge is 
rapid transition of the economy in order to live within our environmental means, while 
preserving and enhancing our general wellbeing. In some important ways, we’ve been 
here before and can learn lessons from history. Under different circumstances, Britain 
achieved astonishing things while preparing for, fighting and recovering from the second 
world war [sic]. In the six years between 1938 and 1944, the economy was re-engineered 
and there were dramatic cuts in resource use and household consumption (Simms 2008). 
 
4. Temporal remoteness of consequences.  
Issues with this characteristic are long-term problems. Slovic (cited in Bennett 
2008, 3) notes that it is ‚a very well established fact about human behaviour that we 
discount future negative outcomes a great deal, especially if it means having to 
postpone some immediate positive benefit‛. As discussed in Chapter 2, Marsh and 
Yencken discuss the impact of this issue characteristic on democratic government in 
Into the Future: The Neglect of the Long Term in Australian Politics. 
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5. Spatial remoteness of consequences.  
Problems of this type are geographically distant from decision makers and thus 
often easy to neglect (Diamond 2005, chapter 14). 
 
6. Pervasiveness  
The size of an issue, or habituation of citizens to it, may require a massive effort 
by democracies to generate the political will needed to manage the problem. This 
includes making sure that most citizens are informed and concerned as well as 
mutually supportive, so they have a high degree of solidarity that enables them to 
take responsibility and produce effective collective action. Confusion in democracies 
about who directs public policy hobbles their capacity to create solidarity, with the 
result that pervasive problems such as overpopulation, species extinction, risks of 
pandemics and global warming are likely to produce dire consequences before the 
political will to confront them can be generated. Authoritarian regimes may find it 
easier to forestall such calamities - if they anticipate them, and if they choose to act. 
An example of this facility is the ability of China to introduce strong measures to 
control the birth rate in order to limit overpopulation, which contrasts with the 
inability of democratic India to make such a resolute attempt to face the same 
problem.  
 
7. Competitiveness  
Rivalry over issues that divide the community can be magnified to a destructive 
degree by excessive competition between politicians in representative democracies 
(Dahl 1998, 150, 154-5). This may inhibit responsibility towards public goods as 
described in Chapter 2/ ‘Excessive competition’. The difficulty that all nations have 
in acceding to calls for secession appears to demonstrate this as these situations are 
competitive, with separatists competing with the rest of the nation to secede. It 
appears that one of the causes of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was exacerbation of 
Hutu-Tutsi rivalries by the competitive struggle of democratic politics 
(Courtemanche 2003, 191-193). Jared Diamond (2005, 317) supports this view by 
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stating that, in addition to desperate competition for land because of overpopulation, 
genocide resulted from hatred and fear fostered by the political elite as it tried to 
retain power. 
 
8. Externalizability  
‘Externalizability’ is the openness of a problem to be interpreted by citizens that it 
is caused or permitted to exist by something outside them or their polity when either 
citizens or their government are partially or wholly responsible for it. One form that 
this interpretation may take is conspiracy theorizing, in which citizens blame evil 
intentions in others, instead of blaming themselves, or blaming a group or political 
system with which they feel some affiliation. Any openness of an issue to such 
wishful thinking will encourage the irresponsibility predicted for liberal democracies 
by triple dysfunction. Confusion of directorship and fierce competition for votes give 
politicians strong motives to respond to externalizable issues by choosing ‘solutions’ 
that do not require effort or sacrifice by their electors, regardless of whether they 
cause the problem or not. This propensity of political agents to externalize solutions 
is likely to be considerable, for evolutionary psychology indicates that the capacity 
for deceiving not only others, but also oneself, is highly developed in humans 
(Trivers 1991). Politicians may therefore be supported in their externalizing by the 
egoistic and prosocial predispositions of each citizen to do it as well. 
A powerful motivation for the wishful thinking that entices people to externalize 
solutions to problems is their inclination to reject evidence that clashes with their 
worldview. Slovic (cited in Bennett, 2008, 5) stresses that people ‚do their best to 
hold onto their worldviews because so much of their personal identity and social 
networks are tied up in maintaining it‛. Researchers have found that the two 
worldviews with the most influence on perception and action seem to be the 
egalitarian and the hierarchist (Bennett, 2008, 4). The former is held by those who 
prefer a society where wealth, power and opportunity are broadly distributed and 
the latter is a preference for leaders on top and followers below. Slovic (cited in 
Bennett 2008, 4, 5) observes that what  
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we’ve seen through this research is that egalitarians are generally more concerned about 
environmental risks over a range of hazards, including global warming. Hierarchists tend 
to be less concerned< The truly disconcerting thing about this work is that it shows how 
difficult it is to change people’s views and behaviours with factual information< People 
spin the information to keep their worldview intact. 
 
This behaviour appears to produce enclaves of people with similar views (Sunstein 
2002). In wealthy societies people have more ability to develop such enclaves by 
being able to choose their place of residence, select those with whom they interact 
and select the information that they find most congenial. These situations will tend 
to foster externalization in peoples’ thinking about issues as they tend to be insulated 
from contrary views and evidence.   
 
 
Three cases of externalization of responsibility by liberal 
democratic governments 
 
The eight characteristics of difficult issues described above will give an uneven 
degree of failure by democratic government across the spectrum of public goods 
issues, according to their occurrence of these characteristics in each issue. As triple 
dysfunction produces a degree of irresponsibility and ignorance it tends to 
constrains democracies to provide those public goods that seem personally and 
urgently relevant to citizens. Examples are the availability of work, a prosperous 
economy, freedom from crime and good educational and medical facilities. 
Irresponsibility from triple dysfunction will also incline democracies to aim for quick 
results by treating symptoms rather than basic causes, so most government failure 
will occur in providing public goods that have only long term benefits. This 
unevenness of failure may conceal much of it from many citizens. Other failures they 
may not notice are neglect of minority groups within their polity, or failures in their 
polity’s relationships with other polities. These group-based issues may be spatially 
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remote from most citizens and often have competitiveness and externalizability, 
which invite citizens to react instinctively to members of other groups with 
indifference or even antagonism. 
Three public goods issues that are often mismanaged by democracies are now 
described, to see how significant such mismanagement can be and whether triple 
dysfunction appears to explain it. These examples are overpopulation, global 
warming and unemployment and they have a common theme: each has strong 
effects on the future availability of natural capital. This theme is pursued further in 
Chapter 5 with a description of inflammation of the wants of citizens by democratic 
governments, so that sooner or later people are frustrated by collisions with the 
limits of natural capital. 
  
 
Size of population 
 
Irresponsibility appears to be displayed in the reluctance of democracies to take 
the problem of overpopulation seriously. This is consistent with the triple 
dysfunction confusion about who directs public policy, for the possibility that their 
population could be, or could become, too large requires citizens to carefully 
consider this and if they choose an optimum size they must then decide what they 
can do to achieve it. Colin Butler (2004, 194) notes that after a surge in public concern 
about growth of population around 1960-70, interest began to diminish and 
overpopulation is now a politically incorrect topic. This attitude has been called the 
‚Hardinian taboo‛ in memory of ecologist Garrett Hardin (n.d.), who noted that 
 
Pacific islanders apparently have no hesitancy in explicitly giving taboo as a reason for 
stopping a discussion. By contrast, Westerners, with their cherished tradition of free 
speech and open discussion, would be embarrassed to say (for instance), "We will not 
discuss population because it is under a taboo‛. Instead, they change the subject. 
 
Chris Rapley (2006) has observed that 
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so controversial is the subject [of population size] that it has become the ‘Cinderella’ of the 
great sustainability debate – rarely visible in public, or even in private. In interdisciplinary 
meetings addressing how the planet functions as an integrated whole, demographers and 
population specialists are usually notable by their absence< Unless and until this 
changes, summits such as that in Montreal (‘Beyond Kyoto’) which address only part of 
the problem will be limited to at best very modest success, with the welfare and quality of 
life of future generations the ineluctable casualty. 
 
The very personal basis of this taboo has been described by Robert Engleman (2008). 
 
Discomfort with the topic is everywhere, not least among environmentalists, who grapple 
daily with the ways human beings are altering the natural world... Who wants to reduce 
humanity to a number, or to see themselves as one? And population trends touch on some 
of the most sensitive issues in our experience: sex, race, childbearing, family size, abortion. 
Yet anyone paying attention to human-induced climate change or the ongoing surge in 
global energy and food prices must sometimes pause to think about just how many we 
are. 
 
As triple dysfunction predicts, in democracies this personal sensitivity is transmitted 
to politicians with little reflection or critical review, so that governments are unable 
to develop rational policy responses. 
People who have strong interests in public goods that are vulnerable to 
population pressure, such as environmentalists and green politicians, have quickly 
recognized this irresponsibility of the system. They know that talking about physical 
and social carrying capacities and suggesting corresponding limits to populations 
arouses political scorn. Some of the complexity of this situation is described in 
Overloading Australia: How Governments and Media Dither and Deny on Population, by 
Mark O’Connor and William Lines (2008, 11). They observe that,  
 
more than a decade ago, Labor strategist Gary Johns, the former Special Minister for State, 
identified high immigration and the lack of a population policy as key reasons for the 
Keating [Labor] government’s fall. As Johns put it, ‚The Australian population has 
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overwhelmingly disapproved of the level of immigration to Australia under both Labor 
and Coalition administrations for many years.‛ 
In his analysis, Johns endorsed a recommendation< that Australia should aim to 
stabilize population at between 20 and 23 million, with immigration kept to about 50,000 a 
year. To introduce such a policy might be difficult, said Johns, but it was a potential 
election-winner for Labor. It would be ‚overwhelmingly positive in national interest 
terms‛ and would also show respect for the electorate’s opinion. 
But even with victory at stake, did Labor have the ‘ticker’ to take on the immigration 
lobbies? At the Labor Party’s national conference in Hobart in 1998, Kim Beazley, Labor’s 
then leader, broke through the Keating era’s wall of silence, and promised that Labor 
would give Australia a population policy. 
Unfortunately, Beazley was soon trimming his rhetoric in other directions, so that at 
business dinners and fund raising occasions he gave the opposite impression: that Labor’s 
new population policy would be one of rapid growth< Before long, Beazley was talking 
of ensuring that we reached 50 million people. No doubt his director of campaign funding 
was breathing easier. 
 
This account indicates that although Australians have some concern that there are 
too many of them, their politicians sense that they are more personally concerned 
about their employment and income and therefore want economic growth. At the 
same time, politicians want financial and other support from business in their 
campaigns for re-election and this also compels them to promote economic growth, 
which is easily done by encouraging immigration. 
Another Australian example of democratic irresponsibility is that its recognition 
appears to have quickly reoriented the early policies of the two political parties with 
very strong reasons to be concerned about the pressure of population on natural 
resources: the environmentally concerned Australian Democrats and Australian 
Greens (O’Connor and Lines 2008, 166-175). This manifestation of the Hardinian 
taboo took strong hold in 1984 when racist interpretations and the personal 
implications of the issue made population too difficult for these parties to handle, so 
they ignored it until late in 2008, when Greens leader, Senator Bob Brown (2008), 
spurred into action by the concerns of his constituents about global warming, peak 
oil, a virtually nationwide shortage of water and many other issues, called for a 
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national debate. The policy paralysis that Brown, at long last, attempted to cure is 
wholly consistent with the irresponsibility predicted by triple dysfunction. 
In 2002 the Australian Minister for Immigration Philip Ruddock (2003, 108) 
appeared to confirm this irresponsibility. ‚Two population inquiries in the past 
decade have< highlighted the very limited range of policy levers available for 
governments to influence population size< we have a very limited capacity to 
ensure any particular population target is actually delivered.‛ In recent years net 
overseas migration into Australia has been rising and reached a record level of 
253,400 in the year ending December 2008 (Australian Government 2010), which 
provoked public expressions of concern at the population exceeding 40 million by 
2050. Although arrivals of illegal immigrants as ‘boat people’ create intense political 
debate, they total less than 4,000 per year. In April 2010, the Federal Government 
announced it was making yet another assessment of the population issue. As 
previous governments have done this to little effect, the prospect of a comprehensive 
and useful study seems dim. 
Much of the population issue concerns procreation and as this is a very personal 
subject, politicians in democracies are averse to suggesting restraint by citizens. This 
may be seen in the contrast between the responses made by China and India to their 
population problems. The authoritarian regime in China implemented a one-child 
per family policy in 1979, whereas democratic India is unable to respond so 
decisively to the same challenge. The Chinese government has estimated that by 
mid-2008 the country would have had a population of 1.6 to 1.7 billion without this 
policy, instead of the 1.3 billion it had at that time. China has thereby ensured that its 
growth of GDP produces a greater per capita improvement than India has been able 
to achieve. It has also done this with less decrease in per capita availability of 
domestic natural resources than would have been achieved with a larger growth in 
population. 
It may be relevant to note here, that ‚the role of rapid demographic change in 
China (from large to small families, with an average of two or fewer children) is 
rarely credited as central to the Chinese economic miracle‛ (Butler 2004, 193). 
Instead, for example, Mahbubani (2008, 67-78) ascribes China’s economic 
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effectiveness relative to India as due to China making much better use of the abilities 
of its citizens. Under communism the Chinese had eliminated class distinctions, 
whereas in India the caste system continued to block much of the population from 
educational, political and economic participation. So when Deng Xiaoping decided 
in 1978 to convert China’s command economy into a market economy, the country 
was able to develop quickly. Deng’s pragmatic insistence on meritocracy in both the 
Chinese Communist Party and business greatly assisted this process. From 1980 to 
2005 China’s economy grew at an average of 9.5 per cent per year, compared with 
India’s 5.5 over the same period (Gittins 2006). The omission by observers in 
democracies, of crediting population control with a role in China’s economic success 
may be another indication of triple dysfunction, for its operation in democracies may 
have taught these observers not to see solutions to policy problems in terms of 
significant costs being borne by citizens. Liberal democracies tend not work in this 
way, except in desperate emergencies such as war, for it is only in a sudden major 
crisis that most citizens, become aware that each of them must make some sacrifice. 
 
 
Global warming 
 
A striking example of the democratic irresponsibility to be expected from triple 
dysfunction is the response of the United States to the reality and prospects of global 
warming. At the end of the Bush administration in 2008 it was the only nation with 
no intention of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and it offered no 
credible alternative procedure. Many other liberal democracies react to the issue 
with lesser degrees of irresponsibility, such as deficient performance on Kyoto 
targets and the EU taking thirteen years after the 1992 Framework Convention on 
Climate Change to implement a dysfunctional Emission Trading Scheme. Until 
December 3, 2007, Australia had refused to sign the Kyoto protocol, a neglect that 
echoed that of the US. In view of the history of scientific knowledge on this issue, it 
is arguable that in 2008 the US was 20 years behind where it should have been in its 
response to global warming (Stern 2009). Global warming has been known to be a 
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high probability, extremely high-stakes risk for 30 years. In 1979 the US National 
Academy of Sciences advised that a ‚wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it 
is too late‛ (Environmental Defense 2003). Wide recognition of the problem 
prompted the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in 1988 and the urgency of the need for preventive action was emphasized in 1990 
with a declaration by 49 Nobel Laureates, 700 scientists and the IPCC 
(Environmental Defense 2003). 
This issue has always been recognized as politically very difficult to tackle, but 
each year of procrastination multiplies the magnitude of the task of curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions, in terms of both the speed at which it must be performed 
to stop the warming and the cost of the reformation of economies that grow more 
dependent on emitting these gases, with every year that passes. This failure of 
government is actually more comprehensive than this as it is also a failure to deal 
with ‘peak oil’ - the fact that world production of oil is currently near its historical 
maximum and within a few years will enter an accelerating decline while demand 
continues to rise. 
As the country that has emitted the most greenhouse gases, consumes the most 
petroleum and is also the wealthiest and most technologically advanced nation, the 
US has the greatest responsibility to lead in forging the transition to carbon-free 
energy. This revolution requires new systems of supply, distribution and 
consumption which are extremely difficult to establish against the competition of 
cheap fossil fuels. The Obama administration is starting to turn this situation around 
with many billions of dollars being poured into reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and stimulating scientific research, but this reversal may not be sustained and 
developed as opposing political voices are very strong. 
A few details of the history of the US response to global warming illustrate its 
irresponsibility, while indicating triple dysfunction as the cause. At the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit in Brazil, US President George H.W. Bush (cited in McKibben 2005) 
appeared to follow the unconscious directorship of US citizens, as well as the 
interests of his financial support base, when in response to suggestions that 
emissions of CO2 be controlled he declared that ‚the American way of life is not up 
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for negotiation‛. The following Clinton administration (McKibben 2005) talked in a 
more environmentally responsible way, but had basically the same approach. In July 
2001, George W. Bush’s Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was asked if the new President 
would call on US car drivers to reduce fuel consumption to help tackle global 
warming. He replied:  
 
That’s a big no. The President believes that it’s an American way of life and that it should 
be the goal of policy makers to protect the American way of life. The American way of life 
is a blessed one (cited in Miller 2001).  
 
In 2006, as the impending oil crisis became obvious to growing numbers of 
electors, America’s ‚addiction‛ to foreign oil was at long last acknowledged by 
President G.W. Bush (KRT-Washington, 2006). This is 27 years after President Carter 
tried to tackle the problem (Bacevich 2008, 32-41; Elliott 2006) but Bush’s (2006) 
action on this was shaped by fear of electors for he carefully avoided asking them to 
help by agreeing to conserve energy. Instead, he essentially externalized 
responsibility for the solution by giving incentives to business to rescue the US with 
new sources of energy. He also promulgated similar evasion through his counter-
Kyoto AP6 group, which did not specify limits for carbon emissions (Hamilton 
2007). Over the last two decades, the White House has suppressed, altered or 
dismissed a dozen major reports on climate change, including the September 2002 
annual report of the EPA in which the entire section on climate change was deleted 
(Flannery 2005). In his 2006 movie An Inconvenient Truth, ex-US Vice President Al 
Gore despaired at the inability of democracies, especially his own, to face global 
warming. Elizabeth Kolbert (2006) lamented the studied inaction of the Bush 
administration on this issue: ‚It may seem impossible to imagine that a 
technologically advanced society could choose, in essence, to destroy itself, but that 
is what we are now in the process of doing‛. The head of NASA’s Goddard Institute 
for Space Studies, James Hansen (cited in Herrick and Owens, 2006), has assessed 
that if greenhouse gas emissions are not being curbed and reduced by 2015, there is a 
strong chance that positive feedbacks will tip the planet into an irreversible runaway 
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global warming sequence. He warned that the Bush administration is blocking the 
transmission of this message to electors. 
A well-known aspect of democratic performance on global warming is the 
manipulation of policy by sections of the fossil fuel industry such as ExxonMobil, 
who appear more concerned about their immediate sales prospects than the future of 
society (Bull 2007; Hamilton 2007). These special interest groups distort public 
information and offer incentives to politicians to bias policy, with the result that 
Mark Chandler (cited in Williams 2006), a palaeoclimate modeller at the Columbia 
University Center for Climate Systems Research, observed: ‚we are not getting our 
politicians to vet their comments based on science< Instead we have a situation 
where our scientists are having to worry about what they say – can you see me 
sweating right now?‛ Hansen (2006, 12) has demonstrated this fear by invoking the 
protection of the First Amendment of the US Constitution before warning of the dire 
consequences of greenhouse gas emissions. However, there are some fossil fuel 
dependent companies that are concerned; either about society, or for their image of 
social responsibility, or for the profitability of their investments - so they warn 
government and the public about the need to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Their 
long time-horizons for returns on capital expenditure, for example a 50-year life for a 
coal fired power station, encourage them to attempt to develop public policy as a 
more reliable basis for investment. A scathing Washington Post op-ed (Worldwatch 
2006) has noted that business activism may offer the best hope of moving the US 
government to address global warming and observed that several large companies 
are pushing the UK government to increase its efforts to reduce carbon emissions. 
Cinergy (Fonda 2006), a corporation that operates nine coal-fired power plants in the 
US, asked President Bush to regulate its industry for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Linda Fisher, DuPont’s chief sustainability officer, has observed: ‚We learned that 
we have to be ahead of legislation‛ (cited in Kluger 2007, 42). 
In contrast with the failure of federal US policy on global warming, California has 
a more constructive approach, which nevertheless is also consistent with triple 
dysfunction. In September 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger approved the Global 
Warming Solutions Act, which requires a 25 per cent cut in the state’s greenhouse gas 
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emissions by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050. In doing this he virtually defied his own 
party as the bill received only a single Republican vote (Breslau 2007). Early in 2007 
he issued an executive order requiring a 10 per cent reduction in the carbon content 
of all transportation fuels by 2020. Schwarzenegger (cited in Breslau 2007, 70) 
regards federal denial on this issue as ‚embarrassing‛ and says what ‚we’re 
basically saying to the federal government is ‘Look, we don’t need Washington’< let 
us let the world know that America is actually fighting global warming‛. Several 
other US states are taking a similar line, although not to this degree. 
Schwarzenegger’s approach reflects both his long-standing concern for the 
environment and his confidence in the ability of technology to solve problems. But 
an enabling factor may be what New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (Breslau 
2007, 70) terms Schwarzenegger’s ‚star power‛. His popularity as a former macho 
muscle-man and film star may give him a freedom to choose policies that would 
cripple the electoral prospects of politicians without such a backup source of public 
approval. However, journalist Karen Breslau (2007, 72-3) notes   
 
there is concern that his approach places too little emphasis on the need for Americans to 
reform their consumption habits, from running their air conditioners around the clock to 
driving (yes) their SUVs. ‚He likes to give the impression that you can have it all,‛ says 
Bill Magavern, a Sierra Club representative in Sacramento. ‚He is overly optimistic about 
the ability of the market to solve our problems.‛ 
 
So although it looks as though ‚star power‛ in a politician may enable him to 
counter triple dysfunction to some degree, it still prevails and public policy does not 
accept the responsibility to pay costs. 
Australian federal government behaves in a similar way to that of the US. An 
illustration is given by the story ‚The Greenhouse Mafia‛ by ABCTV 4Corners 
(Cohen 2006), in which former Climate Director for the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organization, Graeme Pearman, stated that ‚scientists are 
no longer as free to speak as they were‛. Barrie Pittock, former CSIRO Climate 
Impact leader backed this up: ‚I was expressly told not to talk about< how you 
might reduce greenhouse gases‛. In the same program, Guy Pearse, former 
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speechwriter for the Australian Minister for the Environment, claimed that 
‚greenhouse policy is being driven by the mining and energy sectors.‛ This 
irresponsibility by Australian government was summed up by Tim Flannery (cited 
in Hodge and Wahlquist 2006, 8). 
 
What we do with coal is shovel it out of the ground as quick as we can, contribute to a 
global pollution problem, and then say we don’t want to have anything to do with the 
international treaty that is meant to deal with this problem, which is Kyoto. We do the 
same thing with uranium. I just think that is morally abhorrent and very, very wrong. 
 
Such behaviour appears to show triple dysfunction reflecting the egoistic and 
narrow solidary interests of disengaged electors and special interest groups. 
Responding to this government failure, the president of Australasian BP, Gerry 
Hueston (The Mercury 2005, 4), has appealed to his industry to work together to 
develop renewable alternatives to hydrocarbon fuels: ‚My view is that we are 
running out of time to deal with the environmental consequences of fossil fuels 
much faster than we are running down our stocks of them.‛ The Business Council of 
Australia has indicated a similar concern about deficiencies in public policy by 
calling for more effective strategic planning in politics (Marsh and Yencken 2004). So 
we see a few attempts by Australian private enterprise, whose role is to supply 
private goods, to try to do government’s job as well, that of providing public goods. 
As with Du Pont’s Fisher, some Australian businesspeople realize they must 
intervene to try to produce a stable and productive environment for their 
investments. But part of their reaction may also be social responsibility: business 
managers are members of the community and as they are often well informed they 
may develop concerns for society’s future well before the average voter acquires the 
knowledge to perceive the problems. 
A complaint by the former Beatle, Paul McCartney, provides another indication of 
triple dysfunction in responses by democracies to global warming. McCartney was 
reacting to the situation reported in 2006 by the United Nations that world-wide, 
cattle-rearing generates more greenhouse effect through methane emissions than the 
carbon dioxide emitted by transportation. 
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The biggest change anyone could make in their own lifestyle would be to become 
vegetarian< It’s very surprising that most major environmental organisations are leaving 
the option of going vegetarian off their lists of top ways to curtail global warming 
(McCartney cited in Reuters 2008). 
 
By avoiding advocacy of vegetarianism, NGOs do not confront their members, 
potential members and other citizens with a very personal discipline. They seem to 
recognize that such advocacy risks damaging their causes by asking more of people 
than many will tolerate, especially if they have no assurance that all citizens will act 
together to make the effort effective. NGOs’ avoidance of asking people to become 
vegetarian also indicates that they recognize politicians in democracies are in a 
similar position. They cannot ask citizens to pay significant personal costs for public 
goods if most of them have little appreciation of the need for these goods. The same 
situations were observed above for environmental organisations and politicians on 
another very personal issue: that of population. These examples of policy paralysis 
indicate that citizens of democracies are divorced from feeling responsible for public 
goods, which in turn indicates ambiguity in their systems of delegation. 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
When a lack of employment becomes severe, the almost invariable response of 
liberal democratic governments is to externalize their responsibility to provide the 
public good of employment for all, by looking outside the political world of electors 
and politicians to industry and commerce for an answer. These governments do this 
by trying to produce more economic growth. This is advocated as the solution as it 
will provide more work, which hopefully will produce more jobs. Private enterprise 
welcomes this approach, for it means more profit. And pleasing private enterprise is 
good for politicians, for it funds much of their election campaigns and runs most of 
the media. The alternative approach, of sharing more equitably whatever work 
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already exists, is usually carefully ignored - because it requires politicians to ask a 
large section, or even the majority, of electors to change their lifestyle, by working 
less for less income, so that the minority that are unemployed may have a share. This 
alternative strategy would also require that politicians ask businesses to reorganize 
themselves to facilitate the sharing of work. But triple dysfunction imbues politicians 
with some irresponsibility towards public goods and in this case it means that they 
will usually be the last to ask electors to pay a personal cost to produce the public 
good of employment for all. So liberal democratic governments avoid considering 
the sharing of employment and expand the economy instead. Triple dysfunction 
thereby produces the absurdity that labour-saving technology is used to make 
people work as much as before and possibly even more (an effect described as 
‘affluenza’ in Chapter 5/ ‘The scarcity multiplier’), rather than to give them more 
leisure time. As triple dysfunction allows citizens to react to unemployment without 
exercising self-discipline for the good of their democracy, it may develop a culture of 
complaint – an expectation by citizens that difficult personal circumstances can be 
dealt with by complaining to politicians rather than by shouldering a responsibility 
to cope with it. Such coping by citizens would include them appreciating the 
provision of unemployment benefits by the state; being prepared to relocate for 
future employment; regarding such problems as just a normal occurrence that may 
happen several times during their working life; and requesting their politicians to 
organize work sharing opportunities and incentives. 
Herman Daly identifies the current inflexibility of the length of the working day, 
week and year as a crucial problem in sustaining quality of life. 
 
For the Classical Economists the length of the working day was a key variable by which 
the worker (self employed yeoman or artisan) balanced the marginal disutility of labour 
with the marginal utility of income and leisure so as to maximize enjoyment of life. Under 
industrialization the length of the working day became a parameter rather than a variable 
(and for Karl Marx was the key determinant of the rate of exploitation). We need to make 
it more of a variable subject to choice by the worker. And we should stop biasing the 
labor-leisure choice by advertising to stimulate more consumption and more labor to pay 
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for it. Advertising should no longer be treated as a tax deductible ordinary expense of 
production (Daly 2009, 4). 
 
This distortion of the choice between work and leisure by advertising is an example 
of its inducement to neglect public goods, as described in Chapter 2/ Ambiguous 
delegation/ Ignorant directors/ Relatively dynamic</ ‘Distraction by advertising’. 
The role of advertising in diverting attention from public goods is further analysed 
in Chapter 5/ ‘The scarcity multiplier’. 
The importance of work sharing for a sustainable economy is emphasized by Tim 
Jackson (2009, 180): ‚In an economy in which labour productivity still increases but 
output is capped (for instance for ecological reasons), the only way to maintain 
macro-economic stability and protect people’s livelihoods is by sharing out the 
available work.‛ Jackson notes that reduced working hours are usually beneficial for 
other reasons as well, such as increasing labour productivity and improving the 
work-life balance. However, it only tends to succeed under certain conditions. 
Experience in Germany and Denmark has shown that a fundamental pre-condition 
for reducing working hours is a stable and relatively low degree of inequality of 
incomes across society (Jackson 2009, 136). Recognizing this, Daly has recommended 
legislation in the US for 
 
a minimum income and a maximum income< Complete equality is unfair; unlimited 
inequality is unfair. Seek fair limits to the range of inequality. The civil service, the 
military, and the university manage with a range of inequality of a factor of 15 or 20. 
Corporate America has a range of 500 or more. Many industrial nations are below 25< A 
sense of community necessary for democracy is hard to maintain across the vast 
differences current in the US. Rich and poor separated by a factor of 500 become almost 
different species (Daly 2009, 3, 4) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A detailed example of dysfunction: 
Escalation of wants for scarce natural capital 
 
 
 
It is proposed here that triple dysfunction causes many economically developed 
democracies to have an irrational and damaging preoccupation with economic 
growth. This preoccupation may be viewed as the fixed idea that the monetary 
return given by a development project is a benefit. However, as explained here, this 
‘benefit’ may really represent a cost, irrespective of whether there are other direct 
effects of the development such as environmental and social impacts. This cost may 
be incurred a few years after the completion of the development and if that happens 
then the bigger the financial return or ostensible benefit of the development, the 
bigger the ultimate net cost. The following description of how this occurs and why it 
is overlooked is based on a previously published article (P. Smith 2009). If this 
description appears to be an accurate description of economic development, then it 
is another indication that the triple dysfunction hypothesis has some reliability and 
could therefore be used to design a remedy for government failure. The description 
also illustrates the strategic and self-critical capacities of directorship that citizens 
must provide for their democracy. 
The behaviour of democratic government described here appears to be sensed by 
many environmentalists, for many of them give development projects and economic 
growth a lower priority than others do. To people with less environmental concern, 
this priority may seem a selfish preoccupation with personal interests. A rationale 
that some of the more radical environmentalists give for their concern seems to 
confirm this assessment. It is that ‘nature’ has a right to exist without being altered 
by man, irrespective of whether its unaltered state is of value to man. To a less 
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committed observer this may seem like wishful thinking and this chapter offers 
another approach: evidence-based reasoning for a low priority for economic growth 
in developed economies. 
The core behaviour of democratic government at issue here is that it gives citizens 
generally what they want and then has to give more and so on, apparently without 
end. This happens because, as explained below, when people get what they want, 
they then want more, a response that, it is suggested, is strongest for basic wants like 
food, shelter, energy and the education to get the employment that provides such 
essentials. For those who suspect this happens and have concerns about its 
environmental costs, this may raise a question: What is the ultimate point of giving 
citizens the things they want, especially those that are most essential to them, when 
they will then want even more? As economic growth is required to expand the 
supply of both essential and less essential goods and services, this question becomes; 
why have more economic growth when it largely recreates and may even exacerbate 
the dissatisfaction that demanded it? This chapter describes how triple dysfunction 
prevents democratic governments from recognizing and thinking about this 
question, so they remain mesmerized by the quest for more growth. 
 
 
Background 
 
Along with much public choice theory and the other indications of government 
failure discussed in Chapter 1, the triple dysfunction hypothesis implies there will be 
times when citizens would be justified in engaging in civil disobedience, if this is 
their last resort to try to block government actions on important issues. Government 
policy will sometimes be badly mistaken, not from inadequate information, nor from 
unpredictability of consequences and not from incompetence in politicians, but from 
irresponsibility towards public goods that is built into the political system. At times, 
citizens may perceive a moral obligation to challenge government in order to try to 
correct such mistakes. If only a small minority recognize such a case, they may see 
civil disobedience as the only way for them to try to alert the mass public in order to 
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raise political pressure to have that policy changed. Such disobedience could also be 
the only way they have to try to push their government to reform its processes so 
that its irresponsibility is eliminated. Civil disobedience occasionally erupts in 
democratic countries but has not developed the latter rationale, beyond the 
occasional call for revolution and more frequent calls for anti-corruption measures. 
No doubt this is because very few promising ways of systemically improving 
democratic government have been proposed and they have not received widespread 
publicity and understanding. Four proposals that approach this level of intervention 
are described in Chapter 6. Chapter 8 describes devices of more restricted 
capabilities that could assist in such reform. 
A prominent example of civil disobedience occurred in 1982-83 in Australia when 
many hundreds of citizens made illegal attempts to physically block construction of 
the Tasmanian Gordon-below-Franklin hydro-electric project. A total of 1272 were 
arrested and nearly 450 remanded in gaol (Thompson 1984, 174). Before that protest 
and continuing to the time of writing, numerous demonstrations have been made in 
Australia against development projects such as the logging of old growth forests 
with high conservation values. Many citizens have been arrested in these events and 
some have been fined. In parallel with several other countries, such distress in 
citizens has inspired the establishment of a political party, the Australian Greens, to 
try to more effectively address not only the environment, but all public goods. These 
tactics of protest, civil disobedience and new political parties have produced some 
noteworthy gains for public goods, but it is suggested that because they do not 
address triple dysfunction, serious neglect of these goods continues and hostility 
smoulders between environmentalists and supporters of economic development. 
However, if the effect of triple dysfunction on the public goods of the environment 
and other natural resources is understood by all sides, then each should better 
understand the problem and constructive reform may become more likely. 
Damage to natural resources from economic growth is apparent in the well 
advanced degradation of quality of life and future prospects for many regions, 
whether they are governed democratically or not. These problems are caused by 
overpopulation, or overdevelopment, or damaging technology or some mixture of 
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these. In some respects such as global warming, marine fisheries and whale stocks, 
the damage from economic growth is worldwide. Many nations, both democratic 
and non-democratic, have overexploited natural resources, so different types of 
political system appear unable to control their economic growth. The theory offered 
here only attempts to explain this failure in the case of liberal democracies: such 
failure by other regimes may have similar causes but is not investigated here. 
The theory proposes that liberal democratic governments are likely to 
unjustifiably deplete natural resources because of their choices on the issue of 
whether to expand the economy. This issue has seven of the eight characteristics 
listed in Chapter 4 as presenting difficulties for decisions by democratic government. 
 
Complexity 
Expansion of the economy is likely to produce positive feedbacks that defeat the 
objectives of the expansion. This complexity is not seen by voters who are busy with 
their lives and not thinking deeply about public policy. 
 
Abstraction  
Future expansion of the economy and its consequences are merely ideas rather 
than concrete objects that voters can personally experience.  
 
Obscurity 
Important adverse consequences of economic growth develop imperceptibly. 
Those who are responsible for these consequences are difficult for citizens to 
recognize, because most of them are themselves. 
 
Temporal remoteness of consequences 
Adverse consequences are in the relatively distant future; beneficial ones are in 
the near future.  
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Pervasiveness 
As almost all citizens support economic growth and thereby contribute to its 
consequences, avoiding these poses the massive problem of developing solidarity for 
unconventional public policy. 
 
Competitiveness 
Attempting to resolve the issue inflames conflict between those concerned 
primarily with private goods and those with strong concerns for public goods, such 
as the environment and equitable sharing of employment and wealth. This polarity 
is close to the hierarchist-egalitarian divergence in human populations that is 
partially genetic and has a large influence on human perception and action, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and at the end of Chapter 7. As noted there, such worldviews 
resist modification. 
 
Externalizability 
The issue of whether to have more economic growth may be described as 
externalizable because it invites externalization of responsibility. It does this by 
posing the choice of how to match supply and want. It is tempting for voters to 
assume that this should be done by managing their supplies rather than their wants. 
If wants are to be managed, citizens may have to be very well informed, not only 
about the issues but about the readiness of fellow citizens to pay their share of the 
costs. From the perspective of democratic government, managing the wants of voters 
is an internalization of the way the match is made, whereas the matching is largely 
externalized from politics if it is done by manipulating supply. 
The combination of these seven difficult characteristics within the issue of 
whether to have economic growth produces an almost ‘perfect storm’ of democratic 
failure. It is therefore chronic and widespread across states. It also has enormous 
impact. It is a failure of government that allows citizens to continue with accustomed 
ways of acting as individuals rather than as responsible members of their society, so 
they reproduce and consume according to private considerations with scant regard 
for public goods. For some people, as discussed below, consumption may mean 
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migrating to wherever they can do more of it. This continuation of egoistic 
behaviour amounts to collective irrationality if it persists when it has become 
destructive for the society in which it takes place. When democratic dysfunction 
allows such persistence we have a boom constructing a bust, as consuming and 
populating collides with the limits of natural resources. Global warming and peak 
oil indicate the scale of some of these problems. Moreover, the frustrations of such 
physical busts are preceded by those of collisions with the social limits of positional 
competition (Hirsch 1977). 
Before describing the way this irrational preoccupation with economic growth is 
generated, three crucial concepts are described. These are: inflation of want by 
supply, the private goods bias and the supply bias. 
  
 
Inflation of want by increase in supply 
 
The first primary democratic dysfunction, confusion about who directs public 
policy, allows citizens to neglect their democratic role and follow narrow interests. 
This allows an apparently instinctive behaviour to assert itself without being 
disciplined by considerations of public goods: wants grow when their supplies are 
increased. This behaviour is postulated not as an invariable reflex, but as a general 
tendency and is referred to as ‘inflation of want by increase in supply’ (IWIS). As 
discussed later in this chapter under ‘The scarcity multiplier’, IWIS means that an 
increase in the supply of a good to an individual may increase the want of that 
individual for a greater supply, not only of that good but for many other goods as 
well. IWIS applies to both private and public goods that are wanted and supplied, 
but as discussed under ‘The scarcity multiplier’, it is often most pronounced with 
private goods. 
IWIS is a ubiquitous tendency. It is also destructive, partly because the 
satisfaction of having wants met by an increase in supply is subsequently partially 
eliminated by wants being stimulated by that increase. This frustration often persists 
indefinitely through positive feedback, for when an increase in supply stimulates 
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more want, the larger want provokes more effort to find, or buy, or make bigger 
supplies; and if this succeeds, more want is evoked and so on. Frustration increases 
further when these expanding wants collide with the limits of natural resources. 
IWIS therefore obliges societies to exercise self-discipline. As Adam Smith (1976 
[1790], 140) pointed out, 
 
man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself, not as something separated and 
detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature< 
[and] to the interest of this great community, he ought at all times to be willing that his 
own little interest should be sacrificed. 
  
IWIS is not only a positive feedback response by individuals, but also by 
populations. A community is likely to grow in response to an increase in the supply 
of something that its members want, either by more people being attracted to 
migrate into that community to take advantage of its increased supply, or by its birth 
rate being inflated by the increase in supply, or by its death rate being reduced by it, 
or by some combination of these responses. If the increased supply creates a bigger 
population it will also have created a bigger aggregate want for supplies of 
everything that people want. More effort will then go into expanding the supplies of 
all these goods and any success in this will encourage the population to grow further 
and so on. 
The general example of IWIS is the propensity of all species to fully exploit their 
ecological niches. All replicating entities consume the food, shelter, sunlight and 
other things available to them that they need for replication, thereby enlarging their 
populations to the extent permitted by these supplies. If the limiting extent of such 
supplies is expanded by more supplies becoming available, the replicator’s 
population invariably increases to the new limit established by this expansion of 
supply. The universality of such growth of consumption or want as a response to 
increase in supply suggests that it is a product of natural selection. Replicators that 
did not behave in this way would find their supplies taken over by those that did 
and would be more vulnerable to elimination by predators, especially those with 
IWIS behaviour. 
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In the case of humans, an apparent exception to the population growth form of 
IWIS is demographic transition, a failure of populations to respond in this way to 
growing supplies of goods and services. This ‘failure’ usually occurs as a human 
population progresses from a low state of economic development to a more 
prosperous state where most citizens are well educated, child mortality is reduced, 
contraceptives are available and acceptable, and food, housing, transport and other 
goods and services are relatively well supplied. However, the lack of population 
growth IWIS due to the demographic transition tends to be compensated for by 
enhanced IWIS in each individual, as increasing affluence encourages them to want 
more goods and services. Recent research indicates that this effect is usually 
supported by a reversal of demographic transition when a country develops beyond 
the human development index of 9, so that birth rates start to rise (Myrskyla 2009).  
Organisms that show no evidence of consciousness, such as viruses, bacteria, 
plants and the simpler animals, cannot be described as displaying IWIS because it 
seems unlikely that they experience wants. But their behaviour is similar, so perhaps 
IWIS should be changed to ‘inflation of consumption by increased supply’ (ICIS), as 
the universal biological response. This behaviour, whether we call it IWIS or ICIS, is 
so pervasive that when we consider humans, we might anticipate that extremely 
competent social choice is required if societies are to have the capacity to resist it 
when this is prudent. 
As noted above, IWIS in human societies may include inflation not only of the 
want that receives a greater supply, but inflation of wants for many other things as 
well. This gives IWIS considerable power in producing the political fixation on 
economic growth described below under ‘The scarcity multiplier’. As explained 
there, the fixation develops because triple dysfunction means that democratic 
government directs IWIS to preferentially inflate wants for private rather than for 
public goods. 
In economics, demand is want that is backed by purchasing power. As used here, 
‘want’ refers to demand as well as to want for things that are not paid for, such as 
public goods available to all from nature and other public goods provided through 
government action on such things as fiscal, monetary and foreign policy. In what 
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follows, statements such as ‘matching want and supply’ should therefore be 
understood to include ‘matching demand and supply’. Similarly, ‘IWIS’ includes 
inflation of demand by increased supply. 
One form of IWIS has long been recognized by economists: ‚In the economics 
literature it is< well known that increased efficiency in the use of a resource leads 
over time to greater use of that resource and not less use of it‛ (Ekins, cited in UK 
Parliament 2006, 3). Increasing the efficiency of the use of a resource is equivalent to 
increasing its supply and the resultant ‘greater use of that resource’ registers a 
greater want for it, so we have IWIS. This effect was first noted by the nineteenth 
century economist Stanley Jevons as a response to increasing efficiency in the use of 
coal as an energy resource. In 1979-80, the ‘Jevons’ paradox’ was stressed by 
economists Daniel Khazzoom and Leonard Brookes as a crucial consideration for 
energy management. American economist Harry Saunders (1992) subsequently 
called it the Khazzoom-Brookes (K-B) postulate. It is also known in the economics of 
energy use as the rebound effect (Herring and Sorrell 2009) and it may be expressed 
to cover resources in general by the statement that if technological improvement 
allows a resource to be used more efficiently, more of it will be wanted and 
consumed because it now costs less to use for that purpose. Two effects drive this 
increase in want or consumption: reduced cost of use makes the resource more 
attractive as a substitute for other resources; and the money that can now be saved in 
using this resource can be used to increase investment in production capacity and 
also to increase consumption, so economic growth is boosted, which raises the 
demand for that resource. This economic growth also raises the demand for other 
marketed goods and services, which is a part of the comprehensive boost to wants 
for both private and public goods that is hypothesized by IWIS. The rebound effect 
describes inflation of want for a resource via a particular type of expansion of its 
supply, which is not an increase in the quantity available for use, but an increase in 
the effectiveness of the use of the existing supply. Horace Herring and Steve Sorrell 
point out that for energy resources, rebound can be very significant but the ways in 
which it takes place are often not amenable to reliable measurement. 
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The rebound effect is only a part of the spectrum of inflation of want 
hypothesized by IWIS because the latter describes inflation of want for resources that 
may be public as well as private goods and which may be caused by an increase in 
the quantity of supply as well as an increase in the effectiveness of the use of the 
supply. Both these ways of increasing the effective supply may require new 
technology if they are to avoid raising its price. If the price rises, it could counter the 
increase in effective supply by diminishing its availability for use. Both IWIS (as a 
general effect) and rebound (as a particular case) predict that demands for, and 
consumption of, marketed goods and services will tend to rise in response to 
increasing the availability of supply, but IWIS goes further by saying this tendency 
also occurs with increases in the availability of supplies for wants that are not backed 
by purchasing power. So IWIS describes inflation of want for resources that are 
public goods as well as for those that are private goods. This makes IWIS quite 
different from Say’s Law, the early nineteenth century idea that a supply creates an 
equal demand. Say’s Law applies only to private goods, stating that the money paid 
for a supply immediately enables the supplier to exert a new demand of the same 
magnitude. IWIS also differs from Say’s Law by describing the effect of an increase 
in supply, rather than the effect of a supply. 
I now review the tendency for public goods to be underprovided by democratic 
governments and then describe how this combines with ignorance (one of the two 
secondary dysfunctions of triple dysfunction) of IWIS by these governments to 
produce an IWIS complex that persistently escalates the scarcity of natural resources. 
 
 
Private goods bias 
 
It was noted in Chapter 2 under ‘The function of democratic government’ that 
public and private goods usually compete with each other for the resources needed 
for their production and maintenance. An under provision of public goods will 
therefore usually signify a bias towards the provision of private goods. As triple 
dysfunction, in common with much observation and other theory, indicates that 
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democratic governments often under supply public goods we may conclude they 
have a bias to favour the provision of private goods - a ‘private goods bias’. In the 
description given below in ‘The scarcity multiplier’, government failure is called a 
private goods bias instead of an under provision of public goods because it is a more 
direct way of understanding the tendency of government to excessively damage the 
provision of public goods by encouraging the production of private goods. In other 
words, their private goods bias tends to prevent democratic governments from 
controlling economic growth. 
Democratic governments make some attempts to discourage wants for private 
goods and this has the effect of moderating their private goods bias. Examples are 
differential taxes such as excises and labelling laws aimed at specific goods or 
services. Such controls are usually introduced only after considerable pressure, 
either from special interests or from the public and after the development over time 
of the recognition by many citizens of good reasons for not satisfying some of their 
wants for private goods. However, as triple dysfunction makes democratic 
governments under provide public goods, their policies working against the private 
goods bias will be too few and too weak to eliminate it across all public policy. 
 
 
Supply bias 
 
A special form of the private goods bias is here termed the supply bias, a 
tendency of democratic governments to supply goods (whether private or public), 
rather than to ignore or try to discipline citizens’ wants for these in situations where 
this supply will cause some public goods to be underprovided to an extent that 
outweighs the satisfactions of wants that the supply is intended to create. Supply 
bias is a type of private goods bias because it is a tendency for government to choose 
the private good of supplying the personal wants of citizens instead of choosing the 
public good of ignoring or disciplining these wants in the interests of broader public 
welfare. This bias, along with any other form of the private goods bias, reflects the 
strong tendency for politicians to follow the wishes of citizens, as noted in Chapter 2/ 
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Ambiguous delegation/ ‘Citizens as directors’. These wishes, as subsequently 
discussed in ’Ignorant directors’, tend to focus on private rather than public goods.  
Some observers, for example Hardin (1972), have identified the supply bias by 
remarking on a tendency of politicians and citizens to try to solve public issues with 
technical solutions that produce greater or more effective supplies, rather than by 
controlling wants, or as Hardin (1972, 251) expressed it, by ‚change in human values 
or ideas of morality‛. An example of supply bias is the reluctance of the Australian 
and US governments under Howard and G. W. Bush respectively, to respond to 
problems of global warming, peak oil and energy independence by trying to 
persuade their publics to want less energy. One way they might do this is to limit the 
size of their populations, through policies on birth rates and immigration. Instead, 
they have preferred to supply whatever energy is demanded, with technology that 
either reduces emissions (such as nuclear, wind and solar energy) or uses the 
existing supply more efficiently (for example by more effective insulation of 
buildings). However, both supply strategies are constrained by politicians’ desires 
that the costs for citizens do not conflict strongly with citizens’ wants for personal 
purchasing power. 
Thus, for both private and public goods, democratic governments tend to match 
wants and supplies by managing supply more readily than want: they have a supply 
bias. 
 
 
The scarcity multiplier 
 
The following analysis indicates that democratic governments routinely make 
choices with a private goods bias (including a supply bias) thereby producing 
mounting problems of inflating want by increasing supplies (IWIS). These problems 
are largely those of economic growth pushing against the constraints of limited 
natural resources. As this is a self-reinforcing escalation of the scarcity of these 
resources, it is here labelled the ‘scarcity multiplier’. The example described below 
illustrates the usual response of democracies to opportunities for a particular type of 
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economic growth. This is the macro-allocation of natural capital from the ecosystem 
for micro-allocation by the market, which is a subsystem of the ecosystem (Costanza 
and Daly 1992). ‘Natural capital’ refers to the stock of natural resources that provides 
a flow of useful natural goods or services, or ‘natural income’. An example of natural 
capital on a grand scale is the sun, as it provides a flow of sunlight and also the 
‘flow’ of gravity that keeps the earth in orbit and thereby sustains the flow of 
sunlight to earth. Macro-allocation of natural capital is the transfer of materials or 
energy from the ecosystem (which is the macro-system that holds stocks of material 
and energy that may be consumed without paying a price) to the market for micro-
allocation, in which they are converted into goods and services for a price. 
A crucial observation on the macro-allocation of natural capital to the market is 
that of ecological economists Robert Costanza and Herman Daly (1992, 41), who 
state that it ‚should be viewed as a social or collective decision rather than an 
individualistic market decision.‛ This is because most natural capital comprises 
public goods, such as sunshine, climate, rivers, air, soils, mineral deposits, stocks of 
fish and wildlife, native vegetation, genetic diversity, wilderness and space on land, 
sea and in the air. The market is impotent in the allocation of public goods because 
they are freely available to all, so government or some other non-market institution 
must allocate them. This makes politics of fundamental importance for the rational 
macro-allocation of natural capital. When government malfunctions, this macro-
allocation may fail and in democracies this often takes the form of a scarcity 
multiplier.  
It is proposed that any region with the following conditions will suffer scarcity 
multiplication. 
 
Conditions 
1. The region has a resident population with an electorally representative liberal 
democratic government. 
2. Migration to and from other regions is possible. 
3. Economic conditions are well developed, so a basic level of affluence has been 
achieved: say over US$15,000 per capita (Common and Stagl 2005, 199). This has 
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produced demographic transition, so the size of the population is controlled 
largely by the influence on migration of the economic opportunities in the region. 
4. Other regions present higher and lower opportunities for earning income. These 
induce emigration and immigration for this region, which in combination with 
its birth and death rates may produce a tendency over time for its population to 
grow, shrink, or maintain its size. 
5. The natural capital (both public and private) of the region is, with few exceptions 
such as air, limited. The availability of natural capital to residents is higher than 
that of many other regions. 
6. Virtually all types of natural capital (both public and private) in the region are in 
some type of use to some extent, so there is a degree of competition between 
wants for these uses. Many of these wants may be expressed as political or 
economic demands. 
 
An example of options presented by these conditions 
These conditions exist in the Australian state of Tasmania, making escalation of 
the scarcity of its natural capital likely. An example is provided by a recent public 
dispute over whether to (a) dam the Meander River in northern Tasmania, primarily 
to produce private goods in the form of employment and income from agricultural 
irrigation and hydro-electricity; or (b) not dam the river, primarily to protect 
opportunities for the public to enjoy the mainly natural values of the area. These 
values were: the exceptional scenery of a forested mountain valley (which would be 
damaged by both the dam and its reservoir with a summer draw-down zone up to a 
kilometre wide), rare native quolls (carnivorous marsupials, approximately the 
shape and size of a domestic cat) and forms of appreciation based on natural 
seasonal river flows. The dispute arose because it appeared that projected economic 
returns from the dam might pay for its construction and operation, so option (a) 
became attractive to farmers in the region and to other Tasmanians favouring 
economic growth.  
It must be noted that the private goods primarily produced by (a) would be taxed 
to finance consequent new public goods such as infrastructure and government 
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services. Moreover the production of these private and consequent public goods will 
tend to make the economy of the region grow, producing more private and public 
goods. The same effects will be produced to some degree by (b) if its primary 
protection of natural capital supports commercial activity such as tourism or the 
immigration of creative and entrepreneurial talent seeking an attractive environment 
to work and live in. As in (a), any such private goods produced by (b) will be taxed 
to finance consequent new public goods and all these activities help the economy 
grow. The possible consequences for each option may therefore be summarized 
without quantification as follows. 
(a) Dam   private goods   public goods (services, infrastructure)   more 
private and public goods (services, infrastructure) 
(b) Not dam   public natural capital protected   private goods  public 
goods (services, infrastructure)   more private and public goods (services, 
infrastructure). 
The essential difference in possible outputs is that (a) does not protect public 
natural capital (PuNC) whereas (b) does. Politicians will react to these options with a 
private goods bias, including its supply bias variant. So if (a) seems to offer a greater 
or more certain supply of private goods than (b), then politicians will tend to favour 
(a) and ignore its damage to public natural capital. This will distress those citizens 
who are concerned with the public good of environmental quality, producing the 
following consequences. 
 
Social choice from these options 
1. Public dispute arises about whether to dam or protect the river and this signifies 
a degree of scarcity of private goods (water rights, electricity, employment and 
income) and also of PuNC public goods (scenery, quolls and free flowing rivers). 
A political decision is required on which scarcity is the greater cost to society and 
therefore warrants mitigation. This decision is made with the private goods bias, 
including its supply bias variant, giving a social choice of (a), to dam the 
Meander to convert PuNC public goods into a supply of private goods. This 
creates more employment and income in the region, which is central northern 
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Tasmania, an area of about 15,000 square kilometres supporting around 150,000 
residents.  
2. The increase in employment and income encourage this population to grow, by 
attracting migrants from other regions and by retaining residents who might 
otherwise migrate to other regions (see conditions 2, 3 and 4 above) for 
employment and income.  
3. This expansion of the population increases aggregate want in the region for all 
the private and public goods that people want. This increases the wants to use 
the natural capital of the region to supply both public and private goods.  
4. This natural capital is limited, so the increase in wants means its perceived 
scarcity rises above the level that provoked the social choice of the initial step 1. 
This rise in scarcity is further increased by the reduction in the quantity of PuNC 
that was created by social choice (a) at step 1. 
 
This rise in scarcity of natural capital will tend to force more choices about what it 
is used for. The private goods bias with its supply variant means that it seems 
rational to politicians that they respond by converting more PuNC uses from 
supplying public goods to supplying private goods, so we have a tendency to repeat 
step 1. This creates a tendency to repeat step 2, the stimulation of population growth. 
Steps 3 and 4 follow feeding back to step 1 and so on. Each repetition of the cycle 
escalates the scarcity of the natural capital of this region, so it is called the scarcity 
multiplier. 
Repetition of this loop may continue until economic opportunities are 
homogenised between this region and places outside it, for this should eliminate the 
incentives driving the migration effects of step 2. Before this happens, the remnant 
relatively high per capita availability of natural capital also attracts people looking 
for the lifestyle this provides. As the Department of Economic Development in 
Tasmania (Tasmania 2007) boasts: ‚More and more people are flocking to Tasmania 
because we offer a lifestyle that has almost disappeared from the modern world.‛ 
The Department appears determined to ignore the awkward fact that the ‚flocking‛ 
will erase the lifestyle. As growing scarcities of natural capital in Tasmania, or in its 
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central north, or in any other region with the conditions specified above, reduce both 
economic and lifestyle attractions, the migration effects producing growth of 
population will diminish and the loop will break when depletion here equals that 
elsewhere. 
The scarcity multiplier is a positive feedback because the initial input, an 
allocation of natural capital from public to private uses, is repeated to some degree 
by each cycle. This loop is an IWIS – an inflation of want by increasing supply 
feedback - that works by increasing the size of the population. It is strengthened 
when the step 1 conversion of PuNC to private goods aids another type of step 2 that 
is parallel to the population growth step 2 and continually operates in market 
economies regardless of whether they are affected by choices between (a) and (b), as 
in step 1. This second step 2 is a continuing tendency of aspirations for per capita 
consumption of private goods to increase and is called ‘affluenza step 2’, after the 
description of ‘affluenza’ as ‚unfulfilled feeling that results from efforts to keep up 
with the Joneses‛ (Hamilton and Denniss 2005, 3). As discussed below, affluenza 
escalates aspirations for private goods from whatever the current level is, so when 
this is raised as is done by step 1, affluenza works on it to escalate aspirations at a 
higher level. As noted above, this boost to wants adds to the aggregate increase of 
want in step 3 by doing it for private goods only. The population growth step 2 has a 
broader push on the want increase in step 3, for it directly increases wants for PuNC 
and all other public goods as well as increasing wants for private goods, including 
those which are natural capital such as private land. So the two types of step 2 work 
together to push wants in step 3 and thus the whole cycle. As natural capital is 
limited, this escalation of wants increases its scarcity, which converts its uses from 
public to private, free to marketed and low priced to high priced. It should be noted 
that the affluenza IWIS differs from population growth IWIS in that it inflates 
aggregate want by increasing the wants of each individual, whereas the latter 
inflates aggregate want by increasing the number of individuals. 
The affluenza drive of the multiplier is persistent and it may be strong. It arises in 
the status rivalry and adaptation described in Chapter 2/ Ambiguous delegation/ 
Ignorant directors/ ‘Relatively dynamic causes of citizen ignorance of public goods’. 
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As noted there, both status rivalry and adaptation escalate the level of want for 
goods and do it more for private than for public goods. This escalation of wants 
increases efforts to supply them and increases in supplies of private goods enable 
status rivalry and adaptation to further increase wants, so both responses produce 
their own IWIS positive feedbacks. In addition, both status rivalry and adaptation 
are intensified by advertising, which as noted in Chapter 2/ Ambiguous delegation/ 
‘Ignorant directors’/ ‘Relatively dynamic<’, may also maintain itself as a positive 
feedback that strengthens if it increases sales revenue. This is another IWIS, for when 
advertising raises sales revenue, this increased supply of funds inflates advertisers’ 
wants for more sales revenue and they increase their advertising. Affluenza is thus a 
compound feedback of three IWIS cycles, one of which boosts the other two and may 
get stronger over time. The private goods bias further assists the multiplier by 
preventing government from controlling affluenza, so that the culture progressively 
becomes more strongly focused on converting natural capital into consumer goods. 
Stocks are increasingly run down to boost throughput. The private goods bias is 
therefore a democratic dysfunction that not only produces defective political choices 
at step 1, but develops a culture in which citizens want unsustainable growth. 
The scarcity multiplier thereby makes communities burden themselves with the 
economic and intangible costs of rising scarcities of natural capital. It operates as a 
self-propagating, expanding sequence of large and small developments driven by 
separate social choices that appear rational to voters and their political agents 
because the electoral system presents them with incentives to favour private over 
public goods. 
 
 
A possible moderation of the multiplier 
 
A block to the multiplier may be anticipated to be raised as it progresses, by each 
step 1 diminishing the quantity of PuNC that remains, making its value greater, as 
this is perceived by citizens, so they give more emphasis to protecting its remnants. 
In the case of rivers, as more of them get dammed, those citizens who become 
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concerned about this will place a higher value on the remaining natural rivers. This 
means that the step 1 social choice of the multiplier will tend to shift from choice (a) 
to choice (b). However such a shift will not take place until the private goods bias of 
the political process has cycled the multiplier to produce some under provision of 
this PuNC. 
However, as particular types of PuNC become under provided in this manner, 
the exploitation that does this shifts away from these PuNC as perceptions of their 
public values rise, to other PuNC that have not yet gone through this process. This 
substitution of less scarce PuNC for more scarce types tends to stop the rising 
scarcity of any particular PuNC from shifting the social choice at step 1 from (a) to 
(b), so the under provision spreads widely across different types of PuNC. In the 
example of hydro-electricity and irrigation from free flowing rivers, as such rivers 
become rare, the satisfaction of rising wants for energy and water will tend to shift 
from damming more rivers to using PuNC that is perceived as less scarce, which 
might be windy sites for wind turbines and urban waste water for treatment or, as is 
being done in the larger Australian cities, desalinizing sea water. The result is that 
the scarcity of PuNC as a whole continues to escalate and the costs of using PuNC 
increase as less economically attractive PuNC are substituted for PuNC resources 
that are becoming scarcer. Such substitutions often raise the scarcity of PuNC by 
creating new environmental costs, for example wind farms may damage scenery and 
kill native birds, which is happening in Tasmania with the endangered wedge-tailed 
eagle. Such rising costs of growth, both monetary and environmental, tend to be 
overlooked by citizens focused on the here and now of the private goods of 
employment and disposable income, so politicians pursue growth in order to 
provide more private goods without fully considering whether the associated 
erosion of public goods is compensated for by benefits that will be sustained. 
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The private goods bias may push under provision of PuNC to extremes 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the basic themes of government policy in liberal 
democracies are driven mainly by public opinion, but most citizens are disengaged 
from thinking very much about public goods, especially PuNC, so the minority of 
public opinion that does think about these tends to be ignored by government. This 
produces scarcities of PuNC that will increase until they become so obvious and 
serious that the attention and concern of the usually disengaged majority may be 
aroused to the extent that they also demand that PuNC must not be allowed to 
become any scarcer, even if their private goods (such as employment and income for 
employees; and profits for employers, some of which may be generated with the 
help of immigrant labour) have to be restricted in order to achieve this. However it is 
difficult to see this happening, partly because the disengagement of the average 
voter prevents her from realizing that the rising scarcities she experiences are caused 
by people wanting too many private goods, and also that this effect arises from too 
many people as well as from too much want by each of them. In addition, the 
business lobby that wants cheap labour and large populations of consumers has the 
financial capacity to manipulate both public opinion and politicians towards the 
production of more private goods as discussed in Chapter 2/ Excessive competition/ 
’Competition between politicians’. The private goods bias therefore appears to be a 
democratic behaviour that should, sooner or later, produce great deprivation of 
many public goods and the private goods derived from them, unless democracies 
can be modified to reduce or eliminate it. 
 
 
Another possible driver of the scarcity multiplier  
 
The scarcity multiplier is described above as driven partly by the private goods 
bias at step 1 and partly by an indefinite escalation of wants for private goods via 
affluenza step 2. However, the multiplier may be strengthened by another escalation 
of wants for private goods, one that could arise from growth of population at step 2. 
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It might be anticipated that a population growth step 2 will not affect the social 
choice of step 1 in the consequent cycle of the multiplier because a bigger population 
has a proportionally bigger aggregate want for both public and private goods. 
However, if growth of population adds more, or less, to wants for private goods 
than for public goods then this growth will tend to reinforce, or counter respectively, 
the effect of the private goods bias in the social choice at step 1. What will actually 
happen depends on circumstances but one that seems likely would reinforce the 
multiplier by adding more citizen want for private goods than for public goods into 
the choice between (a) and (b) at step 1. As much of the growth of population will 
come from immigration, the desires of migrants will affect the ratio of private/ public 
goods wants that politicians express in their policies. The newcomers will often be 
from less affluent places, many of which are heavily populated and therefore have a 
relative per capita scarcity of natural capital, which may have cultivated a strong 
focus on earning a living. Immigrants may therefore have a higher want for private 
goods than the population they are joining. Another source of this attitude may be 
that such immigrants have had relatively limited opportunities - such as access to 
high quality environments, to leisure time, to education and to income - to learn how 
to use natural capital to enhance their quality of life. They would not be accustomed 
to  living or holidaying in spacious rural or natural situations that enable them to 
cultivate pursuits such as fishing, hunting, horse-riding, all-terrain vehicle use, 
observing wildlife, surfing, diving, skiing, wilderness backpacking, kayaking and 
river rafting. Such effects of immigration at step 2 would strengthen the cultural drift 
noted above as being produced by affluenza, towards greater wants for private 
goods. 
 
 
Human adaptation to loss also drives the scarcity multiplier 
 
The distress of citizens at losses of PuNC due to the scarcity multiplier will fade 
as time and generations pass, leaving them with lower expectations or wants for 
these goods. As Frans de Waal (1996, 201) observes, humans are ‚born adaptation 
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artists.‛ Layard (2005, 229) notes that if ‚things get better, we after a while take them 
for granted. If they get worse, we also eventually largely accept them‛. Adaptation 
to loss occurs not only within the individual, but between generations, for when a 
new one grows up in a situation that the older generation recognizes as degraded 
because of the earlier experiences of its members, the new generation will consider it 
normal. These young people have known nothing better so they unconsciously 
tolerate the situation - no doubt employing instinctive coping responses, as indicated 
below by de Waal’s observation in ‘Costs and benefits of the multiplier’. 
This intergenerational adaptation to loss differs from the adaptation to gain 
described above for affluenza and it takes much longer. With affluenza, a gain in the 
supply of private goods is fairly quickly adapted to by the individual, so that after a 
few months or years, the gain has produced a level of supply that the individual 
now feels she really requires. The human adaptation to loss that helps drive the 
scarcity multiplier is a mixture of adaptation to diminishing availability of natural 
capital within the life of the individual and lack of awareness by new generations. 
Both types of accommodation occur with natural capital whether it is PuNC or 
privately owned (PrNC), such as freehold land. Although humans are more sensitive 
to loss than to gains, feelings of loss fade with time (Layard 2005, 141-42, 167-68, 
229). So the individual’s sense of loss of PuNC will diminish with the passage of time 
and from one generation to the next, sense of loss will disappear completely as the 
total experience of the next generation to a lower supply of PuNC conditions its 
members to have lower expectations for its supply. So both intragenerational and 
intergenerational adaptations to loss are likely to support the private goods bias for 
the choice of (a) in step 1 of the scarcity multiplier, assisting it to convert PuNC into 
private goods. Adaptation to loss shifts the culture from having strong interests in 
the natural environment towards a greater focus on people and the things they make 
and do. This raises questions. Is a culture adapted to crowding healthier, more 
fulfilling and more sustainable than one that is not? 
It seems likely that perceptions of increased value of PuNC induced by its 
escalating scarcity will be overwhelmed by afffluenza, by cultural shift created by 
immigration and by intra- and intergenerational adaptation to loss, leaving the 
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scarcity multiplier free to eliminate PuNC wherever this can be made to expand the 
production of private goods. The scarcity of private natural capital (PrNC) will 
escalate through a similar process, but possibly more quickly because its state of 
private ownership may prevent the public from feeling the distress it initially feels as 
it suffers losses in its common property. 
 
 
The influence of each IWIS system and their control  
 
Either population growth IWIS, or affluenza IWIS, may be enough on its own to 
drive a damaging scarcity multiplier. If affluenza IWIS can be suspended, 
immigration from other regions with fewer PuNC exploitation opportunities may 
continue to drive population growth step 2 as long as such a difference between this 
region and any others lasts. A relatively high preference for private goods by 
immigrants may assist the private goods bias to drive the multiplier through its step 
1 conversion of PuNC to private goods. Immigration may thus overcrowd this 
region to the extent of overcrowding elsewhere on the planet, so the multiplier could 
eventually produce a very high scarcity of natural resources through population 
growth IWIS alone. If this is prevented by government restriction of immigration but 
the affluenza IWIS is permitted to operate, this may also drive the multiplier to high 
levels of scarcity of both PuNC and PrNC. Scarcity of PuNC would produce low per 
capita availability of PuNC and scarcity of PrNC would produce high prices for 
PrNC. If both affluenza and population growth IWIS operate simultaneously, their 
growths of want and scarcity are multiplied together, for one increases the want of 
each individual while the other increases the number of individuals. 
Affluenza may be countered by devices that encourage people to minimize their 
status rivalry and adaptation. These devices should focus on public goods as well as 
on private goods. The latter type should encourage people not to want more, or as 
Hamilton and Denniss (2005, 34-35) put it, to ‚want what I have‛ rather than to 
‚have what I want‛. One such device would be regulation that restricts advertising. 
The public goods focus may combat affluenza by helping citizens with collective 
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choice, so that their choices of public goods are easier, clearer, better informed and 
therefore more able to compete against the choices of private goods that they could 
make instead. Such facilitation of collective choice appears to require a public forum 
that assists citizens to deliberate and select strategic public goods such as controls on 
advertising and goals on population size. A proposal for this type of institution is 
given in Part 2. 
 
 
Other economic projects as triggers for the scarcity multiplier 
 
A region with conditions conducive to the scarcity multiplier can have this 
feedback triggered or boosted by any type of economic growth, not only by the 
diversion of PuNC into commercial uses as described above for the Meander River. 
Consider a new value-adding project in a region, such as a pulp mill which would 
use public forest that is already commercially used in that place for woodchip 
exports. If this new project was environmentally benign, it would appear to be an 
unmitigated benefit for the region as it would produce more economic benefit from 
PuNC (public forest) that is already used for private goods (woodchips and 
employment). However the increase in employment and income from this new 
project would fuel both types of step 2, generating scarcity multiplication. 
At the time of writing, the construction of such a pulp mill is imminent in 
Tasmania. The largest woodchip exporter in the southern hemisphere, Gunns Ltd., 
has obtained State government approval for a Aus$2 billion pulp mill that would be 
the biggest private project undertaken in the state. This proposal has created intense 
public dispute over potential environmental impact, but these arguments have not 
considered the scarcity multiplication that the development would produce. Unless 
this is done it appears likely that sooner or later the proposal will be modified to 
ameliorate its direct environmental impacts and it will follow the pattern of that 
discussed above for the dam on the Meander River. This received government 
approval and water flowed over the spillway in September 2008. 
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Costs and benefits of the multiplier 
 
Two major costs of the scarcity multiplier are that it makes development projects 
reproduce problems of employment and income similar to and possibly bigger than, 
those they were intended to solve and at the same time it increases the scarcity of 
natural capital. These costs amount to frustration of wants for both private and 
public goods and may subsequently change the culture as successive generations 
cope with increasing scarcity. 
The multiplier makes natural capital scarcer by converting PuNC into private 
goods and also by increasing the number of people using the diminishing natural 
capital. Although this produces other public goods by generating tax revenue, these 
goods must serve more citizens and will be limited by the private goods bias in 
government decisions on tax rates. Also, the extra public goods provided in this way 
cannot substitute for some of the types of PuNC that are lost; moreover, these extra 
goods usually require additional work by citizens, in contrast with the free services 
from the PuNC that was eliminated to finance them. The resulting frustrations 
appear likely to doom the aspirations of citizens for a high quality of life. The rise of 
environmental disputes over the last half century indicates that this regression has 
now become a very real problem. Over the decades ahead it is possible that its 
inexorable escalation will increasingly frustrate those with a social conscience so 
fewer may attempt to resist it. 
The multiplier also produces a third set of costs by encouraging inequality of 
wealth in society. This was described at the end of Chapter 4 as exacerbating many 
physical and mental health problems. The multiplier cultivates these problems with 
its affluenza IWIS. As people aspire to consume more, some have the ability or 
position to gain advantage over others. As Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 51, 192) 
observe: 
 
Inequality is a powerful social divider< Our position in the social hierarchy affects who 
we see as part of the in-group and who as out-group – us and them – so affecting our 
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ability to identify with and empathize with other people< The search for a mechanism 
[that causes inequality to damage health] led to the discovery that social relationships (as 
measured by social cohesion, trust, involvement in community life and low levels of 
violence) are better in more equal societies. 
  
These researchers conclude that the major cause of the relative success of more equal 
societies is that people relate to each other in a more supportive way (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2009, 192-3). 
Against these three ways in which the multiplier is costly, a possible benefit is 
that it helps more people to live in the region in which it operates. However, sooner 
or later this is at the cost of rising scarcity of natural capital, which creates an 
increasingly commercialized, narrow and expensive lifestyle. This combination of 
having more people while each has a higher cost of living and lower quality of life is 
very hazardous, for increasing the population at the risk of the happiness of each 
individual may result in a sudden and severe reversal from a situation of moderately 
positive aggregate value where the average individual generally feels somewhat 
satisfied, to one of negative total value in which there are more individuals, most of 
whom feel more or less stressed from crowding effects. In this connection, it is 
interesting to note de Waal’s (1996, 200-201) assessment that 
 
coping with stress is not the same as getting rid of it; constant behavioural (and probably 
also physiological) countermeasures are necessary under crowded conditions. All of these 
techniques are part of the impressive adaptive potential of the primate order< Human 
populations with long crowding histories, such as the Japanese, the Javanese and the 
Dutch, each in their own way emphasize tolerance, conformity and consensus, whereas 
populations spread out over lands with empty horizons may be more individualistic, 
stressing privacy and freedom instead< Adjusting the definition of right and wrong is 
one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of Homo sapiens, a species of born 
adaptation artists. 
 
Many years ago, zoologist Desmond Morris (1967, 177) asserted that we 
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already know that if our populations go on increasing at their present terrifying rate, 
uncontrollable aggressiveness will become dramatically increased. This has been proved 
conclusively with laboratory experiments. Gross overcrowding will produce social 
stresses and tensions that will shatter our community organizations long before it starves 
us to death. 
 
The results of laboratory experiments may not translate well to human society, 
but if ‚gross overcrowding‛ progresses at a ‚terrifying rate‛, the ‚behavioural 
countermeasures‛ of ‚born adaptation artists‛ may be overwhelmed. This type of 
failure seems to be frequently depicted in film and literature, such as Shane 
Meadows’ 2007 movie This Is England and J. G. Ballard’s 2006 novel Kingdom Come. 
Such works focus on social dysfunction that appears to be caused by poor quality of 
life. Prudence dictates that we allow ourselves either plenty of ‘lebensraum’, or 
several generations to adapt to crowding. The former appears far less risky and 
much more pleasant. 
 
 
Implications of the multiplier 
 
The scarcity multiplier is one form of the tertiary democratic dysfunction of under 
provision of public goods. It has the capacity to transform economic benefits into 
costs so that the greater the benefit the bigger the cost it produces. This effect could 
make cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of development projects totally misleading. To 
avoid this, CBA must be based on competent political decisions on preferred limits 
to the IWIS feedbacks that drive the multiplier - those of population, status rivalry, 
adaptation and sales promotion. The primary democratic dysfunctions that foster the 
multiplier indicate that such political decisions require competent strategic 
directorship by the people; so deliberative participatory institutions are required to 
provide them with the incentive and assistance they need to perform in this way. 
To choose their preferred limits for population, citizens need information about 
the costs and benefits of high and low ratios of population to natural capital. 
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Research and public debate on this is neglected. Indeed, as noted under ‘Size of 
population’ in Chapter 4, scholars note that a striking aversion to discussing human 
carrying capacity has developed over the last few decades, following initial 
widespread public debate on the problem that was largely initiated in 1968 by Paul 
Erhlich’s  The Population Bomb. This state of denial frustrates attempts to develop 
sustainability and appears to be a learned response to the inability of democracies to 
rationally deliberate population size, as discussed in Chapter 4. The quality of life 
that we sustain depends not only on the quantity and quality of natural capital, but 
on limits to both the size of the population using it and the wants of each individual. 
IWIS is offered as a better understanding of the response to supply than the 
conventional one, which is that increasing a supply will satisfy wants. The latter 
view justifies the supplying of goods and services that are wanted and the IWIS 
concept does not dispute its accuracy but takes a slightly longer term view by 
asking: ‘and what is the effect of this satisfaction?’ The answer is often the opposite 
to conventional understanding, as explained above by descriptions of IWIS systems 
and their combination to form the scarcity multiplier IWIS. The concept of IWIS 
should replace the current concept of the response to supply because, by taking a 
longer view, it takes more evidence into account. For example the history of 
economic growth in developed economies over the last half century has shown that 
despite doubling and tripling of real incomes, the percentage of citizens reporting 
themselves as ‘very happy’ has hardly altered and in the US and the UK, has 
declined (Jackson 2009, 40). A survey of 61 countries has shown that above an 
average annual income of US$15,000, life-satisfaction hardly responds to increases in 
income (Jackson 2009, 40-2). As noted in Chapter 2/ Ambiguous delegation/ Ignorant 
directors/ Relatively dynamic</ ‘Distraction by adaptation’, the level of income that 
citizens regard as what they require closely follows real increases in their income. 
The prediction of the scarcity multiplier is an analysis in ecological economics 
because this discipline recognizes that decisions on macro-allocating natural capital 
from the ecological system to the economic subsystem must be done by government 
(Costanza and Daly 1992, 41). It cannot be done by the market as this depends on 
market prices for its decisions, which restrict them to marketed or excluded goods, 
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that is, to private goods. As public natural capital is a public good it has no market 
price, so some non-market institution such as government is required to attempt 
rational choices on whether to macro-allocate it to the economic subsystem. The 
description of the scarcity multiplier is significant for ecological economics not only 
as a prediction, but also because it re-emphasizes that ecological economics must be 
based on political science. As choices indicated by ecological economics depend on 
competent choices by governments, ecological economics should be regarded as a 
research program of political science. It is governments who decide, or neglect to 
decide, whether to macro-allocate public natural capital from the ecosystem to the 
economic subsystem. 
The scarcity multiplier describes democracies as having a long term tendency to 
destroy their citizens’ quality of life. Eventually this may stress citizens so much that 
they abandon concerns for equality and dispense with democracy. There is strong 
evidence from studies of per capita income and political stability that ‚poor 
democracies are fragile, exceedingly so when per capita incomes fall below US$2000 
(in 1975 dollars). When per capita incomes fall below this threshold, democracies 
have a one in ten chance of collapsing within a year‛ (Shapiro 2005, 192). 
The pervasiveness of IWIS indicates that governments must be aware that if they 
increase a supply, they must not allow it to destroy satisfaction by escalating wants. 
This awareness is essential if governments are to achieve sustainable development 
but it is counter intuitive. As noted above, it involves not only thinking ‘if we do this 
we will be better off’ and then relaxing, but it requires a little more thinking: ‘and 
what will happen when we are better off?’ As Richard Dawkins (2001) has observed: 
‚Sustainability does not come naturally‛, so governments must be very competent if 
they are to face and control the scarcity multiplier. 
 
 
Conclusions for Part 1 
 
The examples described in this and the preceding chapter appear to show the 
triple dysfunction prediction of democratic failure being realised. This encourages 
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triple dysfunction to be used as a theory that indicates specific types of reforms for 
government. It is therefore applied in Part 2 to guide the design of a new institution 
that may enable liberal democratic governments to improve their provisions of 
public goods. This institution is a new public forum intended to provide the citizens 
of any liberal democracy with the incentive and assistance they need to collectively 
provide a directorship that can address strategic public goods. For example, this new 
forum may enable democracies to effectively deliberate global warming, 
unemployment, population size, status rivalry, adaptation, sales promotion and the 
necessary ingredients of a high quality of life. It may thereby enable democracies to 
recognize and control their private goods bias, including its supply variant, in order 
to prevent inflation of want by supply. 
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Part 2 
 
 
Prescribing a remedy 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
The People’s Forum:   
A deliberative aid for liberal democracies 
 
 
 
The triple dysfunction hypothesis views the electoral systems of liberal 
democratic governments as a major problem, suggesting three possible remedies: (a) 
countering the deleterious effects of these systems, (b) altering them so that they 
produce better effects, or (c) eliminating them. The last option may take the form of 
using a non-electoral method of selecting representatives, or eliminating 
representation by attempting direct democracy, or abandoning democracy itself. A 
new institution designed to implement option (a) is now proposed because it 
appears more feasible to implement in current political contexts than either (b) or (c). 
If (a) works it should improve the political capacity to implement either (b) or (c) as 
well as increasing the competence of the polity to decide whether it is prudent to do 
these things. 
This new design is called the People’s Forum. In this chapter it is broadly 
described and then evaluated in two ways: it is compared with principles that have 
been theorized as required for deliberative participation in democratic government 
and it is compared with three institutional designs of similar scale of operation and 
purpose that have been suggested for the improvement of democratic governance. 
Chapter 7 specifies additional details of the Forum’s structure and uses these to 
explain more fully why it should function as intended. 
Triple dysfunction indicates that if the Forum is to improve government, it should 
do three things: make it clear that it is the people who direct government policy; 
reduce competition between politicians so that it is more constructive; and reduce 
the compromising of relatively informed and considered public opinion by less well 
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developed public opinion. The Forum is designed to achieve the first of these 
objectives by being a very visible public institution that encourages and helps the 
people to exercise responsible directorship. As discussed below, participation in the 
People’s Forum is voluntary, so only some citizens will actively engage with it. For 
their contributions to be credible to all citizens, the participants must be seen to be 
deliberating strategic policy issues from all points of view and thereby developing 
responsible decisions on these. Any development of this credibility would start to 
apply pressure on politicians to implement these decisions, so that the participants 
together with the mass public are then functioning as directors of government. The 
second objective is to be pursued by the Forum helping the people to moderate both 
the degree of competition between politicians and the extent to which it may damage 
policy. The third objective is pursued by the Forum being designed to facilitate the 
development of mass public opinion and also to give more political influence to that 
section of this opinion that is more likely to be well developed. These three 
objectives may be condensed into two, by omitting the specifications of citizens 
being directors and how they should do this. This gives us a mission for the Forum 
of (1) improving public policy and (2) ensuring that this improved policy is seen as 
legitimate by the people.  
The first and third design objectives given above are substantially those of 
deliberative democracy, so the People’s Forum may be classed as a deliberative 
design. This requires a broader interpretation of democratic deliberation than the 
‚public deliberation‛ defined by Michael X. Delli Carpini and colleagues (2004, 319) 
as discourse with other citizens that helps them ‚reach judgements about matters of 
public concern‛. This discourse includes talk, discussion and debate in formal or 
informal settings, via any medium including face-to-face exchanges, telephone 
conversations, email and internet forums. The meaning of democratic deliberation as 
used to describe the People’s Forum is broader than this as it includes ‚self-
deliberation‛ (Delli Carpini 2004, 318-19), the thinking and learning of citizens that 
may be stimulated by their observations of the views of others and of information 
and events relevant to public issues. Delli Carpini and his colleagues exclude self-
deliberation about public affairs from public deliberation because it does not involve 
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personal reciprocal exchange, but I include it as part of democratic deliberation 
because it is an integral part of how people recognize and consider issues. As Robert 
Goodin (2003, 54-5) argues,  
 
it remains significant how very much of the work of deliberation, even in external-
collective settings, must inevitably be done within each individual’s head< The challenge 
facing deliberative democrats is thus to find some way of adapting their deliberative 
ideals to any remotely large-scale society, where it is simply infeasible to arrange face-to-
face discussions across the entire community. 
 
James Bohman (1998, 401) has defined deliberative democracy as ‚any one of a 
family of views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens 
is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-government‛. Michael 
Saward (2001, 365) offers a similar view. ‚That deliberative democracy comes in 
many shapes is an understatement< However, a simple dichotomy between 
circumscribed and uncircumscribed variants of deliberative sites and forums 
captures with reasonable accuracy the institutional aspirations of various strands of 
deliberative theory.‛ Saward defines the circumscribed extreme as a consciously 
designed forum with a limited number of participants, who engage face-to-face with 
a limited agenda of issues and use tight procedures for discussion. The 
uncircumscribed extreme is a spontaneous group or network of an indeterminate 
number of people who may never meet but engage for an indefinite time with 
informal procedures on a self-generated, fluid set of issues. As will be seen from the 
following description, the People’s Forum is circumscribed in several ways as it has 
many specific features such as a regular schedule for voting on a carefully composed 
set of questions: but it is also uncircumscribed in such ways as a degree of 
adaptability of the agenda, an indeterminate number of participants and no 
organised group discussions. 
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The mission, strategies and shape of the People’s Forum 
 
As noted above, the mission of the People’s Forum is to improve the quality of 
public policy and to produce strong legitimacy for this policy in the eyes of citizens, 
so that the government implements it. While the triple dysfunction hypothesis points 
to these two goals as being the required mission, it also indicates three major 
strategies that the Forum should employ to accomplish this. The first primary 
dysfunction – confusion about who directs government – indicates that one strategy 
is to make it clear to all that the people are the directors. The third primary 
dysfunction – compromise of informed public opinion by ignorance – indicates a 
second strategy of ensuring that these directors are well informed. Moreover, their 
knowledge must be focused on fundamental or strategic policy as the function of 
any director is to lay good policy foundations, so that the whole spectrum of issues 
from short to long term can be addressed effectively. A third strategy is also 
indicated by the third primary dysfunction: a strategy of producing political 
influence for the part of public opinion that is likely to be the best developed. This is 
backed by the well recognized limitation discussed in Chapter 2 that many people 
lack the time, facilities and in many cases either the interest or the ability to become 
well informed on public goods.  
In a democracy, the second strategy of getting citizens well informed about 
strategic issues prepares them for directing government, so this strategy may be 
taken as also expressing the first one. The three strategies are thereby condensed into 
two and so, for the People’s Forum we have: 
 
The mission- 
 improving the quality of public policy 
 developing legitimacy for this public policy. 
 
Strategies for achieving the mission - 
 accelerating the development of public opinion on strategic issues 
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 producing political influence for the part of this public opinion that is likely to be 
relatively well developed.  
 
The two strategies would not only reduce confusion about who directs 
government and minimize excessive compromise of informed public opinion, but 
also ameliorate the second part of triple dysfunction - excessive competition among 
politicians. By explicitly making the development of strategic policy the role of the 
people, politicians would be confined to a smaller and subordinate area of policy, so 
any neglect of public goods caused by competition between them becomes less 
significant: there would be fewer policies for politicians to neglect and those that 
they neglect would be less systemically important. Clarifying the role of the people 
as directors may also reduce competition between politicians by preventing them 
from vying with each other for directorship and also by assisting the people to 
introduce regulations, laws or changes to the constitution that would moderate this 
competition. 
To execute its two strategies, the People’s Forum employs a repetitive, non-
binding referendum or poll with an agenda that is largely supervised by the public. 
These features, together with others described below, are intended to stimulate and 
facilitate an unhurried and in some respects, organized and careful consideration of 
strategic issues by citizens. As currently practiced, referendums cannot do this well, 
if at all, because they usually combine most or all of four features: a proposition is 
put to the vote as a binary choice; it is only voted on once; the result binds the 
legislature to enact that choice; and propositions are chosen by elites. This gives 
referendums the image of all-or-nothing contests that cannot afford the reflection of 
deliberation. Simone Chambers (2001, 231-2) describes this as happening in three 
ways: the framing of the question is not negotiable; the vote is irreversible; and a 
majoritarian situation is presented in which citizens’ willingness to deliberate is 
displaced by their need to win. This discouragement of deliberation is also abetted 
by the news media ‚adopting election coverage rules as the standard of news 
presentation for referendums‛ (Jenkins and Mendelsohn 2001, 229). 
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The question of whether heuristics can substitute for deliberation to assist citizens 
to vote on issues according to their existing interests is of limited significance for the 
People’s Forum because its major strategy is to accelerate the development of public 
opinion. Deliberation is necessary not only for this, but for constructive popular 
control of the agenda and also to stimulate demands for new information that may 
be needed for both the elites who provide cues for citizens and for citizens 
themselves, if either group is to be knowledgeable and competent on the strategic 
issues presented by the Forum. As the purpose and design of the People’s Forum 
poll or referendum is quite distinctive, it may be useful to recognize it as a new type 
that does not fit within the current broad classes of decision-controlling and decision-
promoting referendums (Setälä and Schiller 2009, 5). Opinion development referendum 
(or poll) is suggested as a name for this new class. 
To establish itself as a part of the system of government, the Forum’s poll must 
become a widely recognized event that attracts significant levels of public interest, 
public involvement and public status. The development of public status would 
indicate that the Forum was starting to execute its second strategy. For the execution 
of both strategies, the technology that is employed is important (Lupia and Sin, 
2003), but the essential feature is the way the poll is organized (Flanagin et al 2006, 
32-33). This means that the Forum might work to a useful degree with technology no 
more advanced than postal mail for voting, together with print media to introduce 
the ballot paper, to facilitate much of the public discourse on the issues presented 
and to publish the voting results. However, modern communication technology 
makes it much easier to introduce and run this institution. 
 
 
The focus of the Forum 
 
The People’s Forum is not intended to do work that is suitable for small panels of 
perhaps ten or twenty citizens. Such groups may convene as one group or they may 
operate as several that meet in plenary sessions and thereby involve hundreds of 
members. They may meet face-to-face or online. A citizen panel or a coordinated set 
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of these can only be a very small sample of the population of a state or nation, 
because most of the participants must be able listen to each other. Where the 
legitimacy (to all members of a polity) of the decisions of such panels arises from the 
opportunities for participation that they offer to all members of the polity, then these 
panels will tend to restrict themselves to issues that can be managed by small 
communities, for it is only the members of these that will have significant 
opportunities to participate. Where this legitimacy is important for the 
implementation of decisions, these panels must focus on issues that small 
communities might successfully address. 
As the Forum is primarily designed to address issues that only very large 
communities have a prospect of managing, it offers participation to unlimited 
numbers of citizens. To create the prospect that their participation may be powerful 
it concentrates on issues of fundamental or strategic significance. This focuses the 
collective development of citizens’ ideas for public policy on issues of regional, 
national or wider concern and with long term implications. The Forum is thereby 
designed to help citizens direct government to prevent and rectify causes of 
problems, rather than treat symptoms. To help with this systemic, strategic approach 
it must assist citizens to question their basic assumptions and attitudes, when this 
may be useful. But this approach can influence government policy only if the 
resultant changes in attitudes are widespread through the polity. To be seen as 
legitimate by all or most citizens, such changes via the Forum should occur in full 
view of all who care to take an interest and any citizen must be able, if they wish, to 
contribute to the maintenance or reform of these attitudes. The type of issue the 
Forum is designed to deal with can thus be described as fundamental and long-
running. As an example, the issue of whether to have a presidential political system 
would be suitable for the Forum, but the issue of who is to be the next president 
would not be. ‘Long-running’ is specified for the Forum not only because strategic 
issues have long-lasting effects, but also because, as noted below, the institution 
would function by addressing the same issues for many years, so the issue itself 
must be one that remains relevant for such periods. Even after an issue is politically 
decided and acted on, the Forum may continue to address it if there if reason to 
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believe that citizens want, or should want (in the opinion of the Forum’s managers, 
as discussed below), to keep their choice under review. 
The Forum’s focus on fundamental, long-running issues is necessary for it to 
clarify democratic directorship and thereby correct the first primary democratic 
dysfunction. It is only by determining strategic policy that popular rule can provide 
effective directorship for a polity and thereby make it a really functional democracy. 
If popular rule does not consciously and deliberately do this (which Chapter 2 
describes as largely the current situation) then either the polity will drift somewhat 
aimlessly in terms of fundamental goals, or some other influence will take charge 
and direct the polity at this level. Such undemocratic direction will, of course, largely 
control the polity at the other policy levels as well. 
 
 
The poll structure 
 
Each voting event of a People’s Forum that is conducted for a particular society or 
group of societies would usually be repeated at regular intervals of sufficient length 
to allow some possibility of development in public opinion. In contrast with 
continual polling, such distinct separation of polls also makes it possible for all those 
who are concerned to express themselves at the same time, which potentially makes 
the result for each poll a set of preferences that amounts to a democratic social 
choice. An established People’s Forum might therefore conduct its voting events at 
the same time each year. This periodicity should also prevent citizens becoming 
fatigued with too much voting. However, in the start-up phase of a People’s Forum, 
the poll might initially be held quarterly or half-yearly a few times to stimulate 
public interest. As noted in the previous section, this poll is repetitive, so it would 
endeavour to ask the same sets of questions on the same issues each time it is held. 
These issues, the questions, and the menus of answers offered for each question, are 
selected by the poll managers and set out in a ‘ballot paper’ available to the public as 
a free booklet and also on a website. An issue, or a question, or a menu of answers 
would only be changed (by the managers, as described in ‘Ballot paper’ below) if it is 
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found to be unsuitable or if the public has made up its mind and is no longer 
evolving its view. Such stabilizations of opinion would be identified by the poll as it 
shows levelled trends in opinions over successive polls, as discussed below. New 
issues would be placed on the ballot by the People’s Forum managers whenever 
suitable topics become apparent to them. However, as noted below under ‘Ballot 
paper’ and in more detail in Chapter 7/ Elements of the design.../ Function 12/ ‘E3’, 
‘E2’, the public will have a large degree of control over this agenda-setting. 
Voting would be voluntary, a self-selecting process that invites all electors 
(citizens legally eligible to vote) to participate. Voters would be free to respond to as 
many or as few of the issues and questions as they like. One ‘vote’ may comprise 
answers to any questions on any of the issues presented. As noted above, the poll 
results would not be binding on legislatures, merely advisory. Initially this political 
influence is likely to be weaker than that of conventional opinion polls, but due to 
the effects of the structure of the People’s Forum described below, it should become 
stronger and perhaps exceed the influence of opinion polls as public deliberation 
and voting continues over the years. Repetition of the same questions over many 
years would provide a consistent agenda, promoting continuity in the associated 
public debates. This should facilitate the development of public opinion on these 
questions and create or accelerate trends in the opinions of that part of the 
community that is voting. The annual repetition of the poll would allow these trends 
to be plotted. On those questions where participating opinion is stable, or where the 
trend has flattened out in the last few years of polling, the process would indicate 
that the community in general is satisfied with these views. These questions could 
then be taken out of the poll.  
 
 
Voting process 
 
The People’s Forum poll would be open for voting for a week each time it is held, 
to give time for public interest to be stimulated by daily progressive tallies during 
that week and to help ensure that those who intend to vote do not forget to do it. 
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Votes are to be lodged by telephone or internet. Tallying would be electronic and 
thus virtually instantaneous, so that each night of the week of polling the cumulative 
results on selected issues may be shown on television. The internet and print media 
could also give daily updates that might cover all the issues on the ballot and include 
charts illustrating the voting trends on each issue over the years up to the present 
event. At least in the early phase of operation of the Forum, this media coverage 
would not be legally required because this would make establishment of the 
institution much more difficult by requiring strong government support. It is hoped 
that many media outlets would see a potential for growth in public demand for their 
coverage of the Forum’s activities and provide it to help the demand grow and 
expand their ratings and market. They could expect this effect not only during the 
week of voting, but also in the form of an increased demand for information on the 
subjects covered by the ballot paper. The manager of one television channel in 
Australia has been asked about providing free daily coverage of voting in such a 
system over one week each year and he indicated an interest in doing this as a news 
and current affairs service. Forum managers would encourage such cooperation by 
issuing daily summaries of the voting, ready for transmission and printing. 
Ways of ensuring one vote per elector per poll are discussed in Chapter 7 under 
Function 12/ ‘E22 Voting security’, which focuses mainly on using the electoral roll 
in the Australian situation. The ideal voting security system would allow 
spontaneity of voting, so that registration is not a prerequisite and the elector can 
vote on impulse at any time during the week the poll is open. Spontaneity of voting 
allows those who become concerned about the way the poll is currently going in 
particular issues to vote and to urge others to vote before it closes at the end of the 
week. Such interactions should help to get people involved in the process during the 
week of voting and this may encourage wider discussion and deliberation of the 
issues presented throughout the year in anticipation of the next poll. Voters who 
decide to change a vote they have lodged may do so before the poll closes. Voting on 
impulse would work against the objective of giving political influence to citizens 
who have given serious thought to issues (see ‘An element of meritocracy’ under 
‘Major functions of the People’s Forum’ below) but it should help to draw the 
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hitherto disengaged into the process. People who become involved in voting in this 
way may then pay more attention to the issues and develop their deliberative skills 
and habits by dealing with the types of questions posed, as explained under ‘Ballot 
paper’ below. It may be anticipated that holding the poll open for a week and 
allowing voters to change their vote during this period may encourage manipulation 
by special interests, perhaps by scare tactics applied through the media. This seems 
unlikely to be effective because voters will have had the previous year to reconsider 
the issues and any sudden intensive polling event-based attempt to sway them may 
look obviously underhand. Interests that are attacked in this way will have a few 
days to respond to some of it before the close of the poll and may also carry on their 
counterattack through the year before the next poll. A positive aspect of such 
competition is that it should increase the discussion of issues and thereby facilitate 
deliberative effects between polls. If manipulation during the polling event becomes 
a real problem, then voting can be made irrevocable and the event could also be 
restricted to one day. Further consideration of countermeasures against 
manipulation is given in Chapter 7/ ‘Function 9’. 
Having the voting event run for a week and allowing voting on impulse may be 
important practices only for the first few years of polling, in order to encourage as 
many citizens as possible to become involved. It may then seem advisable to move 
out of the introductory phase by making prior registration obligatory, and/or to 
reduce the voting period to a weekend or a day, in order to make voting a more 
premeditated act, thus giving the results a more deliberated status in the eyes of the 
public. However, these changes may not make the poll results reflect a more 
considered opinion as they would help the strongly prejudiced to be well 
represented. This effect, together with reduction of the public exposure of the poll 
during voting, may lower its profile or status and thus the deliberation it stimulates. 
These changes are therefore not recommended at this stage, but experience in 
managing a People’s Forum may indicate they are worth trying. 
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Ballot paper 
 
A People’s Forum ballot paper would treat an indefinite number of fundamental 
long-running issues. As well as being extensive, this agenda should include the most 
controversial of such issues, to provide something of interest to as many people as 
possible and to stimulate public involvement. Although the number of issues treated 
could be very large, the attention span of the public will limit publication of poll 
results by the mass media to perhaps 100 issues and of these, less than 10 might be 
focused on at each poll. Newspapers may be inclined to cover a much greater 
number of issues than television and radio. If the number of issues voted on is very 
large, complete listings of the results and trends may be published in more 
specialized outlets such as websites, magazines, technical journals and books. A 
Forum for a nation of federated states would provide different ballot papers for each 
state to pose questions on state affairs as well as questions on national policy and 
these different papers would be coordinated so that the same national questions 
were posed in all of them. 
The description of each issue that the ballot paper gives should be concise and 
limited to perhaps less than a page. Where appropriate, the description should relate 
that issue to others that the respondent is invited to consider before answering the 
questions on this one. Several questions would be posed on each issue and where 
possible these would include ‘justification questions’ that inquire into the reasons for 
the voter's response to preceding question on that issue, in order to promote the 
questioning of prejudice and values. Poll results on justification questions should 
also stimulate constructive public debate on issues between polls. Each question on 
the ballot is to be accompanied by a range of answers for the voter's choice. Other 
types of questions would also be posed where appropriate such as ‘implementation’ 
and ‘willingness to pay’, as discussed in Chapter 7/ Elements of the design</ 
Function 1/ ‘E13’. 
As the menus of issues, questions and answers offered to the voter would be on 
public display in the ballot paper for years, criticism and endorsement of these 
menus would be invited from the public and plenty of time would be available for 
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reactions by both the managers of the poll and the public. It would thus be an open 
process that places the managers under constant public scrutiny to ensure relevance, 
comprehensiveness, competence and balance in the selection and framing of the 
menus of issues, questions and answers. The penalty for a public perception of poor 
performance would be the collapse of the People’s Forum through distrust and 
boycott by citizens. 
The ballot paper would help citizens deal with an issue if the description it gave 
and the questions it posed summarized the problem to a few crucial concepts that 
they could easily understand and find helpful. Complex issues of technology, risk 
and values must be distilled to their essentials and questions must be incisive and 
oriented to problem-solving. The managers of the poll should be well informed on 
political issues and have skills in the psychology of public deliberation, in issue 
analysis and in question technique. 
 
 
The execution of the Forum’s strategies 
 
The execution of both of the Forum’s strategies depends on the People’s Forum 
ballot paper. For the first strategy - encouraging the development of mass public 
opinion - the paper must cover the issues that are the most important for citizens to 
carefully consider. Politicians may avoid some of these because they confront 
electors with costly choices. The ballot paper must help to solve issues by 
investigating their causes and this may include addressing other issues that are 
related to these problems, so these must also be placed on the ballot. As the Forum’s 
polls will reflect any development of opinion that such tactics facilitate, its results 
should become widely known for reflecting relatively well-considered opinion and 
this should generate political influence for these polls. The Forum’s first strategy will 
therefore help execute its second strategy as well: that of producing political 
influence for the best developed policy ideas. 
The second strategy is elitist in that it aims to empower the views of those who 
are more concerned with the issues. However, rather than being a problem for 
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democratic equality of opportunities for participation, this elitism may help to 
ameliorate disengagement from politics by encouraging the disengaged to join the 
‘elite’ by voting in the Forum. 
If these polls are to create a strong political influence for the opinion they help 
develop, they must become popular public institutions. Such popularity would be 
indicated not just by whether a significant proportion of the electorate votes in the 
Forum polls, but also - and mainly - by the status of their results in the eyes of the 
public. This status of Forum polls should show whether the general public expects 
government to implement their findings and it may depend on whether citizens 
develop approval for the People’s Forum process. If and when these polls are run, 
they would be compared with conventional opinion polls. This should draw the 
attention of the public to the hazardous influence of the latter. Leo Jeffres (2005, 617-
8) observes that for public opinion polls there is a 
 
well-documented public willingness to offer opinions on topics citizens know nothing 
about and respond to ambiguous questions about fictitious public affairs issues< In a 
democracy, and the consumer society, the public itself, political leadership, and 
influentials need ‘feedback’ about each other for the system to work. The question is 
whether we can improve poll results to merit the position surveys occupy in society 
today.  
 
The People’s Forum is intended to provide an affirmative answer to Jeffres’ 
query, for it should reflect less suggestion and lack of knowledge and more 
considered judgement. Much of this judgement will be facilitated by the continuity 
of deliberation that is invited by the Forum’s repetitive process. By showing trends 
in the development of opinion the Forum might also indicate whether further 
progress in sophistication appears likely. 
Another description of the way the Forum is anticipated to operate is given below 
in ‘Major functions of the People’s Forum’. This focuses on five major functions of 
this institution. However before it is presented, a system of evaluating such 
functions is developed. As this system evaluates functions of designs for governance 
it can be used to evaluate different institutions for purposes similar to those of the 
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Forum. The Forum is evaluated with this system at the conclusion of the descriptions 
of its five major functions and this evaluation is later compared with evaluations by 
the same system, of three other designs of institutions for similar purposes. 
 
 
Evaluating democratic institutions 
 
The procedure used here to evaluate institutions for facilitating democratic 
government is derived from Graham Smith’s (2009) very useful proposal of similar 
purpose, which uses the concepts of democratic and institutional goods. His 
democratic goods ‚arguably< embody Robert Dahl’s classic criteria of a democratic 
process‛ (G. Smith 2009, 13) and are the extent to which certain effects are, or might 
be expected, to be provided by the institution being evaluated. Dahl’s criteria are 
slightly different in that they are opportunities for, rather than anticipated 
realizations of, similar effects. Smith specifies four democratic goods: 
‚inclusiveness‛, the degree to which citizens of diverse social perspectives are 
involved in the decision-making process of the institution being assessed; ‚popular 
control‛ of decision-making by the institution, which means control by those 
participating in it; ‚considered judgement‛ by participants (G. Smith 2009, 25); and 
the ‚transparency‛ of this process to all citizens. 
Inclusiveness comprises the presence and the voice provided by the institution for 
citizens of all social perspectives. Presence is the participation that the institution 
provides. Voice is the hearing for any participant, together with her influence over 
the output of the institution. An institution that is closed to the general public (for 
example a random sample such as a deliberative poll or a citizens’ assembly) may 
provide presence for all citizens in the sense of good representation, but this is not 
the same as providing actual presence, or providing the possibility of this, for all 
citizens (Saward 2000, 5). So closed institutions may provide substantive presence 
only for participants and not for all citizens. They may also provide voice only for 
participants. So inclusiveness may be substantively provided only for participants by 
closed institutions, but may be provided by open institutions to all citizens. Popular 
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control may be provided only to participants by both closed and open institutions 
(G. Smith 2009, 13). This control is over decision-making, which may be roughly 
classified into four stages: problem definition, option analysis, option selection and 
implementation (G. Smith 2009, 23). Considered judgement may also be 
substantively provided only to participants by the institution, whether it is open or 
closed. This leaves transparency as the only democratic good that may be provided 
to all citizens by both open and closed institutions. These potential provisions of 
democratic goods are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Provisions of democratic goods by institutions  
 
 
Recipients of democratic 
goods 
Type of institution 
Open Closed 
 
Participants only 
- I 
P P 
C C 
- - 
 
All citizens  
(including participants) 
I - 
- - 
- - 
T T 
Democratic goods: I inclusiveness, P popular control, C considered judgement, 
                                  T transparency. 
 
 
As an open institution may provide inclusiveness to all citizens but a closed one 
can only provide it for participants, high (or low) inclusiveness for an open 
institution will affect many more citizens than high (or low) inclusiveness for one 
that is closed. This prevents evaluations of provisions of inclusiveness by open and 
closed institutions from being meaningfully compared. A good is presumably 
something of value to people or other sentient beings, so the comparison of 
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provisions of goods by several institutions requires a standard set of recipients of 
these various provisions in order to judge how well this set is provided for, by each  
institution. As closed institutions may provide inclusiveness for participants and 
open ones may provide it for all citizens there is no common set of recipients for 
which we might assess how well all types of institution provide this good. This is a 
major problem for using democratic goods, so for this reason as well as others, these 
are replaced here with a new classification, developed as follows. 
As democracy is government by the people, ideal democracy is ideal government 
by the people. This would seem to comprise ideal government outcomes and ideal 
participation by the people as they produce these outcomes. This combination of two 
ideals might be expected in both Graham Smith’s democratic goods and Dahl’s 
(2006, 8-10) criteria for ideal democracy. Democratic goods may thus comprise 
‘governmental goods’ and ‘participatory goods’. As discussed below, this appears to 
be the case, so governmental and participatory goods are recognized in the 
evaluation system described below, rather than democratic goods. This classification 
leads to the identification of four governmental goods, two of which turn out to be 
the aims of the two strategies of the People’s Forum. Another reason for not referring 
to democratic goods is that one of these, transparency, may be more usefully 
considered to be an institutional good, as explained below. A further reason is that 
given above, that the meaning of inclusiveness varies from closed institutions to 
open institutions. This confusion is eliminated here by interpreting all participatory 
and governmental goods of an institution as those it provides to all citizens, whether 
they participate in it or not. This is consistent with the meaning of institutional goods 
as defined by Graham Smith and also as institutional goods are interpreted below. 
This new system of evaluating institutions thus assesses all the goods they provide 
in terms of their provision to all citizens, which means it assesses the contributions of 
institutions to government. If several institutions are evaluated with this system, it is 
their effects on government that are being compared. 
There is also another objective here, in replacing democratic goods with 
participatory and governmental goods. This is to make sure that it is the 
requirements for good government that are being investigated rather than the 
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requirements for good democracy. This avoids assuming that ideal democracy is 
ideal government, without precluding this possibility. It also avoids following one 
theoretical model of ideal democracy to the exclusion of others. In looking for good 
government, the criterion for ‘good’ is the public choice notion stated in Chapter 2/ 
‘The function of democratic government’, that a government is good if it provides a 
good supply of public goods. To judge whether this supply is good, Beetham’s (1992, 
42) fifth liberal democratic principle is used: the judgement is to be made by the 
citizens. To justify this, I propose that citizens are the best judges because it is they 
who need, use and, to a considerable degree, provide public goods.  
As a good government does a good job of providing public goods it is likely to be 
very democratic because it will provide the very important public good of equality, 
which includes political equality. Although a very democratic society will have 
political equality this may not be sufficient to provide good government. This 
discussion of the goods that institutions for democratic government might be 
expected to provide is now followed by a specification of their different types, 
grouped into three classes: participatory, governmental and institutional.  
 
 
Participatory goods 
 
Robert Dahl’s (1998, 37-38; 2006, 8-9) five basic criteria for an ideal democracy are: 
(1) equal and effective opportunities for all members of the demos to communicate 
their views on public policy to other members, before the relevant policy is enacted 
(his ‚effective participation‛ criterion); (2) equal and effective opportunities for all 
members to vote on enactment of policy, together with equality of their votes; (3) 
equal and effective opportunities for each member to learn about policy proposals 
(his ‚enlightened understanding‛); (4) exclusive opportunity for the members to 
control the agenda; and (5) inclusion of virtually all adults and social groups as having 
these four rights as members of the demos. It is suggested that the third criterion of 
opportunities to gain enlightened understanding is fundamentally different from the 
other four as it appears necessary for quality of participation rather than equality of 
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participation, if the latter means equality of freedom to participate. If Dahl’s 
equalities of freedom to participate in politics (criteria 1, 2, 4 and 5) are to produce 
good government (which is a good provision of public goods) they must be 
complemented with quality of participation. The availability of equal and effective 
opportunities for enlightened understanding is therefore considered here to be a 
governmental good, while Dahl’s criteria 1, 2, 4 and 5 are considered to describe 
participatory goods. 
This establishment of a set of four participatory goods and one governmental 
good replaces the four democratic goods. This is consistent with Dahl’s statement 
that ‚all the members *of a democracy] are to be treated (under the constitution) as if 
they were equally qualified to participate in the process of making decisions about 
the policies the association will pursue‛ (Dahl 1998, 36, 37, emphasis added). The 
words ‚as if‛ indicate that Dahl’s concern is with the justice of all members having 
the freedom or right to participate, rather than with all members actually being 
equally qualified to do this, in the sense of being equally well-informed and 
benevolent. Consistent with this meaning, Dahl (2006, 10) later emphasized the 
significance of rights. ‚Democracy consists, then, not only of political processes. It is 
also necessarily a system of fundamental rights.‛ 
As noted above, the democratic good of popular control is control over problem 
definition, option analysis, option choice and implementation of the choice. As such, 
popular control is only partly covered by my participatory goods. Problem definition 
and option analysis is covered by opportunities to control the agenda (Dahl’s 
criterion 4) and option selection is covered by opportunities for voting (Dahl’s 
criterion 2). The missing ingredient is popular control of the implementation of 
policy decisions, so another good is needed to cover this. This is called ‘popular 
implementation’ and as it concerns the execution of government it is considered a 
governmental good and listed as such in the next section. Popular implementation of 
the policy decisions of an institution means that the public values the policy choices 
it makes and expects or demands that politicians heed them. Popular 
implementation also means that this popular pressure continues over time to ensure 
that these policy choices are followed up in a sustained manner. 
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Governmental goods 
 
The classification of opportunities for enlightened understanding as a governmental 
good implies that such opportunities can be used to evaluate any form of 
government, whether it is democratic or not. This appears to be so, because as it is 
the people who need, use and, to a considerable degree, provide public goods it is 
only they who are in the position to decide what provision of these is good or bad. 
To do this competently they need to be well enough informed to be able to recognize 
public goods and assess their benefits and costs. So they need equal and very 
effective opportunities to gain enlightened understanding. The provision of these 
opportunities would virtually implement the first strategy of the People’s Forum - to 
accelerate the development of mass public opinion on strategic public issues. If non-
democratic governments fail to provide such opportunities they may produce poor 
government, if only because they have a problem in conducting credible evaluations 
of their performance. Democracies that fail to provide these opportunities are also 
very likely to produce poor government, because the people have a large influence 
on public policy. 
However, even in political systems that provide opportunities for enlightened 
understanding, the result in terms of the provision of public goods may be flawed - 
at times very badly - unless the understandings of relatively enlightened citizens are 
enabled to prevail over the understandings of the others. This is necessary to address 
the third element of triple dysfunction, excessive compromise. The significance of 
this problem has been described by psychiatrists Wilfred Abse and Lucie Jessner 
(1962, 86). 
 
In the democratic system of values, men have equal rights, but they are not equal in 
ability, personal development, and education. A democracy which promotes illusions in 
this respect is undermining its own strength: its power to foster and release the full 
capacity of the group. 
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It is therefore suggested that the other strategy of the People’s Forum, ‘the political 
influence of informed citizen opinion prevailing over that of less informed citizen 
opinion’ describes a second governmental good. However, if this prevalence is to be 
democratic, it must have the acquiescence of the relatively ill-informed. This is 
required by Dahl’s first criterion: the participatory good of equal and effective 
opportunities for all members to advise others of their views before a policy is 
adopted. The manner in which acquiescence should take place is specified by the 
three other participatory goods: Dahl’s criteria of equal and effective opportunities - 
to vote on policy, for popular control of the agenda and for all classes of member to 
take part in the process. 
This second governmental good may seem an unwarranted extension of this class 
of good because it is appears undemocratic by disregarding equality in the freedom 
of citizens to participate. However as a governmental good it is not intended to 
specify equality of freedom: this is done by participatory goods. It is the combination 
of those goods with governmental goods that produces ‚democratic goods‛. 
There is also a need for innovations to provide ‚defence against manipulation of 
the public interest‛ (Smith 2001, 77) and this appears to be a third governmental 
good. It may be considered that this is already specified by the first and second 
governmental goods. ‘Equal and effective opportunities for all citizens to gain 
enlightened understanding’ and ‘the political influence of informed citizen opinion 
prevailing over that of less informed citizen opinion’ both imply protection from 
distortion by special interests. However, to ensure that this protection is explicitly 
considered in the evaluation of designs of institutions, it seems useful to recognize 
defence against manipulation as a third governmental good. This includes prevention 
of co-option of citizens by public authorities. 
Finally there is the fourth governmental good of popular implementation, the 
popular control of the implementation of policy described above at the conclusion of 
‘Participatory goods’. 
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Institutional goods 
 
Institutional goods are the desirable qualities we would expect of institutions in 
general and they form two subclasses: efficiency and transferability (G. Smith 2009, 13, 
26-7). Efficiency, as applied here, is the degree to which an institution for facilitating 
government minimizes the costs it imposes on both citizens and public authorities, 
so it includes economy of time and effort for participants, as well as financial 
economy. The transferability of an institution for facilitating government is its ability 
to work in three political contexts: the type of political system, the type of issue dealt 
with and the scale of the application of the institution, from local to global. Each 
institutional good is experienced by the whole polity for which the institution is 
expected to perform. 
One cause of transferability failure might be a lack of transparency to citizens of 
the design’s process that causes them to distrust and reject it. Transferability is 
therefore considered here to include transparency to all citizens, which Graham Smith 
classifies as a democratic good. Transparency may be crucial for the transferability of 
an institution to a liberal democracy but not to an authoritarian political system, so it 
is a component of transferability to ‘type of political system’. 
Another characteristic of an institution that affects its transferability to type of 
political system is the feasibility of introducing the institution. This is a crucial 
component of transferability because whether the institution functions depends 
entirely on whether it can be initiated in the existing environment. As John 
Parkinson (2006, ix) notes in respect of proposals for deliberative institutions, they 
must show ‚how to get to those end points from where we are now. Otherwise the 
dream of a genuinely deliberative democracy will remain just that, a dream‛. The 
major determinant of feasibility of introduction in democratic political systems 
appears to be whether this requires political will or private initiative. Political will is 
usually much more difficult to develop in a democracy than private initiative, 
because sufficient private action may involve the motivation of only a few people, 
such as some with money or other types of power, whereas raising significant 
political will may mean motivating many thousands or millions of people. A private 
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initiative might begin with the writing and publishing of a book that describes an 
innovation in some detail, together with the case for implementing it. Such 
communication may motivate a few interest groups or individuals with the 
necessary resources to run a trial or demonstration of the innovation that may then 
generate the political will to establish it as a permanent institution. In contrast to this 
approach, if the innovation is of a type that requires political will for its initial 
demonstration, then it faces the problem that this will is likely to be averse to new 
institutions that significantly change politics; because politicians are oriented to, self-
selected for, and experienced in, dealing with the current political system. Observing 
the US political environment, John Gastil (2007, 646) cautions:  
 
Leaders in both parties< are likely to reject any serious threat to a status quo that both 
sides believe, in their hearts, favors their own party. Special interests accustomed to easy 
access to government will likely resist the idea with even more ferocity, and< there is no 
reason to doubt their power. 
 
The Citizens’ Assemblies of British Columbia and Ontario illustrate the limitation 
imposed by the requirement of political will for initiating an innovation, as they 
were constrained not only by having their findings put to a referendum, but by this 
requiring a supermajority for any change to be effected. In addition, these assemblies 
have been restricted to a type of issue - electoral reform - that many citizens think 
cannot be left to politicians. As Graham Smith (2005, 113) observes: ‚public 
authorities lack the will, resources and freedom to embrace democratic innovations.‛ 
If an innovative political institution with potential for significant impact requires 
political will for its introduction, its feasibility of introduction is likely to be low, but 
if private initiative is sufficient to introduce it, then this feasibility may be high, if the 
design appears promising. 
The incentive given by a design to encourage all citizens to use that institution as 
a means of participating in democratic government might appear to be another 
transferability good. ‚Citizens must believe that participation will make a 
difference< that the results of participation exercises are able to influence decision-
makers< Citizens must be respected and given incentives (or a reason) to 
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participate‛ (Smith 2005, 113). Whether a design is open or closed, citizens’ incentive 
to use that institution is taken here to be the incentive they have to use it by 
approving it and expecting their government to implement the policy choices it 
produces. This incentive is not taken to be citizens’ incentive to use it by 
participating in it, because very few can experience this incentive with closed 
designs. This definition makes incentive to use the institution a transferability good for 
a democracy rather than a participatory good. 
Incentive to use an institution should arise from ‚what most psychologists believe 
are the four core motives that influence our decision-making in social dilemmas< 
understanding, belonging, trusting and self-enhancing‛ (van Vugt 2009, 41). The 
degree to which a design might stimulate these motives may be judged by inspecting 
its institutional, participatory and governmental goods. The institutional good of 
transparency will produce trust and both participatory and governmental goods will 
evoke feelings of understanding, belonging, trust and self-enhancement. 
Assessments of citizens’ incentive to use the institution will therefore duplicate the 
assessments of the other goods, so it is not included in this evaluative framework. 
Another way of looking at this duplication is that the summation of the assessments 
of institutional, participatory and governmental goods of a design is intended to 
assess its value as a democratic institution, which is similar to evaluating citizens’ 
incentive to use it by expecting their government to implement its policy choices. 
The feasibility of introducing the institution suggests another transferability good, 
the feasibility of maintaining it. In a democracy, this is likely to ultimately depend on 
popular support for the institution, whether it is supported and run directly by the 
people or by their government through policy or law or constitutional requirement. 
Such popular support was discussed above as the people’s incentive to use the 
institution by approving it and expecting their government to implement the policy 
choices it produces. As noted there, this popular support is assessed by the provision 
of the institutional goods already specified, together with the participatory and 
governmental goods described above. Feasibility of maintaining the institution is 
therefore not included as another good. 
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Evaluating goods of democratic institutions 
 
The foregoing modification of Graham Smith’s evaluative framework changes the 
number of goods to be assessed from eight to thirteen and this has enabled some of 
them to be more specific, so their assessment can be more focused. This has 
encouraged numerical ratings to be allocated for any design to indicate how well 
each good is likely to be provided by that design for the polity. The summary of the 
next section does this for the People’s Forum and then, in ‘The People’s Forum 
compared with principles and designs for deliberative democracy’, the assessment is 
repeated for three more designs. All four designs are then given a preliminary 
comparison by summing their goods ratings (see Table 2). This is a very simplified 
overview and must be regarded as merely a rough indication of the relative promise 
of these four institutions. However, it invites three ways of systematically reviewing 
the comparison: by reconsidering how well each design might provide each good; by 
considering whether different goods should be given different weightings; and by 
considering whether the evaluative framework needs changing. As noted above, the 
framework assesses provisions of goods for all citizens of the polity, not just for 
those working within the institutional design being evaluated. It may be tempting to 
regard an institution that internally achieves high provisions of goods with favour, 
but if it does not provide them for the whole polity, it fails. 
I now prepare for an assessment of the People’s Forum by describing five of its 
major functions. 
 
 
Major functions of the People’s Forum 
 
The five major functions described here give a broad, but incomplete account of 
how the People’s Forum should execute its two strategies and also how it should 
provide institutional, participatory and governmental goods. The five functions are: 
public deliberation of issues; public deliberation about what issues to deliberate; 
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focusing on basic issues; meritocratic influence; and economizing the effort required 
of citizens. The contributions that a function makes towards the Forum’s strategies 
and the three classes of goods are indicated at the conclusion of the description of 
that function. After the five functions are described, their provisions of goods are 
summarized for the Forum as a whole, by being allocated numerical ratings to 
indicate how complete they are expected to be. 
 
 
Public deliberation: an open, slow and in some ways careful consideration 
by citizens 
 
The People’s Forum would provide a slow process that allows years for public 
judgment to evolve. Its poll would be open to all electors to vote; it would invite all 
citizens to publicly debate the issues on its agenda (the ballot paper); and its format 
would impose a minimum of control over citizens’ deliberations in that the agenda 
would be open to amendment by citizens, little information would be supplied by 
the pollster and deliberation would not be facilitated by mediated group discussions 
run by the People’s Forum. The Forum would focus on assisting current processes of 
public discussion, argument and dissemination of information to produce more 
considered judgements through its selection and framing of issues, its incisive 
choices of questions and its repetition of many voting events. This repetition would 
give a continuity of public discourse and deliberation because the agenda presented 
by the ballot paper is maintained for as long as possible, with perhaps most changes 
made by adding new issues to it and retiring others as they are resolved. Public 
discourse should be encouraged by the vote giving annual feedback to the people on 
what those who are engaged are thinking, why they are thinking this and how their 
views are changing. This should provoke and inform further reflection, enquiry, 
discussion and debate. The People’s Forum poll would only be open for voting by 
electors, but as the process would be public and transparent, the whole community 
could contribute to the arguments, to the search for information and to the 
development of opinion. 
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This function of public deliberation is intended to help execute the first strategy 
of the People’s Forum, the development of mass public opinion. It would also 
provide a basis for the second strategy (producing political influence for the part of 
public opinion that is likely to be relatively well developed) by registering the views 
of those citizens who are interested in the issues it treats. Three institutional goods of 
transferability should be provided: facilitation of policy development on strategic 
issues and the transparency needed for politics to operate well in a large scale 
democracy. This function would also provide the participatory good of opportunity 
for all members to communicate their views to each other; and the governmental good 
of opportunity for all to gain enlightened understanding, which is also the first strategy 
of the Forum. The continuing nature of the Forum’s deliberations will also provide 
the governmental goods of defence against manipulation (see Chapter 7/ Elements of 
the design</ ‘Function 9’) and popular implementation of policy. 
 
 
Deliberating what is to be deliberated 
 
The People’s Forum would assist deliberation of public policy by providing a 
forum not only for specific issues, but for debating which issues should be run 
through this process and the most useful questions to pose on them. As the ballot 
paper would display for long periods the People’s Forum menus of issues, questions 
and answer options, these menus will be open to criticism or endorsement by the 
public. The voluntary voting of the poll will oblige its managers to preface the ballot 
paper with an invitation to citizens to comment on it and suggest new issues, 
questions and answer choices. Any well-managed controversy on such aspects of the 
ballot paper should lift the profile of both the poll and the issues it treats, assisting 
the deliberation of issues, the engagement of citizens with the Forum and its 
management. 
This function should help execute the first strategy of the People’s Forum. It 
should also provide an institutional good of transferability, because inviting the 
public to help set the agenda produces a transparency that should help generate the 
  172 
political will to maintain the institution. This invitation also provides the 
participatory good of equal and effective opportunities to control the agenda and the 
public discussions this will foster should promote the governmental good of 
opportunities for citizens to gain enlightened understanding (the Forum’s first 
strategy). 
 
 
Examining basics 
 
Daniel Yankelovich (1992) has stated that public opinion on an issue often 
develops slowly over a long period, at least ten years for a complex issue. This may 
be an understatement, for it seems likely that the process may stall on issues where 
underlying assumptions remain unrecognized and/or unquestioned. Illusions may 
thus arise of public judgment having developed completely when a potential 
remains for it to be transformed by more thought and information. The long, slow 
and open-ended form of deliberation that the People’s Forum facilitates should be 
especially suited to such public examination of basic assumptions. Its transparency 
to scrutiny by everybody would help raise new questions, evidence and insights. 
The justification questioning referred to under ‘Ballot paper’ above and other types 
of questions discussed in Chapter 7/ Elements of the design</ Function 1/ E11-E13, 
should facilitate critical inquiry and help the public shake itself free of prejudicial 
hang-ups. It may be found that for some issues deliberation may never end, as each 
generation may want to think for itself and re-examine the foundations of its 
opinion. In such ways, the People’s Forum may allow citizens to reassess not only 
their public policies and laws, but their values and culture. This will affect public 
policy. As Slovic and his colleagues (Kahan et al. 2006) emphasize, culture is a 
critical determinant of the quality of deliberation. Tim Jackson (2009, 203) regards 
such reassessment as crucial: ‚the cultural drift that reinforces individualism at the 
expense of society, and supports innovation at the expense of tradition, is a 
distortion of what it means to be human.‛ 
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This function should help execute the first strategy of the Forum and promote the 
institutional goods of efficiency of operation and transferability to fundamental or 
strategic issues. It will also help provide the governmental goods of opportunities for 
gaining enlightened understanding (the Forum’s first strategy) and possibly some 
defence against manipulation by focusing public deliberation on strategic questions, 
which may be difficult for special interests to publicly distort in a credible manner. 
 
 
An element of meritocracy 
 
Meritocracy is often considered incompatible with democracy. As it is 
government by those citizens with the ability to govern well, many citizens are 
excluded. Those without the capacity, interest and time are discouraged or 
prevented from participating and this appears to destroy the political equality that is 
the core of democratic practice. However, Dahl (2006, 8-10) defines this equality as 
equality of opportunity, or a right, rather than equality of action. To maintain this 
right we must be careful that a meritocratic design does not prevent citizen 
participation but merely encourages those with the ability to contribute to good 
government, to actively participate. The others might be encouraged to participate in 
the passive mode of giving support to the contributions of those who are actively 
engaged, or by becoming actively engaged themselves if they become concerned 
about political trends. The meritocratic element of the Forum is designed to provide 
governmental goods without damaging the participatory goods that define a 
government as being democratic, as discussed above in Evaluating democratic 
institutions/ ‘Participatory goods’. 
Because conventional opinion polls systematically sample whole communities, 
they may hobble the competence of democratic governments by influencing their 
policies with views that are ill-informed, as discussed in Chapter 2/ ‘Excessive 
compromise’. The governmental good of ‘informed citizen opinion prevailing over 
less informed citizen opinion’ is intended to avoid such restriction of competence. 
The People’s Forum seeks to provide this good by using the self-selective sampling 
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of voluntary voting to bypass views that are ill-informed due to disengagement. This 
meritocratic device may trouble those who emphasize the importance of political 
equality for democracy, but it should be noted that Dahl (2006, 9) specifies equality 
as ‚equal and effective opportunities‛ to participate politically, rather than equal 
participation by every citizen. The conflict here is between ideal democracy and 
ideal government, which is discussed above in ‘Evaluating democratic institutions’, 
where it is proposed to be managed by dividing democratic goods into participatory 
and governmental goods. 
The degree to which self-selective sampling will reflect more sophisticated views 
than opinion polls may initially be limited, because people who are concerned about 
issues but do not value public goods or are ill-informed will vote along with others 
who are also concerned but more inclined to consider the value of public goods and 
are better informed because of this inclination. Across a succession of polls however, 
the encouragement that the Forum should give to widespread deliberation (see 
‘Public deliberation<’ and ‘Deliberating what is to be deliberated’ above, together 
with Chapter 7/ Elements of the design</ ‘Function 1’) may succeed in increasing 
the sophistication of mass public opinion. Any such deliberative effect is likely to be 
greatest with the section of the public that closely follows the issues presented by the 
People’s Forum and votes in it, so this engagement should significantly differentiate 
Forum results from those of opinion polls. The meritocratic element of the Forum 
therefore comprises two effects: bypassing those who choose to remain disengaged 
and facilitating the development of the opinions of those who engage. In addition to 
being meritocratic, the Forum may also slightly lift the sophistication of mass public 
opinion through the visibility of the public discourse it fosters. 
Public disapproval of the meritocratic self-selection of Forum voting should be 
moderated by awareness that voluntary voting is used by almost all liberal 
democracies for the selection of representatives and by many for referendums. 
Acceptance and appreciation of this ‘elitism’ may increase with time, because as the 
Forum operates it will be compared with random sample opinion polls and this 
should help citizens recognize the danger of giving political influence to the apathy 
and ignorance expressed in the latter. This elitism may therefore come to be widely 
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regarded by citizens as reason to accord status and political influence to Forum polls, 
so that a low voter turnout (say five per cent of those eligible to vote) does not 
impress citizens (and therefore does not impress their politicians) as a good reason to 
ignore their results and trends. Low turnouts may be taken to mean that the results 
reflect only the views of those citizens who are really interested in the issues 
covered. Exposure of the general public to the Forum process should therefore 
slowly develop a public expectation that political representatives should be guided 
by its findings, as required by the Forum’s second strategy. Of course this potential 
for political influence will encourage special interest groups to mobilize their 
supporters to vote in the Forum and to produce propaganda to sway other potential 
voters to their point of view. This should help rather than hinder the public 
deliberation of issues, for such groups are likely to be countered by others expressing 
different views and voting accordingly in the Forum’s polls. The Forum ballot paper 
should help guide these debates in constructive directions by its balanced 
descriptions of the issues and its choice of the most crucial questions for each. 
Voting in the Forum by dogmatic personalities should give them more exposure 
to opposing viewpoints and information, for the Forum’s issue descriptions and 
questions would be designed to do this. Dogmatists may thus feel obliged to 
publicly engage with arguments that oppose theirs. The Forum’s repetitive polling 
would prolong such discussion and argument and help it stay focused on specific 
questions by running substantially the same agenda for many years. In this situation 
participants will need to listen to opposing arguments to see how they might 
improve their own to lift the vote for their view in future polls. The Forum may thus 
help dogmatists, as well as open-minded participants, to develop more reflective, 
informed and socially responsible thinking. However, especially in the early years of 
a Forum’s operation, some dogmatic types may reject it as an insidious evil, for its 
questioning approach - its calling for openness, dialogue and exchange of ideas - is 
the antithesis of belief in faith. As John Dryzek (2006, 47) observes: ‚Those asserting 
identities may feel insulted by the very idea that questions going to their core be 
deliberated. What they want is instead ‘cathartic’ communication that unifies the 
group and demands respect from others.‛ As discussed in Chapter 7/ Concluding 
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comments</ ‘Perceptions of bias’ and also Chapter 7/ Elements of the design.../ 
Function 1/ ‘E10’, there are genetic and perhaps learned psychological limits to the 
loosening of dogmatic attitudes, but any achievements in this direction should help 
to improve democratic governance. 
The intention of the People’s Forum to bypass those who remain disengaged is 
not an attempt to ignore people who are alienated or demoralized, but to develop 
political influence for those who think about and want to express their views on 
problems that are persistent and important, including that of alienation. The Forum 
may be able to help ameliorate alienation by sustaining a public discourse on what to 
do about it and by giving public-spirited citizens a platform for advocating the 
interests of those who are alienated. The operation of the Forum also offers the 
marginalized an opportunity to have a say that is currently not available to them. It 
may even give them an incentive to do this, for if they hear that its polls ‘bypass the 
disengaged’ they may suspect this refers to them and rebel against the label by 
voting. Some of them may then discuss their views with others who feel alienated 
and urge them to vote as well. 
It is noted above that the meritocratic function of the Forum should give it 
political influence, which means the Forum would be executing its second strategy - 
the development of political influence for that part of public opinion that is most 
likely to be well developed. Some of the participatory goods of equal and effective 
opportunities for members to inform each other of their views on public policy, to vote 
and to control the agenda may be generated by meritocracy because the political 
influence it creates for the Forum should encourage citizens to use the Forum by 
debating the issues it deals with, voting in its polls and reviewing its agenda. This 
incentive may not be generated in the first year or two of operation of the first 
Forums that are attempted, but it should develop as Forums become established, if 
they gain reputations for potential or actual influence. The participatory good of full 
inclusion may be poorly provided by the operation of the Forum if many politically 
disengaged citizens are unmoved. Political influence from meritocracy should foster 
the governmental goods of popular implementation and, by stimulating public debate 
on the issues presented, produce opportunities for enlightened understanding. The last 
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effect is also the Forum’s first strategy. The governmental good of defence against 
manipulation may not materialize with the meritocratic element because although its 
political influence may give the Forum a public profile that may expose 
manipulation, it also provides incentive to manipulate. However, the direct and 
major effect of the Forum’s meritocracy is to produce the governmental good of the 
political influence of informed citizen opinion prevailing over that of less informed 
citizen opinion, a good that is the Forum’s second strategy. 
 
 
Economizing citizen effort 
 
Any attempt to increase political participation by citizens must minimize the time 
and effort it demands from them (Beetham 1992; G. Smith 2009, 18-19). For the 
People’s Forum to work under this constraint, no more than one poll per year after it 
has been established seems both necessary and sufficient if it focuses on helping the 
public to indicate only the broad strategic directions in public policy, leaving the 
mass of detailed decision-making within these guidelines to politicians. This 
periodicity also allows time for public discourse to produce some change in the 
opinion registered by successive polls. The ‘economy of time’ provided by the design 
of the People’s Forum is further explained below in Chapter 7/ Function 12/ ‘E10’. 
This function helps execute the Forum’s first strategy of developing mass public 
opinion. It promotes the institutional good of efficiency by minimizing the time 
required from citizens and thereby fosters the participatory goods of all members 
having equal and effective opportunities for communicating their policy views to each 
other, to vote and to control the agenda. By minimizing the task for citizens, this 
function also fosters the governmental goods of opportunities for citizens to gain 
enlightened understanding (the Forum’s first strategy) and popular implementation. 
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Summary of the effects of the Forum’s major functions 
 
To summarize how well these five functions would enable the Forum to provide 
institutional, participatory and governmental goods, the likely provision of each 
good is assessed with a rating on a scale of 0 (the Forum cannot provide that good) 
to 5 (it should be extremely effective in providing that good). Each rating is noted in 
brackets after the name of the good and is intended only as a rough indication of 
effectiveness of provision. Different readers may give different ratings, based on 
their estimation of the potential for the Forum to perform. These ratings are entered 
into a table later in this chapter, to compare the effects that the People’s Forum and 
three other institutional designs appear to be likely to have on liberal democratic 
government. 
Unless otherwise stated here, the following ratings are assessed from the 
preceding descriptions of functions. These indicate that the Forum should do a good 
job of providing the institutional good of efficiency (4). Of the four institutional goods 
comprising transferability, transparency (4) is high for the Forum and should give 
citizens confidence in using it. An element of transferability that is not indicated by 
this limited selection of five functions is that the Forum promises fairly high 
feasibility (3) to initiate, as it could be introduced to a liberal democracy by private 
initiative. This is discussed in the following section and analysed further in Chapter 
7/ Elements of the design</ ‘Function 11’. Two other elements of transferability are 
well addressed: the Forum should help large scale (5) state, national, multinational 
and possibly global communities manage strategic issues (4). For participatory goods, 
the five major functions should provide opportunities for all citizens to communicate 
their views to each other (3), to vote (4) and to control the agenda (4), but full inclusion (1) 
is not likely to be realized. The governmental good of opportunities for all citizens to 
gain enlightened understanding (2) should be slightly provided. That of informed 
opinion prevailing over less informed (4) should be well provided, if transferability is 
high, which appears likely. The third governmental good of defence against 
manipulation (4) of the public interest should be assisted by the indefinite duration of 
public deliberation (as discussed below in Chapter 7/ Elements of the design</ 
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‘Function 9’) and also by the focus on examining basic aspects of issues, if these 
prove difficult for special interests to distort in a way that is credible to the public. 
Popular implementation (3) should be fairly effective in getting government to adopt 
the policy developed by the Forum and in seeing that it is implemented (see 
‘Evaluating democratic institutions/ Participatory goods’ above). 
 
 
Initiating and running the Forum 
 
The potential ‘market’ for the People’s Forum design initially comprises liberal 
democratic state and national governments. It might then be adapted to international 
and global governance. Its operation in democracies may set examples that 
encourage publics under less democratic regimes to press for its establishment in 
those polities. A government could finance a People’s Forum as an independent 
service to the public and in doing so may have it managed by an NGO or a private 
business, to ensure that it is seen by the public to be entirely free of government 
control. Several attempts to interest politicians in this system have indicated that 
they are unlikely to provide it unless citizens experience it, develop a desire for it 
and then urge their governments to fund it. A demonstration trial therefore appears 
to be a necessary first step for its implementation. The design of the Forum enables 
such a demonstration to be done without government support, so funds for this 
purpose might be sought from philanthropic foundations, NGOs, citizens (via a 
donation website), opinion polling companies, media businesses, 
telecommunications companies or corporations interested in promoting their image 
or in improving government policy to create greater strategic certainty for corporate 
investments. A trial of the Forum could be initiated by an existing NGO or a few 
citizens who formed an NGO for this purpose. Such a body would attempt to raise 
the necessary money and if successful this would be used to hire a small team of 
perhaps five to ten people to establish and run the Forum. As noted in ‘The mission, 
strategies and shape of the People’s Forum/ Ballot paper’, ‚issues of technology, risk 
and values must be distilled to their essentials and questions must be incisive and 
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oriented to problem-solving.‛ The management team must therefore include 
members with a good knowledge of political issues and with skills in issue analysis, 
in poll question technique, in the psychology of public deliberation, in business 
management and in information technology. This team would arrange for some 
work to be outsourced, such as advertising the polls and applying information 
technology, so that they could focus on designing and compiling the ballot paper, on 
public relations, on supplying polling results and analysis to the media and on the 
overall management of the Forum. If the first year or two of the Forum’s operation 
generates positive public interest, this may start to produce political pressure for it to 
be accepted as a formal part of the apparatus of democratic government. If this 
happened, the state would take responsibility for funding the Forum, but its 
management must remain independent of government and entirely in the hands of 
its staff. The regulation of these managers would be done by citizens, for if the 
People’s Forum acquires a public reputation for bias, or irrelevance, or some other 
serious defect then citizens will destroy it by not voting in it and by encouraging 
their politicians not to fund it and to ignore its results.   
In the Australian situation, the island state of Tasmania would be a suitable 
laboratory for a trial as its physical separation from the rest of the nation gives 
Tasmanians a distinct sense of being in a position to influence their future. The size 
of the Tasmanian population, at half a million, should be sufficient for vigorous 
debate on fundamental, long term issues. This state also has an extensive and 
continuing experience with very divisive issues so it should welcome a new way of 
approaching these. The cost of a three year trial of the People’s Forum here, based on 
telephone and internet voting, free hard-copy plus website ballot papers and some 
advertising, may be around Aus$ five million. After three years such a test should be 
indicating whether the poll is starting to develop public acceptance as a political 
institution. During this period it may not have generated political influence, but be 
raising anticipation of this, be attracting increasing voter participation, be facilitating 
public thought on key issues and be showing trends in opinion on the issues it treats. 
The initiation of such a trial may stage the first three polls at six month intervals, to 
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generate publicity for the Forum and quickly pass through any backlash vote in 
reaction to initial poll results. Subsequent polls may then be annual events. 
An obstacle to such a trial in Australia is that the Federal Government is 
prevented by law from making its electoral roll available to private interests which 
are not legally authorized to use it. If a non-government group is running the trial, 
this would preclude the possibility of high security impulse voting as discussed 
above under ‘Voting process’, but this problem may be tackled by the Forum 
running a poll sequence without serious voting security. If this relies on a web-site 
ballot paper without free hard copy, the cost of a three year demonstration may be 
around Aus$ three million. This should enable the public to see the potential of the 
system, so if citizens then wanted to try it out as a functioning political institution, 
pressure of public opinion may elicit cooperation from the government, together 
with financial backing from this or other sources, to permit a fully operational poll. 
Once this was established and running successfully it may provide an example of 
public participation that attracts wide interest from around the world, prompting 
politicians or citizens to introduce the People’s Forum to other states and nations 
and possibly adapting it for international and global applications. 
 
 
The People’s Forum compared with principles and designs for 
deliberative democracy 
 
As the People’s Forum is designed for large scale operation it has an overarching 
reach that could use input from other devices that operate in more limited ways. 
Such limitations may be that these devices cannot treat a large number of issues at 
the same time, facilitate deliberation of issues with fundamental or systemic impacts 
and include many thousands of citizens in their deliberations. An example of a 
device that has at least the first and last of these limitations is the Deliberative Poll®, 
which is briefly described in Chapter 9. This device could give some indication, each 
time it is run, of what an operating People’s Forum is likely to do to public opinion 
some years in the future, on one issue - if it is not strongly affected by others. If 
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Deliberative Polls or other similar devices are deployed carefully for this forecasting 
function, they might produce effective publicity for the People’s Forum, helping it to 
attract more voters, to generate more public deliberation and to exert more political 
influence. Deliberative mini-publics (statistically reliable samples of the population) 
could also assist a People’s Forum by providing local, intensive sites of deliberation 
that contribute something to the broader development of public opinion, adding a 
little to the wisdom registered by the Forum. In return, People’s Forums would assist 
the operation of such mini-publics by presenting state, national or global expressions 
of influential public opinion that they might be able to contribute to. Saward (2001) 
has proposed that cooperation between direct and deliberative democratic devices 
would improve democracy and Graham Smith (2005, 112) observes that if ‚different 
innovations are able to increase and deepen citizen participation in different ways, 
then the creative and imaginative combination or sequencing of democratic 
innovations has the potential to improve the effectiveness of citizen involvement in 
decision-making processes‛. Carolyn Hendriks (2006, 499, 502-3) sees this as a 
necessity for deliberative devices, because ‚unless a micro forum is closely 
connected to its macro discursive setting, then it risks drowning in a sea of other 
public conversations.‛ She therefore advocates an ‚integrated system of public 
deliberation‛ in which ‚structured deliberative arenas work together with some of 
the more unconstrained, informal modes of deliberation operating in civil society‛. 
As the People’s Forum has the potential to encourage very large numbers of people 
to simultaneously deliberate a large number of fundamental issues it may provide 
the basis of such an integrated system. 
 
 
The People’s Forum compared with principles for deliberative democracy 
and public management 
 
As the People’s Forum is a deliberative design, criteria for ensuring public 
deliberation in democratic government should help to indicate the Forum’s potential 
to perform. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003) have proposed such criteria in 
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the form of principles and ‚design properties‛ of ‚Empowered Participatory 
Governance‛ (EPG). Their first principle is a focus on practical problems and 
concrete concerns of society at local levels. The People’s Forum has this focus but 
only in an indirect way as it is designed for systemic treatment, which means 
attending to fundamental causes of problems. The other two principles of EPG are 
more easily recognized in the design of the Forum and call for deliberative 
democracy. They are: bottom-up participation and the deliberative generation of 
solutions. In addition to these three principles, the People’s Forum broadly follows 
the three ‚design properties‛ of EPG. The first of these, devolution of power, would 
not be to local bodies as in EPG, but would go further, to citizens. The second design 
property, centralized supervision and coordination, is basic to the Forum as this is 
what its managers would do. The third, a ‚state-centered‛ approach, to ‚colonize 
state power and transform formal governance institutions‛ (Fung and Wright 2003, 
22) is a crucial feature of the People’s Forum, for if it proved effective its popular 
acceptance would urge the state to enact the policy trends that evolve in its poll 
results. 
Peter Levine, Archon Fung and John Gastil (2005, 273-274) have observed that 
within the community of political theorists advocating deliberative innovations for 
democracy, there appears to be a broad agreement that any such device should: 
1. have realistic expectations of political influence; 
2. include key stakeholders and publics in deliberations; 
3. foster informed, conscientious discussion working towards common ground; 
4. use neutral, professional staff to help participants through a fair agenda; 
5. earn broad public support for its recommendations; 
6. be sustainable  
They also note (Levine et al 2005, 274-277) that full consensus is often not possible 
but benefits flow from trying to develop it; that organization is vital; and that scale is 
important, i.e. scaling ‚out‛ to reach as much of the public as possible as well as 
scaling ‚up‛ to address concerns at strategic levels such as state, national and global. 
Levine, Fung and Gastil (2005, 238) stress  
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the importance of an open-minded, ongoing discovery of one another’s possibly changing 
values and interests, which we call dynamic updating< participants in productive 
deliberation should continually and consciously update their understandings of common 
and conflicting interests as the process evolves. 
  
The People’s Forum appears to address all of these concerns to some degree. The 
specification of neutral, professional staff is met not by providing facilitators and 
expert advice on issues for panels of citizens, but by having the Forum’s polls 
administered by professionally qualified staff who may consult with specialists on 
issues and on the content of the ballot paper, especially on the selection and 
description of issues, the selection of questions and the flagging of connections 
between different issues and questions. 
David Ryfe (2005, 59, 57, 63-4) observes that deliberation by citizens is episodic, 
difficult and tentative; that it is driven by feelings of accountability, by high stakes 
and by diversity of views; and also that it is facilitated by rules, leadership and 
learning by deliberating with others who are skilled at it. The Forum appears to 
accommodate or use most of these responses. Its facilitation of deliberation by rules, 
by leadership, and by deliberating with those who have such skills is attempted by 
the presentation of a well designed ballot paper. Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and John 
Hibbing (2005, 243) emphasize that face-to face deliberation is difficult for the 
general public, mainly because many citizens are uncomfortable talking about 
policy, they lack interest in politics and they are busy doing other things that seem 
personally more relevant to them. They make this observation from numerous focus 
groups on politics that they have conducted around the US and from ‚a careful 
review of the empirical evidence [which] suggests that many people lack the 
motivation to engage in civic life generally and politics specifically< joining groups 
is not a way of embracing politics but a way of avoiding politics‛ (Theiss-Morse and 
Hibbing 2005, 244). The People’s Forum is designed to cope with this reluctance by 
not relying on meetings of citizens; by using a poll to give incentives to think about 
issues; and by designing the ballot paper to assist deliberation. 
Cass Sunstein has expressed concern that a tendency for people to discuss issues 
in like-minded groups or ‚enclaves‛ creates extreme views. He notes that the 
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individualization facilitated by wealth and technology divides communities because 
it helps people to associate with those who have similar views. For example, political 
blogs can create partisan communities who demonize each other. To prevent this, 
Sunstein (2002, 195) suggests: 
 
The trick is to produce an institutional design that will increase the likelihood that 
deliberation will lead in sensible directions, so that any polarization, if it occurs, will be a 
result of learning, rather than group dynamics (2002, 188)< It is desirable to create spaces 
for enclave deliberation without insulating enclave members from those with opposing 
views, and without insulating those outside the enclave from the views of those within it. 
 
The People’s Forum would work against such insulation by publicizing poll results 
that show the differing views of citizens and some of their reasons for these. This 
would invite the public to debate and deliberate further, so that people may get 
closer to consensus and eventually come to agree that the majority should prevail. 
A potential problem for any system of governance is the probability that incentive 
compatible devices (ICDs) will impair the cooperative dispositions of citizens (Orbell 
et al. 2004). ICDs are instruments such as laws or tax schemes that align the self-
interest of the individual with the interest of the group. As the framing of choices by 
these devices obviates the need for citizens to invoke ethical concerns about public 
goods, these concerns may atrophy or their development may be neglected (Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer 1996). This makes the fostering of ethical individual responsibility 
and the improvement of collective welfare difficult to combine in formal institutions 
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2003). Democratic institutions should therefore not rely 
exclusively on ICDs. The People’s Forum should not encounter this problem because 
it invites citizens to maintain and develop their social responsibility by devising and 
choosing ICDs. They would do this by contributing to the compilation of the ballot 
paper and by using the Forum’s polls to express themselves and to hear each other. 
Brian Head and John Alford (2008) report that research and practical experience 
in public management suggests that the social complexity of ‚wicked‛ problems 
requires that they be managed by wide-scale collaboration. They recommend that 
this be supported by a systems thinking and outcomes focus and also by ‚adaptive 
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leadership‛. Leadership scholar Ronald Heifetz (cited in Head and Alford 2008, 20-
21) has described this as a ‚mobilizing of adaptive work‛ in which the public 
manager  
 
leads organizational members and/or stakeholders themselves in doing the collective work 
of identifying the problem and developing ways to deal with it. In effect, those who are 
led are asked to perform the shared leadership role of setting a direction (emphasis in 
original). 
 
So those who are led are asked to lead, by ‚setting a direction‛. This is the remedy 
suggested for democracies by the triple dysfunction hypothesis: that the people 
should become active and competent directors. The People’s Forum is designed to 
assist them to do this by facilitating their collaborative communication. Head and 
Alford specify that such institutions must build trust and commitment in 
stakeholders and other parties: the Forum is designed to do this by being 
transparent, by being vulnerable to rejection by citizens and by making the execution 
of its policy recommendations contingent on a general level of acceptance, as 
discussed below in Chapter 7/ Elements of the design.../ ‘Function 8’.  
 
 
The People’s Forum compared with other proposed deliberative designs  
 
The People’s Forum is now compared with three designs that are similar in 
purpose, as they are designed to influence strategic public policy with enlightened 
understanding by citizens across large scale democracies. Several other deliberative 
devices have much merit, but as they do not aim for this transferability they are not 
compared here with the Forum. Some of these are discussed in Chapter 9 as 
institutions that might be run in conjunction with the Forum for mutual benefit.  
The comparison given below starts with descriptions of the three other designs. 
Each description ends with a list of the apparent capacities of that design to provide 
the goods defined above in ‘Evaluating democratic institutions’. In these listings, my 
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ratings of these capacities are given in brackets after the name of each good, as was 
done above for the People’s Forum at the end of ‘Major functions<’. Also as done 
there, these ratings are on a scale of 0 (cannot provide that good) to 5 (extremely 
effective in providing that good). Readers may give ratings that differ from mine, 
according to their judgements of the effectiveness of a design. As emphasised above 
in ‘Evaluating democratic institutions/ Evaluating goods of democratic institutions’ 
these ratings are the extent to which the institution is assessed to generate a good for 
the whole polity, not the extent to which the institution generates them within itself. 
Ratings are summed for each design to give a preliminary comparison of designs, 
as set out in Table 3, but this warrants further consideration as it assumes that all 
goods are of equal importance. 
 
The Popular Branch 
The Popular Branch was proposed by Ethan Leib (2004) as a mini-public that 
would enhance the representativeness and policy development of the US federal 
government. This institution would comprise 525 citizens compulsorily selected as a 
stratified random sample of all those US citizens who are eligible to vote and it 
would work in one location as 35 juries, each with 15 members also selected as 
stratified random samples (Leib 2004, 23) and which meet in plenary sessions to 
compare their deliberations. The Popular Branch would consider issues nominated 
by citizen-initiated referendums (CIR) that achieved a voter response of at least ten 
percent of the US electorate. Each issue would be deliberated for a few days with 
facilitation similar to that of the Deliberative Poll®, including the presentation of 
balanced information on the issue being dealt with. The findings of the Branch 
would become law, so its establishment would require amendment of the US 
Constitution. 
It would appear that as the Popular Branch deals with one issue at a time, it may 
be limited to producing findings at rates that may be much slower than one issue a 
week, depending on the complexity of the issue. This may be a serious bottleneck 
and may produce flawed conclusions by deliberating some issues before fully 
considering others that are strongly related to them. Another problem is the need for 
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political will to establish and maintain the Branch. Leib (2004, 135) hopes that this 
would develop through citizens and politicians experiencing events such as 
Deliberative Polls®, but he concedes ‚it is hard to expect politicians, who often feel 
they don’t have enough power, to delegate it back to the people‛. 
 
Institutional goods 
As the structured deliberation of the Popular Branch means that only one issue 
can be deliberated at a time, the agenda of issues to be deliberated in a given period, 
say a year, is a matter of public contention that calls for popular control, so CIR is to 
be used to select the issues to be treated. This limits efficiency (3) as CIR is very 
expensive: it now costs more than US$1 million to place a measure on a CIR ballot in 
California (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). Leib’s design is based on the assumption 
that strictly representative samples deliberating in a structured manner are essential 
for enhancing democracy, a view that has also been expressed by James Fishkin and 
Cynthia Farrar (2005, 77). ‚The most significant challenge ahead is to find ways to 
adapt, institutionalize, and take the deliberative poll to scale while preserving its 
defining elements.‛ These elements include a large random sample of citizens and 
their systematic exposure to different points of view. 
Random sampling creates a difficulty with transparency (2) that may produce low 
to moderate transferability to democratic polities: the people may not have faith in 
deliberations from which the vast majority of them are excluded. Deliberation must 
take place at lower as well as at elite levels in order to develop not only laws and 
policies, but the attitudes and opinions that are needed to sustain them (Smith 2003, 
86). If fundamental changes in law and policy are to be supported over the long run 
by citizens, then those who choose to take an interest must be able to understand 
these changes and have an opportunity to influence them. John Parkinson notes this 
problem of legitimacy in schemes such as Leib’s and calls for 
 
us to loosen the tight institutional restrictions some early theorists had inadvertently 
imposed on deliberative designs, allowing us to think about legitimacy as being created 
across multiple deliberative moments in a wider deliberative system< involving many 
more people in deliberative democracy than any one micro-deliberative process could 
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ever manage, even though not all of them can deliberate in the technical sense (Parkinson 
2006, 174).  
 
Another problem for transferability is a lack of feasibility (1) of introduction that 
arises from the need for political will to establish the Popular Branch. 
The restriction to one issue at a time is also likely to prevent transferability to 
fundamental, strategic issues (1), because issues that are strongly related may be 
overlooked. Causes may be neglected through a preoccupation with symptoms that 
are more apparent or urgent. The selection of agenda items by CIR may entrench this 
deficit in transferability by not providing enough public deliberation of the selection 
and sequencing of items on the agenda. Competent strategic policy may also depend 
on altering popular values and priorities, in which case the exclusion of citizens by 
the sampling that selects the members of the Branch will impede or block progress. 
The Branch is designed for large-scale (4) national government. 
 
Participatory goods 
The random sampling of the Popular Branch virtually excludes opportunities for 
all citizens to communicate their views to each other (1) on the matter being dealt with. It 
also excludes opportunities for all citizens to vote on policy (0). In addition to deficits 
in efficiency and transferability, another effect of the financial cost of CIR would be 
to limit opportunities for popular control of the agenda (2). Inclusion (4) of all socio-
economic, ethnic, cultural and other groups should be fairly well achieved by the 
stratification of the random sample. 
 
Governmental goods 
Opportunities for all citizens to gain an enlightened understanding (1) of the issues 
being dealt with are largely absent. The governmental good of the political influence 
of informed citizen opinion prevailing (2) over that of less informed citizen opinion 
would be provided by the Popular Branch, but this good would be limited, possibly 
severely, by the transferability difficulty it would have with fundamental issues, so 
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that this ‘informed’ random sample may not be able to become very well informed 
on some crucial issues. 
The governmental good of defence against manipulation (1) of the public interest is 
suggested to be deficient because of the likelihood that the special interests who 
manipulate the actions of elected representatives could also influence the politics of 
randomly selected representatives. Both types of representatives are a very small 
fraction of the electorate, so it is feasible for special interest operatives to influence 
how they vote and who attains leadership positions within their assemblies. As 
journalist Jonathan Rauch (cited in Snider 2007, 4) observes, random sample panels 
‚won’t be insulated from politics but will be insulated from accountability.‛ Popular 
implementation (4) is assured by the legal power of the Branch, if this is interpreted as 
a Constitutional expression of popular support for the Branch and its findings. 
However, the restricted ability of the Popular Branch to handle many issues may 
interfere with this. 
 
The People’s House 
Kevin O’Leary (2006) proposes a deliberative improvement of American national 
government through a much larger sample of 435 deliberating groups called local 
citizen assemblies, each of which has 100 randomly selected citizens who choose to 
accept the role. Members are limited to two year terms and each assembly would 
represent a congressional ward in addition to its current representation by a member 
of the House of Representatives. Local citizen assemblies would conduct their 
business face-to-face, two or three evenings a month and they would be linked by 
internet, so that together they form a decentralized national ‚Assembly‛ of 43,500 
delegates. In its first stage of development, as envisaged by O’Leary, this Assembly 
would not have formal power but its deliberations and votes could inform Congress 
and the president. The agenda for the Assembly would be set by a national steering 
committee of 50 people randomly selected for a two year term from 435 candidates, 
each of whom is nominated from each of the 435 citizen assemblies. Agenda items 
would be selected from the Congressional legislative program, with a focus on bills 
passed either by the House of Representatives or by the Senate and awaiting 
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ratification by the other. As the whole national Assembly would have to deal with 
each legislative proposal at the same time, it would deal with a very restricted 
number of these each year. 
Stage two of O’Leary’s proposal is the People’s House, which is the national 
Assembly after it is empowered by constitutional amendment to help set the 
legislative agenda and to have the capacity to veto bills passed by the House of 
Representatives or the Senate. The House and the Senate could each override a 
People’s House veto with a 60 per cent vote. The People’s House would also have 
the ‚gate-opening‛ power 
 
to force a floor vote on certain bills heretofore stuck in committee and destined to die. 
Other positive powers include the authority to initiate bills in either the House or the 
Senate, the power to offer amendments to bills under consideration on the floor of the 
House or the Senate, the ability to pass formal instructions to individual representatives, 
and the right to draft at-large resolutions addressed to the House of Representatives or the 
Senate as a whole (O'Leary 2006, 8).  
 
The members of the citizen assemblies would receive $100 per month for their 
contributions and the 50 members of the steering committee would each be paid 
$75,000 per annum as their work would be a demanding and crucial job that may 
require full time commitment (O’Leary, 2006, 159). This salary would also help ‚to 
assure the integrity and honesty of these delegates when they are the focus of 
lobbying efforts by various interest groups‛ (O’Leary, 2006, 249n32). Additional 
costs would cover the employment of 25 technical and administrative staff. 
O’Leary (2006, 113-126) summarizes the mission of the People’s House as giving a 
voice to the public, curbing the excessive influence of special interests, providing the 
public with a mechanism for breaking legislative deadlock and producing a fairer 
aggregation of electors’ preferences. Although the People’s House is designed as an 
addition to the US system, it should be adaptable to other democracies, including 
parliamentary types and those with multi-member electorates.  
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Institutional goods 
The People’s House design provides some efficiency (3) in that its total financial 
cost of perhaps $50 million per annum is spread among all citizens (O’Leary 2006, 
159), but it may lack efficiency by frustrating legislators, as discussed below under 
governmental goods. However, as noted there this inefficiency may produce a 
governmental good. Another problem for efficiency may be that each prospective 
member of the national Assembly/ People’s House is unlikely to have the incentive 
to ‚give up a good portion of their lives to seriously grapple with public policy 
issues‛ (Snider 2007, 4) when they are only paid $100 per month and are merely one 
voice among 43,500. 
Transferability to democratic political systems will be limited by a lack of 
transparency (3) from random sampling, but this may be compensated to some extent 
by the large number of representatives making them fairly accessible to citizens. 
Another limited transferability item is that the feasibility (2) of introduction of the 
People’s House depends on the development of the political will to create the 
legislation to establish the Assembly and then to amend the Constitution to 
transform it into the House. O’Leary (2006, 130-32) suggests that this problem could 
be overcome by introducing the system in just a few states, to start to develop a 
national political will for the Assembly. But even an introduction on this scale 
requires political will that may not be possible to generate (Gastil, 2007, 646). 
Transferability in respect of strategic issues (2) may be restricted because the 
Assembly/People’s House cannot deal simultaneously with a multitude of issues. 
This is likely to cause crucial interconnections between issues to be neglected, 
including examinations by citizens of their priorities and values. The national 
steering committee can only place on the agenda those issues that all 435 local citizen 
assemblies could consider as a national Assembly or as a People’s House in a period 
of a few months or a year, so a very restricted number of issues will be attended to 
annually. The tendency of the People’s House to focus on the current legislative 
program of Congress reinforces this effect. Furthermore, the random sampling of the 
House will do little to facilitate such deliberation across the demos. The People’s 
House may therefore be rather blinkered, disjointed and inflexible in its 
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deliberations. Symptoms of issues may therefore be attended to while fundamental 
causes are ignored. Any such confusion of priorities in deliberation may limit the 
development of public opinion and culture, blocking the enactment of reforms that 
could work. This effect of random sampling is also noted below as producing a 
deficit in the governmental good of opportunities for citizens to gain enlightened 
understanding. In contrast to this deficit, however, transferability to large scale (4) 
national governments appears quite practicable. 
 
Participatory goods 
The Assembly/People’s House would provide some increased opportunity for all 
citizens to communicate their views to each other (3) because the very large sample of 
43,500 would attract public attention to their deliberations. This large number of 
representatives would also give citizens more access to them, which should motivate 
citizens to communicate their views on policy, to both representatives and other 
citizens. Opportunities for all citizens to vote on policy (0) would be little affected by 
this design. Opportunities for all citizens to control the agenda (2) are limited as their 
input must pass through the People’s House and then through the 50-member 
National Steering Committee, which is largely restricted to helping Congress set the 
agenda. Full inclusion (4) of social groups should be achieved by the very large 
sample. 
 
Governmental goods 
As noted above, because the Assembly/ People’s House design does not invite all 
electors to actively participate, it is unlikely to encourage many citizens to think 
about issues. It also does not attempt to facilitate such thinking on a mass scale. This 
deficit of opportunities for enlightened understanding (2) is likely to mean that the 
quality of the legislation and public policy that elected politicians can produce with 
the assistance of the Assembly/ People’s House is somewhat limited. The same 
defect is predicted above for the Popular Branch, but the People’s House should not 
perform as badly as Leib’s system in this respect due to its much more widespread 
presence in the community. Any such disconnect between the deliberated views of 
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the People’s House and mass public opinion may cause the veto power of the 
People’s House to frustrate legislators because they largely represent mass opinion. 
This frustration may be wearing for legislators, despite their ability to overrule the 
People’s House with a 60 per cent supermajority vote, but the political struggles 
borne of this institutional inefficiency may produce two governmental goods. The 
first is some stimulation of public debate and education about the issues involved, 
which is taken into account by the rating of 2 suggested above for enlightened 
understanding. The second governmental good is some demonstration to citizens that 
their politicians should defer to the deliberations of the People’s House because it 
represents public interests more competently than the mass of citizens can manage 
via the political influence of their often ill-informed public opinion. This is assessed 
as giving the House a little of the governmental good of the political influence of 
informed citizen opinion prevailing over that of less informed opinion (2). 
The governmental good of defence against manipulation (2) should not be as acutely 
deficient as is anticipated for the much smaller number of members of the Popular 
Branch. Even so, the members of the People’s House may be limited enough in 
numbers, at 43,500, to enable the operatives of special interests to manipulate some 
outcomes (Rauch cited in Snider 2007, 4). Popular implementation (4) is assured by the 
legal power of the House, if this is interpreted as a Constitutional expression of 
popular support for the House and its findings. However, the inability of the 
People’s House to handle a large number of issues in a given period may restrict 
this. 
 
Pyramidal democracy  
In contrast to these suggested mini-public additions to current representative 
systems, a radical change has been recently and independently suggested by 
Stephen Shalom (2005) and Marcus Pivato (2009). Shalom calls this political system 
ParPolity. Pivato calls it pyramidal democracy and points out that it was discussed 
as early as the seventeenth century and a three tier version is currently used for 
participatory budgeting in many cities in Brazil. Pyramidal democracy is intended to 
completely replace current democratic state and national governments with up to 
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seven tiers of popular assemblies in which each tier is composed of representatives 
from the tier below. All citizens in a nation are invited to attend an assembly or 
‚node‛ (Pivato 2009) in the primary tier and each node would elect one member to 
represent it at similar sized nodes in the second tier, which would likewise elect 
representatives to nodes in the third tier and so on, up to the supreme node at the 
top, which forms the government and would differ from the other nodes in being 
much larger, with say 100 members. Shalom envisages that this system of ‚nested 
councils‛ would have 25-50 citizens in each council or node, while Pivato’s 
preference is for a minimum of seven and a maximum of ten citizens in each. These 
size restrictions are intended to facilitate interpersonal deliberation, whether face-to 
–face or online, but large size would minimize the number of tiers. The mathematics 
of this system is that seven tiers could serve a nation with 100 million citizens, if all 
nodes comprised 10 citizens or representatives, even if there were no age or other 
restrictions on eligibility to participate. Nine tiers of 10 member nodes could 
represent ten billion people. If only one person in six were interested in participating 
in the primary tier, then eight tiers might govern the current population of the planet 
in this way. 
Pyramidal democracy offers face-to-face or online deliberative participation to all 
citizens, at least at the primary level and for many citizens at higher levels. Each 
representative is accountable to the node she represents, which can replace her at 
any time by electing another. Pivato specifies that node membership would be 
voluntary, with citizens choosing to enter a particular node according to ideological 
affinity, whereas Shalom envisages geographical proximity as the determinant, to 
enable face-to-face deliberation. Node members would be free to choose whether to 
accept a new member, to expel a current member and to replace their representative 
in the tier above them. The operation of nodes on the basis of ideological affinity 
would be facilitated by deliberation conducted online and by email, blogs or other 
types of ‘virtual forum’. Representatives in the upper tiers will have to handle many 
issues so their work would be full time, requiring commensurate payment. These 
people will be very competent as their ascent through each tier will be based on 
personal assessments of their dedication and ability by fellow members of the nodes 
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they have worked in. Pivato points out that this makes pyramidal democracy 
meritocratic, as well as being deliberative and accountable to all citizens via the 
chain of communication in which representatives report back to the nodes they 
represent. He also points out the possibility that ‘cascades’ of representative 
replacements or defections could propagate up the pyramid, causing it to become 
unstable or collapse, but he shows that this could be prevented by constitutional 
provisions of mandatory waiting periods for replacing representatives, for allowing 
new ones to start voting, for allowing them to defect, for allowing defectors to start 
voting in new nodes and for nodes that have less than the minimum number of 
members to regain their minimum size. 
Shalom’s design appears to use the geographical basis of membership of nodes to 
provide a pyramid that covers local and provincial affairs in its lower tiers and 
national or wider affairs in its upper levels. He recommends that his version has a 
‚High Council Court‛ of 41 citizens chosen by lot for staggered two year terms, to 
prevent majority decisions unjustifiably harming minorities. A system of Lesser 
Council Courts for each tier above the primary level would be needed to judge 
whether an issue should be decided at a higher level or not. As Pivato’s concept is 
for nodes to form around ideological interests it may require separate pyramids for 
local, state (provincial), national and global issues. Attending more than one of these 
pyramids might make the citizen’s task too onerous or unfocused so they may 
choose to specialize in just one level of government. Coordination of policies 
between these levels and pyramids may cause problems. With Shalom’s version, 
citizens interested in the broader policy of higher level tiers may find it difficult to 
start deliberating such national or global policy in primary level nodes as these may 
be focused on local issues. While Shalom’s system appears confusing for citizens, 
Pivato’s may also overload them with the problems of coordinating the policy work 
of different pyramids. 
Pyramidal democracy needs a clearer formulation and the following assessment 
is merely a preliminary attempt to evaluate Pivato’s version. The ratings given for its 
goods are therefore to be treated as especially questionable. 
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Institutional goods 
Pyramidal democracy will lack efficiency (3) by demanding much time from 
citizens, but this problem may be alleviated to some extent by this system 
eliminating the expense of the formal apparatus of electoral democracy, together 
with electoral campaigning and advisors for politicians. Most professional lobbying 
may be converted from spin and trading favours to providing information for node 
members, because the large numbers of enquiring and deliberating citizens may 
become quite discerning about the type and quality of information that they use. 
Pivato’s system may have a deficit of transferability to democracies if its long 
chains of responsibility impair transparency (2) for those at the bottom. These chains 
may be further complicated by the need to coordinate policy between three or four 
pyramids. Low feasibility (1) of introduction is another transferability problem 
because this system requires broad community or political will to introduce it. Pivato 
suggests this may be developed by implementing the pyramidal system in an 
incremental, experimental manner that should educate citizens about its potential 
and prevent failure of governance at large scales by uncovering flaws before the 
pyramid is applied to regional or national government. He sees the political will for 
pyramidal democracy as starting in ‚micropolities‛ such as student groups, private 
clubs and professional associations. However such groups show no sign of wanting 
the complexity of the chains of representation of multi-tiered pyramids. Perhaps the 
narrow focus of their interests makes this unnecessary. 
Another transferability problem is that long chains of responsibility may prevent 
pyramids from considering enough policy problems in a given period to enable 
them to be competent on strategic issues (1). This could be a crucial flaw, for as 
pointed out above, many issues are interrelated and therefore should be deliberated 
in a coordinated manner, such as simultaneously, or in a specific sequence and also 
with feedback that helps citizens to update their thinking as their opinions on related 
issues are developed. In order to deliberate fundamental issues, nodes may have to 
follow an agenda that applies to a whole pyramid and probably across more than 
one pyramid. This would enable upper tier nodes to introduce topics to all lower 
tiers when upper level deliberations reveal needs for the grassroots to consider 
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questions they have overlooked, such as citizens having to pay more tax or change 
other expectations in order to enable the implementation of new policy that may be 
identified and favoured by an upper tier. 
This system is potentially transferable to large scale (5) national, multinational or 
global polities, but whether the long chains of delegation, together with 
communication between pyramids, are able to produce accountability seems 
questionable and this is registered above in the low transparency rating. 
 
Participatory goods 
Pyramidal democracy would give citizens more opportunity to communicate their 
views (3) to other citizens across the polity than electoral democratic systems. This 
effect would be through communication within nodes and it would also occur 
between tiers and then across tiers as representatives report views up to the next one 
and then back down to nodes in lower tiers for deliberation. These effects would be 
supported by nodes in upper tiers publicizing policy problems, because these groups 
would be professionally remunerated and would have the time and facilities to do 
this. However, communication between pyramids might confuse citizens with too 
much information. 
Citizens have restricted opportunity to vote on policy (3), as voting for all citizens is 
limited to their participation in either a primary level node or a higher tier node as a 
representative. Representatives can only vote in the node where they represent a 
lower tier node: they cannot vote in the node they represent. The long chains of 
responsibility may create difficulties for popular control of the agenda (3). Voluntary 
membership of nodes, together with the obligation to attend meetings, may prevent 
full inclusion (3) of all socio-economic and other groups, despite the freedom of each 
node to form around interests that its members have in common. Experience with 
the truncated three-tiered pyramid of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre 
indicates that inclusion will not be achieved in each pyramid as nodes that deliberate 
strategic or high level jurisdiction issues will tend to be dominated by politically 
active middle class citizens (G. Smith 2009, 69-70). 
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Governmental goods 
Membership of nodes may provide opportunities for all citizens to gain 
enlightened understanding (3) that are limited by the small size of these groups. 
Polarization is likely when they form around common interests. This may happen in 
the lower tiers and produce standoffs in upper tiers so their members vote rather 
than deliberate. Pivato (2009, 19) anticipates that such clash of views would counter 
polarization as representatives report back to their nodes in subordinate tiers but this 
reciprocating process may be too time-consuming and indirect for much educational 
effect and could discourage participation. Nodes at the lower levels may be too 
short-lived or changeable to be able to make well considered judgements and to be 
consistent in their decisions. This could make it difficult for higher tier members to 
represent lower tiers. 
The meritocratic function of pyramidal democracy enables the political influence 
of informed citizen opinion to prevail over that of less-informed citizen opinion (4). The 
likely problem of lack of transferability to strategic issues may limit the value of this 
effect by restricting the quality of informed opinion, but this is registered by the low 
rating given to this class of transferability. The potential for very large numbers of 
participants assists defence against manipulation (4) because it makes manipulation 
potentially very expensive and increases the probability that it will be exposed to 
public censure by the many citizens that are trying to contribute constructively as 
members of pyramids. Popular control of the implementation (4) of policy decisions 
should be very good, due to the broad and continuing base of citizen participation 
that the pyramid encourages. This would apply to both popular support for policy 
and its effective implementation. However the complexity of having many tiers and 
several pyramids may mean that a lack of transparency and deficiencies in 
participation goods might limit the extent to which this control is popular. 
 
Comparing the four designs 
The ratings that have been suggested above for anticipated provisions of goods, 
including those anticipated to be provided by the People’s Forum, are compared 
below in Table 3. As indicated above, these ratings and also the evaluative  
  200 
 
 
Table 3 
A preliminary comparison of the anticipated abilities of four institutional 
designs to facilitate large scale deliberative democratic government in 
respect of strategic issues 
 
 
 
 
 
Goods 
Institutional design 
Popular 
branch 
People’s 
House 
Pyramidal 
democracy 
People’s 
Forum 
Added to 
electoral 
democracy 
Added to 
electoral 
democracy 
Replacing 
electoral 
democracy 
Added to 
electoral 
democracy 
Compulsory 
random 
sample 
Random 
sample with 
role 
acceptance 
Self-selection 
open to all 
citizens 
Self-selection 
open to all 
citizens 
Institutional  
Efficiency 3 3 3 4 
Transferability     
Transparency 2 3 2 4 
Feasibility of introduction 1 2 1 3 
Type of issue (strategic) 1 2 1 4 
Scale (large) 4 4 5 5 
Participatory 
Communication 1 3 3 3 
Voting 0 0 3 4 
Agenda control 2 2 3 4 
Full inclusion 4 4 3 1 
Governmental 
Enlightened understanding 1 2 3 2 
Informed opinion prevails 2 2 4 4 
Defence against manipulation 1 2 4 4 
Popular implementation 4 4 4 3 
Total w/o feasibility of int. 25 31 38 42 
Total goods 26 33 39 45 
(Abilities are termed ‘goods’ and subjectively assessed on a scale of 0-5) 
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framework into which they are inserted are not intended to be the last word, but are 
presented for alteration or endorsement. Two sets of total scores are given in the 
table, one that is complete and the other with feasibility ratings omitted to compare 
the apparent potential effectiveness of designs without the complication of 
considering whether they could actually be established as functioning institutions.  
In addition to the People’s Forum registering in this assessment as the most 
promising of the four designs, another feature is higher effectiveness for the two 
designs that rely on self-selected participation. The remaining two that use random 
sample participation rate as less effective due mainly to lower prospects for 
participatory and governmental goods. It would be appropriate to add a design 
based on sortition to this comparison, as this could have a purpose similar to the 
others: that of deliberatively developing strategic policy for large scale democracies. 
Sortition could provide intensive deliberation because the members of the 
representative body would be assisted to frankly and freely exchange views and 
information by the absence of electoral pressures and their limited numbers of 
perhaps up to a thousand members. However, this deliberative potential may be 
distorted by manipulation from special interests, a problem that also occurs with 
random sampling for the Popular Branch and the People’s House. Furthermore, as 
intensive deliberation is confined to representatives it may not transfer much 
enlightened understanding to citizens. Although sortition is not entered into this table, 
its feasibility of introduction should also be noted. A sortition-based government is 
likely to rate very low on this transferability good, as it would replace electorally 
representative types and thereby run into a lack of political will for its introduction. 
This means that if the ratings total for goods, excluding feasibility of introduction, 
that is assessed for sortition indicates it should be trialled, then this would require 
another innovation with higher feasibility of introduction to be implemented first, in 
order to establish a new form of government that is more capable of considering 
whether it should reform or replace itself. Such consideration might use the 
comparative framework of Table 3. 
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Perspectives on the promise of the People’s Forum 
 
The promising result for the People’s Forum in Table 3 may be exaggerated by the 
functions of the Forum being inspected more closely than for the other three 
systems. Apart from this possibility, other assessors might prefer to allocate different 
ratings that give a less optimistic view of the Forum. However, a basic cause for its 
good showing may be the importance of the two strategies that it would employ to 
try to improve democratic government: helping mass public opinion to develop and 
inviting the public to give political influence to that section of its opinion that is most 
likely to be well developed. The design of pyramidal democracy would also execute 
these two strategies and this may explain its second-place ranking in Table 3, 
whereas the lower ranking Popular Branch and People’s House are not as strongly 
designed for these purposes. 
The second strategy of the Forum is necessary because, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
public disengagement usually makes the development of mass public opinion very 
slow. Diana Mutz describes some of this disengagement as people trying to avoid 
risking their relationships, which means that it 
 
is questionable whether conversation alone is the best route to exposing people to 
oppositional political views< Deliberative theorists< have not gone so far as to suggest 
in concrete terms how people might interact with one another in mixed company, and yet 
simultaneously pursue active lives as political citizens< Clearly not all citizens feel they 
can speak their minds freely without repercussions for their public or private lives. And 
yet the goal of reducing risks, both individual and collective, is an extremely valuable one 
that has yet to be incorporated into political theory or practical politics (Mutz 2006, 144, 
149, 151). 
 
Both the People’s Forum and pyramidal democracy are suggestions ‚in concrete 
terms‛, as to how citizens could minimize collective risks by conducting more active 
political lives that also minimize individual risks. These designs would do this by 
encouraging ‚diverse networks‛, as advocated by Mutz (2006, 150). ‚Only when< 
[we have] the ability to build and maintain diverse networks, and to evaluate and 
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promote ideas through them – will the metaphor of a marketplace of political ideas 
ring true for American political culture.‛ In considering innovations in governance, 
Mark Moore and Jean Hartley (2008, 19) state that ‚the most important problem 
facing the public is discovering itself and identifying its own true interests. We argue 
that this challenge will only be solved by more practice with, and innovation in, the 
processes of democratic deliberation itself.‛ A similar view is given by Ian Marsh as 
he discusses a perceived decline of democratic governance in Australia. He 
recommends that renewal requires a  
 
richer or more elaborated public conversation about policy frameworks. In turn, this 
requires an institutional structure capable of mediating the strategic or agenda entry 
phase of the issue cycle< Further, this phase must be located in the mainstream of the 
political drama< *and not be+ automatically subordinate to the will of the executive 
(Marsh 2005, 38). 
 
Marsh (2007, 336) later observed that ‚A serious impact on the quality of political 
deliberation requires institutional change. But this needs to occur in the power 
structures that frame its core dynamics, not in an irrelevant periphery.‛ Of the four 
institutions assessed in Table 2, the People’s Forum and pyramidal democracy are 
arguably the most strongly ‚located in the mainstream of the political drama‛ and in 
‚the power structures that frame< core dynamics‛ as they are designed to work 
with mass public opinion. 
Although Table 3 shows the Forum as the most promising of the four designs 
surveyed, it does not indicate whether it would actually work. This depends on 
whether it is recognized and strongly endorsed by the mass public. Its potential to 
deliver institutional, participatory and governmental goods indicates that it could 
generate such support, but whether this is achieved is likely to depend on whether 
the Forum is well publicised and whether it is well managed and run for a long 
enough period to develop wide public recognition of its capacity to deliver the 
goods. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Design elements of the People’s Forum. 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the proposed structure of the People’s Forum in a more 
detailed manner than Chapter 6, to give more perspective on whether it is likely to 
function effectively. The five major functions of the Forum that were previously 
outlined are replaced here with twelve more specific functions. These are listed 
below and are intended to produce the major five functions as well as others. The 
ways in which these twelve functions would perform the five major functions are 
indicated by the notation MFx, where x is the order of appearance of the major 
function in the previous chapter; that is, 1 for ‘public deliberation – open, slow and 
in some ways careful consideration by citizens’; 2 ‘deliberating what is to be 
deliberated’; 3 ‘examining basics’; 4 ‘an element of meritocracy’; and 5 ‘economizing 
citizen effort’. 
The more detailed explanation in this chapter necessarily repeats much of the 
description in Chapter 6 and to be systematic, repeats information that is relevant to 
more than one of the twelve functions. In the following list of these functions, those 
intended to assist the Forum’s strategy of developing public opinion are indicated by 
(So) and those that should contribute to the meritocratic strategy of producing 
political influence for opinions that are likely to be relatively well developed are 
indicated by (Sm). As this chapter aims at description rather than evaluation, it 
makes limited reference to institutional, participatory and governmental goods. 
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Functions of the People’s Forum 
 
1. Presenting a forum for the public to debate and discuss (MF1) fundamental, 
long-running issues (MF3) (So).  
2. Being open and easily accessible to the whole electorate, so that the deliberation 
fostered by the poll is widespread (MF1) and all electors, including politically 
alienated or marginalized groups, find it easy to vote (So). 
3. Assisting citizens to indicate the specific responses they want their government 
to make to the issues covered (So). 
4. Indicating when the people have reached a stable set of views on an issue after 
extensive public discussion and voting (MF1) (So). 
5. Developing political influence for the public opinion expressed in People’s 
Forum polls (Sm). 
6. Developing this political influence as or after, but not before, opinion develops 
into a stable public judgment (Sm). 
7. Reserving political influence (on issues dealt with by the People’s Forum) for 
those who have thought about these issues (MF4) (Sm). 
8. Inviting the public to review its opinion on an issue, as expressed in People’s 
Forum polls, before the political influence of these polls causes that opinion to 
become policy or law (MF1) (So, Sm). 
9. Minimizing the ability of powerful narrow interests to distort the development of 
public opinion and voting in People’s Forum polls (MF1) (So, Sm). 
10. Developing the political will for difficult political decisions to be executed (Sm). 
11. Offering a capacity for citizens to initiate and run the People’s Forum poll 
without government assistance and funding, if these are difficult to obtain (So, 
Sm). 
12. Developing the confidence of the people in the People’s Forum, so they and their 
representatives will maintain and use it. This includes a capacity for the public to 
set the agenda (MF2, MF5) (So, Sm). 
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Function 11 is designed to get the poll going and, along with Function 12, to keep 
it running. 
 
 
Elements of the design of the People’s Forum and how they 
should produce its twelve functions  
 
The People’s Forum is intended to produce its twelve functions largely through 
the influence of the following 22 elements (E) of its design. 
 
 
Elements of the People’s Forum design 
 
E1 A reference document to facilitate deliberation and voting by the public (the 
agenda or ‘ballot paper’). 
E2 Agenda contributions from citizens. 
E3 Voluntary voting which is self-selecting, not randomly selected. 
E4 Regular repetition of the poll (posing substantially the same questions each 
time, probably annually). 
E5 Demonstrating trends in the development of the opinion of the participating 
public. 
E6 Feedback: relaying voters’ opinions back to the public to stimulate deliberation 
and future participation in the poll. 
E7 Accessibility: all electors eligible; voting by phone and internet; personal 
identification available for voting on impulse; a week for voting; media 
coverage before/ during/ after voting. 
E8 Focus: the voluntary nature of the poll extends to the voter having the freedom 
to focus on only those issues and only those questions that he or she wants to. 
E9 Dealing with long-running, fundamental issues. 
E10 Wide-ranging menu of issues. 
E11 Investigating connections between issues. 
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E12 Searching for solutions to causes rather than for treatments of symptoms. 
E13  Questions on attitude, justification and action. 
E14 The solidarity exchange: eliciting willingness to pay for solutions. 
E15 Competition between rival People’s Forum polls, to satisfy the public. 
E16 Report cards: ratings for politicians and parties, mainly on how closely the 
actions of each reflect the trends of the People’s Forum poll. 
E17 Advisory influence: poll results are not binding on the legislature. 
E18 Executive review: opportunity for the public to reverse voting trends before 
these trends change the law or government policy. 
E19 Defence against manipulation (of public opinion and voting) by narrow 
interests. 
E20 Incentives for participation by the public in democratic government – 
including motivations for voting and for deliberating the questions posed. 
E21 Ability to privately finance the People’s Forum: especially for its introduction 
to the electorate. 
E22 Voting security. 
 
The ways in which these design elements are expected to produce the twelve 
functions of the People’s Forum are now explained, for each function in turn. 
 
 
Function 1: Presenting a forum for the public to debate and discuss 
fundamental, long-running issues  
 
E1 A reference document to facilitate deliberation and voting: the ballot paper 
The ‘ballot paper’ would not only be a tool for lodging votes, but a framework for 
helping citizens to think issues through. It would provide a standing agenda, in 
hardcopy and online, of key questions on important issues. This agenda would be 
compiled by the managers of the poll, with input from the public as discussed below 
in Function 12/ ‘E3’ and ‘E2’. For each issue, a concise description would provide 
information as impartially as possible, including the major pros and cons. Questions 
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are then posed, each with a range of answers for the voter’s choice. The ballot paper 
may note sources of information on the issues it polls and the on-line version may 
give active links to relevant references. Some of this work has been done for many 
years for small groups that deliberate face-to-face, for example in the US by the 
Kettering Foundation’s National Issues Forums and by the Paul J. Aicher 
Foundation’s Everyday Democracy. In Australia, more than 250 small books have 
been produced by Issues in Society (Healey 2005), each dealing with one public 
issue. These organisations concentrate on presenting information for discussion, but 
the People’s Forum would usually restrict itself to very little of this in order to focus 
on posing the most significant questions, some of which would invite respondents to 
explicitly state or re-examine the value system they use in making their choices. 
The ballot paper would give instructions on how to vote by phone and internet 
and how to have input into the management of the poll. New editions of the ballot 
paper may be published annually and, if necessary, a few issues or questions may be 
dropped, replaced or augmented each time - but only if necessary. The intention is to 
have an annual vote on each question for many years, to encourage extended public 
debate and informal deliberation on each one. This continuity should help citizens 
gather relevant information and carefully consider issues that interest them. The 
ballot paper would try (as explained in Function 12/ ‘E3’ below) to present menus of 
issues, questions and answers that are relevant, comprehensive, competent and 
balanced. 
As a mechanism to facilitate deliberative participation in democratic government, 
the ballot paper conforms to John Dryzek’s (2000, 162) stipulation that ‚authenticity 
of deliberation requires that communication must induce reflection upon preferences 
in non-coercive fashion.‛ The ballot paper merely invites and assists this form of 
participation. It might be expected that the Forum’s process of individuals voting in 
a secret ballot would allow the expression of narrow self-interest, but experience 
with Citizen Assemblies and deliberative opinion polls indicates that the secret vote 
does not prevent public spirited judgements (G. Smith 2009, 97-8). Those two types 
of panel consider public goods with face-to-face meetings that are informed by 
experts and carefully moderated, but the People’s Forum should achieve a public 
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goods focus with its ballot paper questions and by allowing several years for these to 
be publicly addressed by technical experts, interest groups and concerned citizens. 
Dalton (2004, 146, 151) observes that in the past several decades, expanding 
concerns of citizens have raised so many new issues that  
 
in a multidimensional policy space a government can satisfy most of the people some of 
the time, or some people most of the time, but not most of the people most of the time< 
[There is] strong evidence that this factor contributes to the public’s growing frustration 
with their government... It is not so much that governments produce less, but that citizens 
expect more. 
 
The People’s Forum ballot paper is intended to assist citizens to take up much of the 
extra work that they now expect from government. It would respond to ‚a lack of 
institutions and processes that can aggregate and balance divergent interests into 
coherent policy programmes that the participants can accept‛ (Dalton 2004, 205). 
The treatment of issues by the ballot paper will require much expert knowledge 
and would therefore be costly. For the introductory phase of a People’s Forum, the 
number of issues it lists may be restricted to perhaps fifty or so of the most urgent 
types, but as the Forum operated its agenda would be expanded (see Function 12/ 
E10 below). This would increase not only the appeal of the poll to a wider range of 
citizens, but the ability of the ballot paper to draw the attention of voters to 
important relationships between issues that they should consider before finalizing 
their vote. 
 
E3 Voluntary voting 
It may seem superfluous to specify voluntary voting as a design element, because 
the usual assumption is that voting is voluntary, even in the case of the random 
selection of conventional opinion polling. Voluntary voting is specified partly to 
focus on the importance of self-selective sampling rather than random sampling for 
this poll and also to help distinguish this system from other voting events such as in 
Australia where referendums may be held together with elections as a compulsory 
vote. 
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As discussed below (mainly under Functions 3, 5, 7, 8 and 12), egoistic and 
solidary predispositions will drive interest groups, activists and others to want their 
points of view to look good in the poll results. Voluntary voting gives citizens more 
incentive to compete with each other for this goal, for it puts them in the position of 
not only wanting to persuade others to vote their way, but also wanting to persuade 
them to vote. Such tension or competition should help to raise the profile of the poll, 
provoking the community into more debate on the issues it presents, thereby 
motivating people to educate each other and also themselves as they seek to develop 
their arguments or, alternatively, to review their attitudes. 
 
E4 Repetition 
The People’s Forum polling event is to be held at regular, preset, well publicised 
intervals, say once a year, asking the same questions each time. One vote by a 
respondent may comprise answers to any questions on any number of the issues 
presented. The repetition of questions on each issue run in the poll would allow 
years for debate, which should assist public opinion to develop. Debate may be 
stimulated as people become aware that they have time to convince others of their 
views and thus to influence future poll results. Repetition would invite the 
proportion of the electorate voting on any issue to increase, as people see the event 
recur and become tempted to debate and vote. Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew 
Parkin (2001, 20) argue that repetitive referendums could produce a ‚public 
brokerage‛ that fosters deliberation. In reviewing constitutional referendums, 
Simone Chambers (2001, 251) also advocates this approach for effective deliberation 
and the legitimacy of the ultimate outcome. It is noted by Arthur Lupia and John 
Matsusaka (2004) that even without repetition, referenda stimulate citizens to 
increase their political knowledge, to donate campaign contributions to interest 
groups and to vote. These responses occur even among the most poorly informed 
segments of the electorate. 
The fostering of deliberation by repetition should help chronic problems to be 
tackled until they are minimized. One such issue is the alienation of citizens from 
civic engagement. Although these people may not be stimulated by the repetition of 
  211 
polling to join in as voters, others who do vote may be able to provoke constructive 
policy action on alienation and its effects, through their engagement with the Forum. 
Such ‚de facto representation of the shy and disinterested by the articulate and 
engaged‛ is common in direct-democratic assemblies such as New England town 
hall meetings (Brown 2006, 211-12) and might also be expected in the People’s 
Forum because of its repetition and other features designed to foster deliberation. 
The importance of alienation is emphasized by Martin Gilens (2005, 778), who finds 
that in American democracy  
 
actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear 
virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-income Americans. The vast 
discrepancy< stands in stark contrast to the ideal of political equality that Americans 
hold dear< representational biases of this magnitude call into question the very 
democratic character of our society. 
 
E6 Feedback 
Each annual poll is to be spread over a week with television and other media 
coverage of the progress of the voting on the most topical issues each evening. This 
should provoke reactions from the public to the trends in polling, sharpening 
interest in the poll and its issues and encouraging more to vote before that poll 
closes. Such promotion of the People’s Forum should encourage debate among 
citizens through current channels such as the electronic and print media, books, 
schools, universities and talk between friends, thereby helping public opinion on the 
Forum’s questions to develop between polls. A discussion with the manager of a 
local television station on the feasibility of week-long media coverage of People’s 
Forum polling has indicated that this may be undertaken by the media as a part of 
their coverage of news and current affairs. 
 
E7 Accessibility 
The extent to which the People’s Forum helps to develop mass public opinion and 
also its achievement of political influence will both depend to some extent on the 
number of people who are attracted to participate. Voting by telephone and internet 
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would therefore be employed to make participation as quick and convenient as 
possible. A central computer would receive all voting calls, which are made by 
keying code numbers on phones or by selecting answers offered on the poll website. 
Other elements aiding accessibility are noted under Function 2 below. The ‘digital 
divide’ tends to exclude the poor, but they should find that access via telephone or 
internet is hardly more complex than paying their utility bills in these ways. 
 
E8 Focus 
As their time and interests are limited, citizens must be able to focus on a 
restricted number of issues. The voter may deal with only those issues and only 
those questions within an issue, that he or she wishes to vote on. Focus is also 
assisted by E9, as noted below. 
 
E9 Long running fundamental issues 
Questions are to be repeated over many years in order to facilitate deliberation, so 
the issues the poll treats must be long-running. This, together with the focus 
described above and the need to make this limited input as politically significant as 
possible indicates that the issues dealt with should be of strategic importance. This 
focus is essential for effective public participation, as discussed in Chapter 6/ Major 
functions of the People’s Forum / ‘Economizing citizen effort’. 
In studying sixteen deliberative organizations, David Ryfe (2002, 369) observed 
they 
 
have learned that conversations about values ought to be organized differently than 
conversations about actions. For instance, disagreements between pro- and anti-abortion 
activists are not likely to be reduced by the distillation of more policy information or the 
convening of a debate< [When values are not shared,] conversations break down very 
quickly. 
 
The Forum’s focus on fundamental issues enables this problem to be addressed, so 
that the recognition of shared values may be developed or strengthened (see also 
Chapter 6/ Major functions of the People’s Forum / ‘Examining basics’). 
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E10 Wide-ranging menu of issues 
The People’s Forum ballot paper would present a wide spectrum of issues (see 
Function 12/ ‘E10’ below) and embrace controversy, in order to raise all options and 
stimulate voter participation, debate and mutual education. John Dryzek (2006, 47-
48) has called for this type of approach, arguing ‚for a discursive democracy that can 
handle deep differences< *to+ seek robust and passionate exchanges across 
identities.‛ He recommends that these exchanges be moderated by ‚partially 
decoupling the deliberation and decision aspects of democracy, locating 
deliberation< in the public sphere at a distance from any contest for sovereign 
authority‛ (2006, 47). Such decoupling is to be achieved by the non-binding status of 
Forum results (see E17 in Functions 6 and 12 below). Mutz (2006, 80-84) observes 
that dogmatism/ non-dogmatism is a stable personality trait and exposure to 
oppositional views creates tolerance in non-dogmatists and intolerance in 
dogmatists. Most learning from exposure to crosscutting information will be done by 
non-dogmatists. Intolerant responses should be minimized by making information 
available with minimal confrontation, such as by presenting references and web 
links that citizens may use or ignore and by balancing the presentation of 
information that supports different conclusions. 
 
E11 Investigating interconnections 
Many issues are related to other issues. For example, the issue of matching supply 
and demand in energy in a way that minimizes depletion of natural resources is 
usually seen by democracies as being the narrow issue of whether to supply more 
energy in ways such as solar or wind power that are less destructive of these 
resources than using fossil or nuclear fuels or converting rivers, valleys and natural 
lakes into hydro-electric reservoirs. However, matching supply and demand in 
energy has another component, the social choice of the size of the demand to be 
supplied, as discussed in Chapter 5. Dealing with an issue by ignoring its 
connections with others may allow both it and the others to get worse. 
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Connections between issues are to be identified in the ballot paper by references 
in an issue's description or in its questions, to other issues or questions on the ballot. 
These references would invite the voter to consider those other issues and questions 
before finalizing her vote on the question before her. This should reduce the problem 
noted in 1954 by Hyman and Sheatsley (cited in Bennett 2006, 115): ‚People often 
express approval of two ideas which are quite incompatible with one another and 
they frequently uphold a general principle while denying its specific application‛. 
 
E12 Search for solutions 
The ballot questions must focus on causes and systemic solutions rather than on 
the amelioration of symptoms of problems. To fail to do this will make the poll 
superficial and invite public criticism and boycott, but this task will be complicated 
for some issues as there may be no universally accepted definition of the problem. 
Hence the observation in Chapter 6/ The People’s Forum/ ‘Ballot paper’ that the poll 
managers must be skilled in the analysis of issues. 
 
E13 Questions on attitude, justification, implementation and willingness to pay 
Several ‘attitude’ questions on an issue would usually be the first posed on that 
topic in the ballot paper. These would ask the voter for her attitude on aspects of the 
issue. An issue may then be further explored by ‘justification’ questions that search 
for common ground underlying differing attitudes of voters. These would inquire 
into the reasons for the answer given to an attitude question and may prompt the 
voter to re-examine her attitude. To go further and pose justification questions on 
justification questions may make the ballot paper too complicated, but such 
progression may be possible by changing justification questions in subsequent polls. 
Justification questions should help the debates that precede a vote, as they would 
allow analysed feedback to the public on reasons for attitudes expressed in the 
previous poll, which may show why opinions diverge in the community and allow 
future debate to focus on the reasons for this. Such analysis might also correlate 
attitudes on an issue with whether or not the voters supporting each attitude gave 
answers to justification questions on their attitude. This may help the public to 
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further deliberate these issues by indicating which attitudes seem dogmatic and 
which appear to be reasoned. Other types of questions which might be posed on an 
issue may be ‘implementation’ questions, which ask what the government should 
do, and ‘willingness to pay’ (or what citizens should do) as discussed under E14 in 
Function 3 below. 
The risk of polarization of a community through deliberation and the potential for 
the People’s Forum to avoid this is discussed in Chapter 6 toward the end of ‘The 
People’s Forum compared with principles for deliberative democracy and public 
management’. Major design elements intended to minimize polarization are E11 
(investigating connections between issues), E12 (searching for solutions to causes), 
E13 (justification questions) and E14 (the solidarity exchange, as described below 
under Function 3). 
In addition to posing multiple questions on an issue, each question may offer a 
menu of several choices. This approach has been advocated by Chambers (2001, 251), 
as it ‚encourages substantive discussion on issues.‛ 
 
 
Function 2: Being open and easily accessible to the whole electorate so that 
the deliberation fostered by the poll is widespread and all electors, 
including politically alienated groups, find it easy to vote. 
 
John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002, 239) have observed: ‚While 
people are not eager to provide input into political decisions, they want to know that 
they could have input into political decisions if they ever wanted to do so. In fact 
they are passionate about this.‛ Moreover, they want their participation to ‚be 
welcome and meaningful‛. This indicates that the Forum’s poll must be very easy to 
access and give some political influence to the views of its voters. Easy access is 
provided by several elements of its design such as E7, 8, 9 and 22. The last of these 
concerns voting security and is discussed below under Function 12.  
E7 describes accessibility as being provided by several features of the poll: all 
electors being eligible to vote; voting to be done by phone or internet; the availability 
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of personal identification for voting on impulse (see Chapter 6/ Mission, strategies.../ 
‘Voting process’); a week for voting so that it is hard for electors to overlook the 
opportunity; and media coverage before, during and after voting. 
 
 
Function 3: Assisting citizens to indicate the specific responses they want 
their government to make to the issues covered. 
 
E13   Action questions 
Each issue should, if appropriate, have a question asking respondents what they 
want their government to do about it. 
 
E14   The solidarity exchange: eliciting willingness to pay for solutions 
Perhaps the most crucial responses by government on many issues, and often the 
most difficult for elected governments to make are those requiring them to ask 
citizens to make costly contributions, perhaps with money or with changes in 
lifestyle or attitudes, in order to deal effectively with those issues. The People’s 
Forum may question citizens on what contributions they want to make. Those 
concerning the willingness of citizens to pay financially for government action are 
collectively referred to here as ‘solidarity exchange’ questions, for this function of the 
poll bears some resemblance to that of a stock exchange. The structure of this 
‘exchange’ is tentatively sketched below in this subsection under ‘Objectives for the 
solidarity exchange: facilitating commitment and solidarity’ and also under ‘How 
the SoX would operate’. 
The stock exchange is a market for individual choice in which entities choose to 
purchase and sell rights to profits (which are private goods) and thereby invest in 
the production of other private goods. The ‘solidarity exchange’ (SoX) would be 
similar in that it would be a market for financial investment in goods, but differ in 
that it deals in public goods. This market would operate through questions in the 
People’s Forum poll where citizens may compile pledges to pay, or requests to cease 
to pay, for public goods. Over a sequence of polling events, these pledges and 
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requests may develop into strong trends that become seen as instructions to 
politicians to purchase or liquidate public goods, as discussed in Functions 5 and 10 
below. Some space is now devoted to preliminary ideas for this exchange, because 
citizens must be able to negotiate easily with each other on how much they will pay 
for important public goods that cannot be provided unless each makes a 
contribution. Action on global warming poses this type of problem, for whether the 
concern of people around the world creates an effective response depends on highly 
developed capacities for collective action, both within and between nations. Before 
describing the proposed broad structure of the solidarity exchange, circumstances 
affecting collective action are outlined to help the reader understand why this design 
element should work. These same circumstances also affect the functioning of the 
People’s Forum as a whole. 
 
The collective action dilemma for democracies  
Evolutionary psychology indicates that the fundamental preference of humans for 
group life has given them a social environment that over several million years has 
selected the genetically determined predisposition of ‚wary cooperator‛ (Hibbing 
and Alford 2004). This means that we are generally ‚willing to pay our fair share 
only assuming others do the same and evaders face swift and certain consequences‛ 
(Alford and Hibbing 2004, 711). Kevin Smith (2006, 1015, 1013) observes that ‚what 
drives the behavior of wary cooperators is ‘sucker aversion’< It is not just what they 
get from decisions, but whether they perceive the process of decision-making as fair 
that leads people to view the decisions as legitimate.‛ In democracies, the primary 
dysfunction of confusion about who directs the polity allows sucker aversion to 
prevent citizens from acting together as directors to ensure that public goods are 
produced. 
This confusion is an absence of communication that prevents other 
communication and as Andrew Flanagin, Cynthia Stohl and Bruce Bimber (2006, 32) 
observe: ‚collective action is communicative, insofar as it entails efforts by people to 
cross boundaries by expressing or acting on individual (i.e. private) interest in a way 
that is observable to others (i.e. public).‛ They stress that ‚formal organization is 
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central to locating and contacting potential participants in collective action, 
motivating them and coordinating their actions‛ (Bimber et al 2005, 365). However 
the organization of liberal democracy is flawed by ambiguous delegation. The 
People’s Forum is designed to correct this by clarifying the roles of electors and 
those they elect. This will facilitate communication between electors and also 
between electors and politicians, fostering reciprocity, openness and trust that would 
allow effective negotiation of the norms, rules and sanctions that most can agree on 
for collective action. The solidarity exchange would perform a similar role with a 
more specific focus within the People’s Forum. It would assist citizens to act as 
directors of the polity by helping them to decide what they are prepared to pay for 
particular public goods. Before describing the structure of this exchange, the two 
feelings it is designed to help develop and communicate are discussed.  
 
Objectives for the solidarity exchange: facilitating commitment and solidarity  
If a liberal democracy is to take strong action on an issue that will require a 
significant cost to be borne by each citizen, then most citizens must have the 
following two feelings. 
1.  Commitment 
Each citizen must feel that the action is worth her share of its cost. In the terminology 
of social psychology, this feeling would be the citizen’s ‘commitment’ to that action 
(Fetchenhauer et al. 2006). The measure of commitment might be the individual’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the action, in terms of the percentage of the per capita 
cost that she offers to pay. This per capita cost may be expressed as extra income tax 
or higher cost of living (COL) and voters could vote for more than 100% of the per 
capita cost, in order to express a high commitment to getting that public good 
supplied. 
2.  Solidarity 
Each citizen must feel that if he makes a commitment to the action, this will be 
supported by commitments by other citizens to that action. This might be called the 
‘solidarity’ (Fetchenhauer et al. 2006) of the community on that action. One measure 
of solidarity might be the fraction of the electorate that states some commitment, 
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even if it is zero WTP, for such unwillingness is taken into account by summing all 
commitments. Another possible measure of solidarity on an action could be the ratio 
of votes to pay something, to votes to pay zero for that action. This measure ignores 
the large majority who may not vote in the People’s Forum and its SoX, but it may be 
considered a fair indication because the government will not act on it until it has 
been tested with the public, to see whether citizens accept it as ‘an instruction by all’, 
as discussed below under ‘How the SoX would operate’. 
Commitment and solidarity may be developed in a community if they are 
demonstrated by citizens to each other in a repetitive manner that allows them to 
respond by joining or leaving the demonstration or by revising their commitment. 
By facilitating such reciprocity, the SoX may help citizens build a common resolution 
to act on difficult issues. 
 
How the SoX would operate 
The ‘public commitment’ on a policy is proposed to be the average of the 
individual commitments to it as expressed via the SoX. This terminology implies that 
the average WTP expressed in the exchange is to be taken as the commitment for the 
whole community even though it may directly express the views of only a small 
proportion. Only a minority, let us say, perhaps five to twenty percent, may bother 
to vote in a People’s Forum poll - and much less on any particular issue it lists. 
However, after several well publicized annual votes beyond the stage where the 
voting trend (see Function 4 below) for that particular question has levelled, the 
public commitment registered by the solidarity exchange for that question may be 
taken by the whole polity as acceptable to those who do not bother to cast a ballot, 
for the poll is voluntary and open to every elector to take part. An average SoX WTP 
(‘public commitment’) that is sufficient to pay for the implementation of a policy if 
paid by all citizens may be tested to see if it is accepted as ‘an instruction by all’ by 
the government declaring an intention to implement it unless the next poll shows a 
reduction of this WTP. This intention would heighten the incentive of electors to 
vote in SoX, because it may soon influence the taxes or prices they pay. An indication 
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of the strength of the resolve of the community to act on an issue could be given by 
multiplying public commitment with solidarity, to produce a ‘solidarity index’. 
The operation of the SoX may be considered to comprise three stages. Two lie 
within the People’s Forum process, the first being the questions in the poll that ask 
voters to express their WTP for the implementation of particular policies, together 
with the responses of voters. These questions would state the approximate costs to 
each citizen of implementing a range of policies on an issue (if all taxpayers paid an 
income-proportional contribution) and invite each voter to pledge some 
commitment to the one they prefer. The hard copy ballot paper would include a 
table entitled ‘CHECK YOUR OFFER!’ where voters should enter each vote they 
make to pay extra tax or cost of living. This is to help them add up their SoX bids so 
they can see their total commitment to pay, before their vote is submitted for 
tallying. This addition would be done automatically by the website ballot paper, 
which would display it to prompt voters to check for over-commitment on SoX 
questions before they finalize their vote. 
The second stage of the SoX is the post-poll analysis, publication and public 
discussion, of the answers to the WTP questions. This analysis would summarize the 
answers in terms of public commitments, solidarities and solidarity indices. It would 
invite citizens to reconsider what they want to pay for. 
The third stage lies outside the People’s Forum and is the response of politicians 
to solidarity indices. Those indices that show citizens as sustaining demands that 
they be enabled to pay for specific policies will request and possibly even command 
politicians to organize this, either through higher taxes or policy that raises prices. 
To help citizens ensure they make bids they can afford, the SoX would present a 
comprehensive menu of policy costs covering, in broad terms, programs currently 
implemented by government as well as the additional public goods canvassed by the 
People’s Forum. These costs would be expressed as percentages of either the citizen’s 
annual income before tax or increases in COL. If voters want to pay less than they 
currently do, they register this by voting for reductions in expenditure on existing 
programs and voting zero WTP on WTP questions on the ballot. Negative 
commitments on WTP questions would not be recognized by the SoX but may be 
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interpreted as zeros. This system should enable electors to vote for fund transfers 
from existing programs to new ones presented by WTP questions. 
 
 
Function 4: Indicating when the people have reached a stable set of views 
on an issue after extensive public discussion and voting. 
 
E4 Repetition 
Repetition of the vote by the People’s Forum would allow the plotting of trends in 
the opinions it registers as discussed in Chapter 6/ The mission, strategies and shape 
of the People’s Forum/ ‘The poll structure’. The issues on which these trends show 
no change over the last few voting events can be considered to be those on which the 
public has made up its mind after the process has given it considerable opportunity 
to evolve different views. At this point, either a degree of consensus has been 
reached or the people have essentially agreed to differ so there is likely to be an 
acceptance that the majority could have its way. That particular issue may then be 
dropped from the poll. 
 
 
Function 5: Developing a strong political influence for public opinion 
expressed in People’s Forum polls 
 
E4 Repetition 
The repetition of the People’s Forum vote is to be a regular event that is very 
public and promotes the opinion it reflects by giving it sustained exposure. After a 
year or two the public profile of the poll should focus citizens’ attention on the issues 
it covers, not only in the weeks before the poll, but throughout the year. Public 
awareness that these particular issues are voted on year after year, should make 
them and the specific questions posed by the poll, ongoing subjects of attention by 
the media, schools, universities, interest groups, legislators, political candidates and 
the public at large. As people see the event recurring, more may be stimulated to 
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argue, discuss, read, think and vote. The resultant profile of the poll and the 
numbers voting in it will do much to determine its political influence. 
 
E5 Trends 
As noted above under Function 4, repetition of the vote allows the poll to show 
trends in the development of opinion. The managers of the People’s Forum would 
publicize these trends before, during and at the conclusion of each annual vote. 
Trends which run against existing policies or laws or urge new ones should apply a 
degree of public pressure on politicians to make the changes these trends advocate, 
as noted below under ‘E3 voluntary voting’. Such pressure may excite more voter 
participation which may then generate more political influence, more discussion of 
the issues and greater public wisdom. Note that a People’s Forum majority vote is 
likely to be a small minority in the whole electorate. ‘E3 Voluntary voting’ below 
gives reasons to anticipate that the views of these minority-majorities may develop a 
public status and political power that far exceeds their weight as a proportion of the 
electorate. 
 
E6 Feedback 
Stringing the vote out over a week as described under ‘E6 Feedback’ in Function 1 
should accentuate the profile of this forum and enhance its political influence. The 
annual repetition of People’s Forum polls would do this as well and also enable the 
people to see what they as a society, think, and to some extent why they think that 
way (see E13 in Function 1). This invites them to argue again with each other and 
vote next year and so on, continuing this feedback until it becomes obvious to all 
that a majority view has developed that is stable in the face of, and as a result of, all 
the argument and information that can be mustered. As noted under Function 4, this 
should generate an agreement to differ between the majority and minorities on any 
issue and a public acceptance that the majority can have its way. 
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E3 Voluntary voting 
Power to those who are interested enough to vote  
As discussed in Chapter 6/ Major functions of the People’s Forum/ ‘An element of 
meritocracy’, the management of public affairs should follow the views of those who 
are interested in these issues. This provides a basis for the People’s Forum to acquire 
public status and political influence, as its voluntary voting should ensure that it 
registers only the views of those who are interested in the issues it treats. This 
interest will have stimulated many of these voters to develop their knowledge and 
opinions on these issues. However, as noted in ‘An element of meritocracy’ in 
Chapter 6, voter interest in the issues also means that People’s Forum voters will 
include dogmatists as well as questioning thinkers. However, the poll process 
should draw both types into exchanges of views and the questions it poses would be 
designed to use this interaction to try to develop reasoning and negotiation as 
discussed above under Function 1/ ‘E11-13’. These effects should lead the public to 
recognize that People’s Forum poll results reflect more considered judgement than 
conventional opinion polls, so that the public learns to grant more status to the 
Forum than to opinion polls despite the fact that the Forum represents the views of 
only a fraction of the population. As discussed in Chapter 2/ Ambiguous delegation/ 
‘Ignorant directors’, the mass public has very low levels of political information with 
only perhaps ten percent of the population having much political sophistication. As 
this disengagement is an enduring feature, experience with the Forum could assist it 
to become well known to many citizens and thus part of their understanding of both 
opinion polls and the People’s Forum. Exposure to Forum polls may therefore 
encourage citizens to demand strong responses by politicians to Forum results, even 
if only a low proportion of the public votes in these polls. The ability of citizens to 
make political judgments with heuristics (Lupia 1994) suggests that the People’s 
Forum could perform well as a cueing device. 
High status and influence for this poll would also be supported by a public 
awareness that its voluntary voting allows any elector to participate. After the 
introduction of a People’s Forum poll it should soon become common knowledge 
that if bystanders become alarmed at the way that concerned opinion is evolving and 
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expressed through this process, they can decide it is time that they became 
concerned and voted in the next poll, or in the current one if it is still open. 
 
Leading edge  
Because the voluntary vote of the People’s Forum will reflect the views of those 
who are interested in the issues, it is likely to indicate what the views of the majority 
of the whole population will be on those issues in the future, if and when most 
citizens take an interest in them. Such growth of interest in issues may be 
encouraged by the publicity generated by the People’s Forum. Politicians will be 
sensitive to any such leading edge indication by this poll because many of them 
want to be seen to be providing leadership. 
 
E16 Report cards: People’s Forum ratings for politicians 
The managers of the People’s Forum would publish ‘report cards’ (Weir 2004) of 
the performance and attitudes of political candidates and members of the legislature. 
A prominent section of each card would be the degree to which the subject’s views 
conform to People’s Forum voting trends. As indicated in ‘E3 Voluntary voting’ 
above, this voting is likely to show the most informed and considered views of the 
community on the issues it deals with and will thus indicate to politicians the views 
they should espouse in order to represent the people in the most responsible way. If 
electors develop an appreciation of this, the report card would become a highly 
regarded guide for their vote at the next election, giving the poll more political clout. 
In addition to helping establish the Forum as a heuristic, such report cards should 
also promote community-wide deliberation by helping to focus attention on the 
Forum process. 
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Function 6: Developing political influence as or after, but not before, 
opinion develops into a stable public judgment 
 
E17 Advisory influence 
People’s Forum results would not be binding on legislatures, merely advisory. 
They would exert a pressure of concerned public opinion for new laws and policies 
to reflect the trends in, or statements of, concerned opinion that are established by 
successive polls. 
 
E3 Voluntary voting 
Voluntary voting means that People’s Forum results will reflect the views of only 
a part of the electorate. This may make politicians in the few countries such as 
Australia, where the whole electorate is compelled to elect representatives, slow to 
depart from their current policies in order to follow People’s Forum results. In 
countries where voting for representatives is voluntary, the Forum may exert 
political influence more quickly because those who are concerned enough to vote in 
its polls may also be those who vote in elections. 
 
E5 Trends 
Politicians would be likely to wait for trends in the People’s Forum to establish, or 
to establish and then level off to a flat line, rather than react immediately to a poll 
result only to become known for outdated views after a few more polls. They will 
want to wait to see if there is any reversal of trends as discussed under Function 8 
below. 
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Function 7: Reserving political influence on issues dealt with by this poll 
for those who have thought about these issues (the meritocracy principle) 
 
E3 Voluntary voting 
In Function 5 above it is indicated that political influence is likely to be generated 
for the opinion registered by the People’s Forum. As the voting that expresses this 
opinion is voluntary, it will tend not to register the opinions of those who are 
disengaged and think little about the type of issue that the Forum treats. The People’ 
Forum will therefore give political influence to those who have thought about those 
issues. These people are likely to include dogmatic types as well as citizens with 
more carefully considered opinions, but the involvement of dogmatists may 
stimulate them to think more constructively as discussed above in Function 5/ E3/ 
‘Power to those who are interested enough to vote’. 
 
 
Function 8: Inviting the public to review its opinion on an issue, as 
expressed in People’s Forum polls, before the political influence of these 
polls causes that opinion to become policy or law 
 
E18 Executive review 
As a People’s Forum is run, electors who have not voted in its polls may become 
worried that politicians will introduce new policies or laws to reflect the Forum’s 
polling trends. This prospect may also cause previous voters to change their minds. 
Politicians will therefore warn the electorate of their intention to act if the trends are 
not reversed at the next poll. With an eye to votes, they will want electors to approve 
their actions. 
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Function 9: Minimizing the ability of powerful narrow interests to distort 
the development of the opinions of the public and their voting in People’s 
Forum polls 
 
Wealthy interests may seek to manipulate public opinion in many ways, such as 
by funding biased media programs and movies, through editorial policy, by 
advertising, by supporting selected scholars, activist individuals and groups, by 
deterring activists through strategic litigations against public participation (SLAPPs), 
by funding political electoral campaigns, by lobbying and so on. Such activities 
compromise democratic integrity by corrupting the one person-one vote principle, in 
effect delivering multiple votes to those with money. Graham Smith (2001, 88) 
considers this danger to be  
 
a criticism of the existing practice of initiative and referendum, not of their potential< we 
need to spend more time investigating possible ‘imaginative safeguards’ to ensure that 
information is balanced and that the influence of money and media interests does not 
grow< However, even with< *the existing+ imbalance of resources, greens have had 
success [with initiatives and referenda on environmental issues]. 
 
Lupia and Matsusaka (2004, 478) support this view in finding that the evidence 
does not support the ‚idea that the initiative allows special interests to subvert the 
policy process to the detriment of the public‛. Nevertheless, the more influence that 
the People’s Forum develops, the more attractive a target it will become for control 
by parties with narrow interests. However, as explained under E4 below, the 
transparency of the People’s Forum process should mean that as its influence 
increases, undemocratic attempts to manipulate it will become more likely to be 
counterproductive for manipulators. 
 
E4 Long-running repetition of issues and questions 
The Forum’s long-running process should make manipulation expensive and also 
endanger the public image of manipulators. 
  228 
 
Exhaustion of wealthy manipulators through long-running repetitive polling  
The People’s Forum process would take several, perhaps many years to facilitate 
and demonstrate the development of public opinion on a question. More time may 
elapse before such trends are translated into political action, as indicated by 
Functions 6 and 8. Such time spans would make it very expensive to fund a 
propaganda campaign to sway the views of citizens and their responses to the poll. 
 
Exposure of manipulators to public censure through long-running repetitive polling  
The passage of time as these polls deal with each issue would also make any 
attempt to buy votes on it risky for the manipulator, because the public, media and 
politicians will have plenty of opportunity to recognize what is going on. When a 
manipulator’s efforts are focused on a question running in a People’s Forum poll, the 
publicity surrounding this event is likely to make those efforts obvious to citizens. 
The more money the manipulator spends, the more blatant their activity will appear 
to citizens concerned with the issue. As these citizens are those who are likely to vote 
in the poll, big spending by manipulators risks damaging both their reputation and 
their cause. This situation is also likely to encourage citizens to become more 
discerning about whether the information they receive is misleading. 
A similar risk arises for manipulators whose power to distort the poll arises not so 
much from wealth as from an ability to organize and control electors who comprise a 
significant proportion of the community being polled. Such potential organizers may 
be large corporations with many employees or shareholders, unions with many 
members, or government agencies with many employees. The managers of such 
groups could attempt to influence the vote on People’s Forum questions in which 
they had an interest, by encouraging or instructing their shareholders or members or 
employees to vote in the poll and to give the responses the managers want. This 
behaviour is likely to become public knowledge because of (a) anticipation by many 
citizens that any entity with this organizational ability that has vested interests in a 
question on the ballot will be tempted to do this; (b) suspicions and protests of 
citizens with opposing views; (c) poll results on that question which appear 
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surprisingly weighted towards these vested interests; and (d) the possibility of 
evidence being found, for example by whistle-blower disclosure of unfair 
organization of voters by narrow interests. The annual repetition of the voting event 
allows time for these factors to raise the alarm and for citizens to respond with 
public criticism and by voting in protest against causes promoted by undemocratic 
manipulators. 
Suspicion or confirmation of this type of activity should spark public debate 
about whether it is excessively self-interested and thus against the public interest. 
Such debate could be assisted if the People’s Forum added another question to those 
dealing with the issue evoking an undemocratically manipulated vote. This could 
ask voters whether they considered that responses to the questions on this issue 
were being unduly influenced by narrow interests acting against the public interest. 
Any controversy over such a question would focus more public attention on the 
issue in the ballot that is stimulating it, drawing in electors who are not interested in 
that issue but want to vote on the problem of manipulation of democracy. The 
managers of the People’s Forum should continue to run the questions generating the 
‘manipulation’ debate until it has been cleared up. If the dispute over manipulation 
drags on without showing signs of resolution, all the questions at stake may have to 
be deleted from the ballot. If the controversy is resolved, the question on 
undemocratic manipulation would be dropped leaving the questions on the issue 
itself to be run through more polls until they had developed stable votes indicating 
that public deliberations on them had run their course. 
The outcome of extended public debate and voting on whether votes organized 
by vested interests are excessively self-interested may depend on whether the 
government has procedures in place to compensate those who would suffer loss 
because of new laws and policies. Providing public goods at unjust cost to 
individuals is likely to damage the image of the public interest and the legitimacy of 
government.  
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E19 Defence against manipulation of opinion and voting 
If manipulation by powerful self-interested entities is not stopped by financial 
exhaustion or exposure to ethical judgment by citizens, the credibility of the People’s 
Forum may suffer as the one-person one-vote fairness of its voting becomes suspect. 
How much damage such suspicion does to the reputation of the Forum may depend 
on whether the questions involved can be identified, so they are protected as 
suggested above, or abandoned as being likely to generate undemocratically 
distorted results. A backup procedure for preventing such damage to the poll is that 
it would run questions specifically on the issue of powerful narrow interests 
manipulating the opinions and voting of the public. A target for such inquisition that 
is given little mention in the discussion above is the media. The political power of 
the media differs from that of narrow interests that are either wealthy or can 
organize and control voters, as it comes from a direct and incessant communication 
to the public. A free and diverse media is essential for informed and well-developed 
public opinion. This may mean that free-to-air television and radio, which are 
sponsored by the state and thereby independent of commercial imperatives, is a vital 
part of the operating environment for the People’s Forum. The Forum’s managers 
should consider canvassing in their ballot paper, laws or policies designed to 
prevent manipulation of public opinion by all types of powerful narrow interests, 
not least the media. This should be done at the inception of these polls, not only for 
their own protection but for that of deliberative democracy in general. The People’s 
Forum should be able to help the public consider such ways of protecting and 
improving democracy - if it can do this before manipulators can interfere. 
 
 
Function 10: Developing the political will for difficult political decisions to 
be executed 
 
E20 Incentives for public participation 
The People’s Forum should increase the political will to both recognize issues and 
act on them, for it would help citizens participate more directly in the policy 
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formation process by enabling them to more actively determine what issues are seen 
as important and what they, through their government, will do about them. 
Widespread distrust of politicians, as discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2/ 
‘Ambiguous delegation’, should motivate many citizens to take the opportunity 
offered by the Forum, to issue public instructions to these agents, even though such 
directives are non-binding. 
 
E4 Repetition of the poll 
The ongoing operation of the People’s Forum would allow it to monitor and 
pressure the implementation of the policy changes it effects. Lupia and Matsusaka 
(2004, 476) observe that difficulty with such implementation currently arises because  
  
the same governmental actors who once blocked the policies from proceeding through 
traditional legislative channels may be in a position to influence, or even determine, the 
extent of their post-election implementation and enforcement< Organizations that pass 
initiatives<often disband soon after the election< Compared with professional 
legislatures, such entities are in a relatively bad position to oversee those charged with 
implementing their edicts. 
 
 
Function 11: Offering a capacity for citizens to initiate and run the poll 
without government assistance and funding, if these are difficult to obtain 
 
As is discussed later in Chapter 8/ ‘A small scale trial...’, the Forum is not 
amenable to starting up as a small, inexpensive, local project and then expanding it. 
This is because a large operation that covers a province, state or nation is needed to 
create the strong political impact required to stimulate public interest and 
deliberation. Publics of large size usually have more power to determine their future 
than small ones, so People’s Forums run at large scales would offer the prospect of 
strategic influence to those eligible to participate in them. As the People’s Forum is 
designed to develop strategic policy, running it at a local scale will appear irrelevant 
and impotent. The requirement of large scale for the People’s Forum makes it 
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difficult for citizens to initiate and run it. However, as noted under E3 and E17 below 
and discussed in Chapter 6/ ‘Initiating and running the Forum’, this is a basically a 
financial problem that is probably easier to solve than that of raising the political will 
to have government introduce and run the system. 
 
E3 Voluntary voting, E17 Advisory influence 
Voluntary, advisory voting allows the People’s Forum to be run as a private 
organisation if governments are unwilling to run it as a service to the public. 
Voluntary, self-selecting voting also facilitates its operation on a large scale. 
 
E7 Accessibility 
Polling by telephone and the internet makes voting highly accessible to citizens. It 
also facilitates fast tallying by computer and minimizes cost. As noted under E7 in 
Function 1 the ‘digital divide’ may inhibit internet voting by the poor, the elderly 
and the disabled, but the availability of telephone voting may compensate for some 
of this. 
 
E21 Funding 
Possible sources of finance for this system are discussed in Chapter 6 under 
‘Initiating and running the Forum’. The economies of operation noted above under 
E7 support the feasibility of raising funds for a demonstration poll covering a 
substantial region such as a province or state. This may have to use low or negligible 
voting security as discussed under E22 in Function 12 below and be restricted to 
online presentation and voting, without backup from hard-copy ballot papers. 
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Function 12: Developing the confidence of the general public in the 
People’s Forum as a political institution, so that the people and their 
representatives will maintain it and use it. This function includes a 
capacity for the public to set or supervise the agenda 
 
The People’s Forum should be attractive to many citizens, for there is growing 
interest in new democratic processes. As Mark Warren (2002b, 681-2, emphasis in 
original) observes,  
 
people in the developed democracies have become disaffected from their political 
institutions. They are now less likely to trust their governments and more likely to judge 
them incompetent, untrustworthy, and even corrupt. While the causes and meanings of 
these trends have been subject to considerable study and debate, it seems that disaffection 
reflects not apathy but increasingly critical evaluations of government... increasing 
disaffection from formal political institutions seems to be paralleled by increasing 
attention toward other ways and means of getting collective things done... The most 
dramatic developments over the past couple of decades include the rise in power of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the international arena and the dramatic 
increase in associations devoted to problems of collective action that replace, displace, or 
work in concert with state powers. 
 
E3 Voluntary voting 
If the People’s Forum is to succeed, its selection of issues, questions and menus of 
answers must be seen by the community to be relevant, comprehensive, competent 
and balanced. If citizens suspect shortcomings they are unlikely to participate. 
Voluntary voting therefore confers an easily exercised power of boycott on citizens 
and this will oblige poll managers to invite suggestions from them on the selection of 
issues, questions and menus of answers, as discussed in E2 below. This invitation 
would be a prominent, permanent feature of the ballot paper. 
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E2 Agenda contributions from citizens 
In response to requests from citizens for issues and questions on the ballot paper 
to be altered or deleted, or for new ones to be added, the managers would publish a 
list of the requests they have received since the previous poll. This would note 
whether each request has been acceded to and if not, why not. The reasons given for 
refusing requests, together with any ensuing public controversy, should contribute 
to the deliberation of issues by the public. Such capacity for the public to have a 
continuing influence on the agenda conforms to the recommendation by Chambers 
(2001, 251) that questions should be chosen and framed as an iterative, nonbinding 
process that makes referendums ‚part of an ongoing process of consultation rather 
than a once-and-for-all ratification.‛  
As discussed below under E10, the agenda may be of indeterminate length, so 
any agenda suggestions could be accepted by the Forum to produce what might be 
called a ‘wikiagenda’, after the manner of compilation of Wikipedia. However this is 
unlikely to produce a high quality ballot paper without strong control by the 
managers of the Forum, including their inclusion of many issues and questions. 
Their judgement would be needed to ensure that the issues placed on the ballot are 
long-running and preferably of high public significance either on their own or 
because of their relationships to other issues on the ballot. The managers must also 
ensure that the most crucial questions are posed (see Function 1/ E12, E13 above), 
including questions aimed at systemic solutions rather than at the treatment of 
symptoms. They would also make sure that references are given in issue 
descriptions and questions to other issues or questions in the paper that are related 
to them. The description of each issue also requires editorial supervision to minimize 
bias and to make sure that crucial aspects are covered. For such reasons, the 
published agenda must be the responsibility of the managers, but the voluntary 
voting of the Forum ultimately transfers this responsibility to the public, for they 
will see what the managers present and may pass judgement on this by voting in the 
poll, or by boycotting it, or by publicly voicing their approval or disapproval of the 
management of the Forum. 
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An alternative to relying on the poll managers to write the agenda might be a 
government regulation that requires the Forum to run issues and questions that are 
requested by the public through a minimum number of signatures on a petition, as is 
done with citizen initiated referenda. This is not recommended as it should not be 
necessary, it requires the government to assist the Forum and it would be time -
consuming and expensive for citizens. The cost of collecting signatures to place one 
measure on a citizen initiated referendum in California has now risen to over US$1 
million (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). 
As the Forum’s ballot paper requires voters to give their personal response to pre-
prepared questions, it restricts their creativity in devising solutions to policy 
problems by comparison with deliberative processes such as consensus conferences 
and citizen juries in which the whole group discusses an issue and devises a joint 
response (G. Smith 2009, 100). However, this constraint should be largely countered 
by the Forum’s invitation to citizens to contribute to its agenda, for this enables them 
to raise questions implying solutions that differ from those suggested by the 
questions already posed by the ballot paper. 
 
E10 Wide-ranging menu 
An extensive ballot paper that covers the widest range of important long-running 
issues would maximize the number of citizens who could find within it, issues of 
concern to them and who may therefore engage with the poll. The size of this menu 
should not be intimidating to citizens because, as with using dictionaries, telephone 
directories and the internet, people will easily see that size is helpful, for it means 
they are likely to find that the ballot includes issues on which they want to have a 
say. 
An extensive ballot paper will not make large demands on the time of citizens, for 
they may only vote once a year when the poll is established and when they do, they 
only vote on those issues in which they are interested. They will be assisted to find 
these in several ways: by grouping related topics under headings such as 
International Relations, Population, Natural Resources and the Environment, The 
Economy, and Ethics; by showing such headings in a table of contents; by listing 
  236 
issues in an index; and by providing a search engine in the web-based ballot paper. 
The act of voting should only take an hour or two at home and probably less when 
the voter becomes familiar with the ballot paper and becomes more expert with the 
set of issues she wants to vote on. Another demand on the time of citizens is noted 
by David Beetham (1999, 8): ‚It takes time to grasp and discuss the complex issues 
involved in public decision-making, and there is only so much time that people will 
agree to devote to it.‛ The People’s Forum provides economy of time by not 
requiring citizens to attend deliberation events, either in person or online. However, 
as it would provide an easy, quick and potentially slightly influential way for each 
citizen to express political views, it may encourage them to spend more of their free 
time reading about, observing, discussing and thinking about issues. As part of this 
activity they may want to join deliberative groups such as study circles. 
The length of the ballot paper will be determined by how much editorial and 
associated work the Forum’s management team can handle, which includes 
responding to requests from citizens and groups for changes to the menus of issues, 
questions and answers. 
 
E15 Competition 
Competition between two different People’s Forums may assist with creative 
approaches to the menus of issues, questions and answers that are presented to 
citizens and this would maximize their choices of issues and questions and their 
interest in this system. However, as indicated above in this section under E3, E2 and 
E10, public scrutiny and good management should make this unnecessary. 
 
E20 Incentives for public participation 
People may vote in People’s Forum polls and also argue to get others to vote their 
way, through both egoistic and solidary interests. Egoism will incline them to try to 
get their preferences to dominate the results in order to take advantage of any 
political influence developed by the Forum. The solidary, or cooperative and 
altruistic motivation (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Orbell et 
al. 2004) is partly a desire to raise the profile of important public issues in order to 
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promote public discourse that may develop and help to execute wiser public policy, 
especially via the influence of the Forum. As it would give each citizen the prospect 
of having slightly more power to express and implement their opinions, at a very 
low personal cost in effort and time as noted in E10 above, the Forum should 
stimulate some citizens to develop their opinions on public affairs and in turn this 
may increase the demand for accurate information. A motivation that should 
encourage both egoistic and solidary responses is, as noted in Function 10/ E20, that 
widespread distrust of politicians and conventional political processes may drive 
some citizens to take the opportunity offered by the Forum to attempt to publicly 
and regularly issue instructions to them. This motivation for engagement may also 
encourage some citizens to learn more about the issues. 
Stephen Bennett (2006) emphasizes the importance of cognitive ability, 
motivation and opportunity in determining the level of political information 
possessed by citizens. This makes good organization and communication essential, 
because organization facilitates both motivation (Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl 2005) 
and opportunity, while communication encourages motivation by developing both 
trust and incentives of purposive and solidary types. Bennett (2006) considers 
nothing can be done about deficits in cognitive ability, but the People’s Forum aims 
to minimize this problem by allowing many with these deficits to be bypassed by 
preferentially facilitating the political influence of those who are thinking about 
public issues (see Function 7). The Forum’s design assumes that many of these 
engaged citizens will have high cognitive ability. 
 
E22 Voting security 
Some degree of voting security is essential for citizens to have confidence in the 
Forum. Security is provided by several conditions: that only those people eligible to 
vote are allowed to; that they each have only one vote per polling event (one vote 
may comprise answers to any questions on any number of the issues on the ballot); 
that their privacy is protected; that their votes are tallied without corruption; and 
possibly other facilities, such as a voter being able to revise her vote before the final 
tally and being able to discover if her vote was omitted or miscounted and then to be 
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able to correct this (Schneier 1996, 125). The security system should permit easy 
access for voting and preferably the freedom for the poll to operate without 
interference by government. Ease of access ideally includes the opportunity for 
electors to vote on impulse, without prior registration, as discussed in Chapter 6/ 
The mission, strategies.../ ‘Voting process’. In Australia, impulse voting with some 
security requires the electoral roll to be used as votes are cast, in order to check 
whether each voter is eligible and to ensure that they only vote once. High security 
will not cater for voting on impulse as it requires the voter to first contact the 
Forum’s central tabulating facility (CTF) to register and be allocated an identification 
number. The voter may then vote, quoting that number and attaching a personally 
selected two-part code. When the CTF publishes her vote with the first part of the 
code she may confirm it by attaching the second part and returning it to the CTF 
(Schneier 1996, 129). This procedure allows errors in tabulation to be corrected by the 
voter and also permits her to alter her vote, but its complexity may discourage 
engagement if it were used by the People’s Forum. As this poll is not an election but 
only registers non-decisive opinions, a simpler lower security approach should be 
adequate. 
To enable impulse voting in countries where citizens do not have a personal 
identification number (PIN) that locates them on an electoral roll, the People’s 
Forum security system must personally deliver a PIN to every eligible voter before 
the poll, or the ballot paper must instruct the voter how to devise his or her own 
PIN, so that the tally computer can use it to locate the voter’s name on the roll. The 
latter type of PIN might be name and date of birth, converted by the voter into a 
number code if this is needed for telephone voting. Both types of PIN require the 
cooperation of the government for the use of its electoral roll and this may not be 
forthcoming. If a government chose to assist in this way it could either (a) license the 
polling company to use the electronic form of the roll to identify eligible voters in 
order to check the validity of incoming electronic votes, or (b) authorize the 
government electoral department to be contracted by the People’s Forum to validate 
incoming electronic votes and then transmit them to the Forum’s CTF for tallying, 
classified as either fraudulent or valid. In Australia, use of the electoral roll by either 
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option (a) or (b) requires changes to Commonwealth legislation and this may not be 
possible until a demonstration People’s Forum poll is carried out to raise public 
awareness of its potential. 
Where a demonstration of the People’s Forum does not have the support of the 
government, it must be cheap enough for the necessary funds to be raised by citizens 
and it must proceed without checking each voter’s eligibility against the electoral 
roll. These conditions present two options for the demonstration, both of which 
would use a web-based ballot paper. The first is to essentially dispense with voting 
security and perhaps merely require that voters give their name and address before 
being permitted to vote. This insecure way of demonstrating the People’s Forum 
may be sufficient to gain public comprehension and support. Public confidence in 
the validity of the results of the initial demonstration polls may be much less 
important than citizens using the system or seeing it operate, to get a feel for its 
potential. The second option gives a slight degree of voting security and it allows 
citizens to either register before the poll or use a credit card to identify themselves if 
they choose to vote on impulse. To register, they would request (by phone, website 
or email) a PIN to be sent to their postal or email address. In the case of postal 
delivery, registration may have to close a few days before the end of the poll to allow 
the PIN to arrive in time for a vote to be cast. Citizens who do not register before the 
poll may vote on impulse during the week that it is open by prefacing their 
telephone or internet vote with a credit card payment of a nominal fee, say 1c, to the 
People’s Forum. Successful payment by the bank to the Forum would inform it that 
the name used was authentic, or at least linked to the credit card number used. 
Neither that name nor that card number could be used to vote again without the 
managers of the Forum seeing it recur, in which case they would block those votes 
and perhaps the initial one as well, to tally them as fraudulent for a subsequent 
analysis of which views were falsely represented by multiple votes. With this 
procedure, impulse voters would pay about 21c to vote (20c for the credit card 
transaction and 1c for the vote), which is hardly a disincentive. A demonstration of 
the People’s Forum by either the insecure or the slightly secure option may produce 
pressure from the public for its government to assist future operation of this system, 
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by public funding and also by allowing voting security to be implemented by 
making the electoral roll available in either of the two ways (a) and (b) suggested 
above. 
 
E17 Advisory influence 
If the People’s Forum is to earn the confidence of the public, it must not incite 
violent conflict between citizens as they probe controversial and strongly held 
beliefs. In considering such possibilities, John Dryzek (2006, 47), as noted above 
under E10 in Function 1, argues for ‚partially decoupling the deliberation and 
decision aspects of democracy‛. The People’s Forum does this by producing choices 
that are not binding on government but which would invite the mass public to make 
them so. 
 
 
Concluding comments on design element E1 - the ballot paper 
 
As the transferability of the People’s Forum to a liberal democracy will depend on 
the reception that the public gives to the ballot paper, a few additional comments on 
its design and potential impact are offered. 
A Forum covering a limited jurisdiction such as a state or province would not 
restrict itself to issues managed at this level, but would also cover issues of a broader 
scope, from national to global. This is partly to encourage residents to develop 
preferences for their state in recognition of the wider context in which it operates. It 
also invites state residents to send messages to their national government and 
perhaps on occasion to the rest of the world, as well as to their state government. A 
Forum that is run at a high level of jurisdiction, say nationally, would use ballot 
papers that differed from state to state in its treatment of state issues but which were 
identical in the questions they posed on national and wider issues, as noted in 
Chapter 6/ The mission, strategies.../ ‘Ballot paper’. The ballot paper should include 
subjects that are not normally considered to be issues of public policy, such as the 
way citizens think, the values they hold and whether they make choices with self-
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assurance or defensiveness. Such inquiry into the culture would be a vital part of the 
deliberation that the People’s Forum would try to stimulate among citizens, for their 
culture influences the opinions they hold and therefore government policy. 
An example of the possible treatment of a subject, or a class of issues, by the ballot 
paper is now given, to help the reader imagine how it would try to foster public 
deliberation on strategic issues. This illustration uses the subject of population size 
and shows a possible treatment of this by a ballot paper for the state of Tasmania in a 
national People’s Forum for Australia. The strategic importance of this subject was 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 and the long term focus can be seen in the way the 
first three issues are treated. This issue currently tends to be treated with more short 
to medium term emphasis, stressing the impact of migration on unemployment, the 
congestion of cities, a lack of infrastructure, the desire of the business lobby for 
labour and domestic demand, the aging of the population and greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
The menus of issues and questions given here are offered as examples and 
consultation with others may produce a different selection that addresses this class 
of issues more effectively. Questions and answer menus are identified by codes such 
as Q1a, which means question 1 for that issue (identified for example, as PO1 issue 
in the issue class PO) and A1, which means answer menu 1 for the question it 
follows. The bracketed descriptions following Q and sometimes A, such as ‘state’, 
‘national’, ‘attitude’, ‘justification’, ‘implementation’ or ‘willingness to pay’ (see 
Function1/ ‘E13’) may not be displayed on the published ballot paper. The menus of 
answers give a number to the right of each answer for the voter to select for her vote. 
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An example of possible treatment of a class of issues by a People’s Forum 
ballot paper for the state of Tasmania 
 
 
PO POPULATION SIZE 
 
PO1 HOW MANY OF US DO WE WANT? 
 
What future population size do you think our governments should aim at, for the 
next century or more, in both Australia and the state of Tasmania?  Before you 
commit yourself, you may like to examine and explain your thinking by considering 
the questions in PO2 and PO3. 
Something you may be concerned with here is the question of whether 
Tasmanians and Australians have the right to choose the size of their populations.  
Should these decisions be made by these residents or should they be made by the 
global community instead (if this were possible, say through the UN or a future 
world governing body) or should they not be made at all? You can vote on GO4 if 
you want to express your wishes on the desirability and structure of a world 
government [GO4 is not included in this sample of a ballot paper]. 
 
Q1 (national, attitude) 
What size of population do you think we should aim for in Australia?  
 
A1   
Zero  0 
<10 million 1 
15 million 2 
21.5 million (approximately the current size) 3 
25 million 4 
30 million 5 
40 million 6 
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>40 million 7 
We shouldn't aim for any particular size of population. We should be open to 
the ebb and flow of migration across the planet and to whatever birth rate 
we happen to have.   8 
We should adhere to any population targets for Australia which may be 
determined by the world community, for example under the auspices of 
the United Nations. 9 
Q2 (state, attitude) 
For this question, just ignore the problems of changing or controlling the size of 
Tasmania’s population - if we wanted to - and state the size you prefer it to be. 
 
A2  
Zero  10 
<300,000 11 
400,000 12 
500,000 (approximately the current size) 13 
600,000 14 
800,000 15 
1,000,000 16 
2,000,000 17 
>2,000,000  18 
We shouldn't aim for any particular size of population within Tasmania but 
be open to ebb and flow of people over the whole nation. 19 
 
Q3 (state, attitude) 
If your answer to Q2 expresses a preference for restricting the size of Tasmania’s 
population, either currently or after some further growth in the future, do you want 
Tasmania to secede from Australia if that is necessary to achieve this restriction (by 
making it possible for the state to implement its own population policy, including 
controlling migration into the state)? 
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A3  
No, Tasmania should not secede. 20 
Not sure. 21 
Yes, Tasmania should secede if this is necessary. 22         
 
 
PO2 ARE THE BENEFITS OF POPULATION GROWTH WORTH ITS COSTS? 
 
Over the last decade, Australia's population grew at around 1.2% per year. This is 
the fastest of the developed countries, which average 0.3% per year and is the same 
as the current average for the world. In 2007, Australia’s population grew at 1.6%, 
more than half of which (56%) was produced by net migration and the rest (44%) by 
natural increase (Weaver and Weaver 2008). A larger population gives benefits such 
as more people enjoying the Australian lifestyle, greater ethnic diversity, more 
cultural development and cultural facilities, bigger domestic markets and more 
intellectual and other human resources for our industrial development and our 
defence forces. 
On the other hand this growth of population incurs economic costs. It requires 
expenditure on expansion of infrastructure such as housing, hospitals, schools, 
roads, factories, power stations, oil wells, mines and farms in order to maintain the 
national level of per capita affluence for more and more people. The cost, in terms of 
human effort or finance, of the population growth-driven part of our expansion of 
infrastructure and skills is not known, but may be more than 10% of Australia's 
GDP. 
There is another type of cost incurred by this growth of population. As it 
progresses it makes natural resources more scarce. Natural resources are committed 
and consumed by the effort to support more Australians. At the same time there are 
more Australians sharing the remaining natural resources. So the per capita 
abundance of natural resources shrinks. This process also converts more and more 
free uses of natural resources, including the natural environment and biodiversity, 
into commercial uses. Some of the natural resources affected in these ways are 
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overseas, such as oil reserves and native forests of the tropics and North America. 
Australians are among the world's heaviest per capita consumers of natural 
resources, including an extreme per capita contribution to global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions that is around ninth out of 185 countries in a ranking that includes 
emissions from changes in land use. 
If the economic costs of the growth of our population were avoided by stopping 
such growth, the savings should permit more development in areas such as social 
welfare, future prospects for Aborigines, health, education, protection of 
biodiversity, protection of natural and cultural environments, increasing average 
income and leisure time, aid for other countries, converting energy sources from 
GHG emitting to renewable non-GHG types and contributing to the development of 
a global administration as described in GO4 [not included in this sample of a ballot 
paper]. 
 
Q1 (national; attitude and justification) 
In view of the possible costs to both financial and natural resources, of increasing the 
size of Australia's population, do you think this population growth should be 
slowed or stopped to allow these resources to be used for other purposes?  
A1 (attitude ) 
I think our population growth rate should be increased. 23 
I think our population growth rate should be maintained. 24 
Population growth in Australia should be slowed. 25 
Population growth in Australia should be halted.  26  
 
A1 (justification) 
I think that population growth incurs financial costs. 27 
I do not think that population growth incurs financial costs. 28 
I think that population growth makes natural resources more scarce. 29 
I do not think that population growth makes natural resources more scarce. 30 
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PO3 QUALITY OF LIFE, GLOBAL EQUALITY AND OUR CHOICE OF POPULATION SIZE  
 
Since the early years of colonization Australians have enjoyed a lifestyle based on 
a high per capita availability of natural resources. This may be regarded as unfair 
when compared with the situation of people in more heavily populated countries. 
The word 'lifestyle' is used here to refer to affluence (or per capita income), plus 
quality of life. The latter comprises all those public goods that help to make life 
pleasant such as a healthy and interesting environment and a supportive and 
stimulating culture, including a high standard of social justice and social welfare. 
 
Q1 (national; attitude) 
Do you want Australia to maintain (or to achieve and then maintain) standards of 
per capita affluence and quality of life that may be distinctly higher than those in 
many other countries, because of an advantage for Australians of a relative per 
capita abundance of natural resources? Or do you think Australians should 
eliminate any such privilege in order to share our natural resources more equitably 
with other people around the world? 
 
A1 
Select one of the following four options:
We should try to remain more affluent than the world average (also see Q3 
below). 31 
We should try to remain more affluent than the world average - provided 
that this affluence is not produced by exploiting other nations (also see 
Q3 below). 32 
We should only be as affluent as the world average. 33 
We should be less affluent than the world average. 34 
 
Select one of the following three options: 
We should try to retain a relatively high quality of life (also see Q3 a below). 35 
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We should have just an average quality of life. 36 
We should have a quality of life below the world average. 37 
Q2 (national; attitude) 
Do you think that an important ingredient of both affluence and/or high quality of 
life is a low pressure of population on natural resources, in other words a high per 
capita abundance of land, sea, air and the natural resources (including native 
wildlife and vegetation) that go with them? 
 
A2 
Yes, for affluence.   38 
Yes, for quality of life.  39 
No, for affluence.   40  30 
No, for quality of life.   41  31 
 
Q3 (national; attitude) 
Do you think that if we are to maintain living conditions that are better than those in 
many other countries, we will have to maintain immigration controls to restrict the 
inflow of immigrants wanting to enjoy these favourable conditions? 
 
A3  
We must restrict immigration to maintain relative affluence. 42     34 
We must restrict immigration to maintain relative quality of life. 43 
We do not have to restrict immigration to maintain relative affluence. 44 
We do not have to restrict immigration to maintain relative quality of life. 45 
 
 
  248 
PO4 WHO DO WE WANT TO JOIN US? 
Q1 (national; attitude) 
If Australia is to continue to accept immigrants, on what basis should they be 
selected? 
 
A1 
Select one or more of these answers 
No selection criteria. First come, first accepted. 46 
Acceptable races and ethnic groups only. 47 
Their value to Australia's economy – accept the wealthy, those with skills in 
short supply, young, healthy, English language proficiency... 48 
People seeking to avoid any economic, political or other difficulties. 49 
Refugees from acute difficulties such as persecution, disaster or war. 50 
Family reunion. 51 
Minimize the numbers taken now, to maintain a maximum capacity for 
Australia to take refugees in the longer term, for example if global 
warming inundates places or causes famine by disrupting the Asian 
monsoon. 52 
 
 
Perceptions of bias 
 
Some citizens may interpret the People’s Forum as being biased to a liberal 
viewpoint because it questions conservative positions much more than it questions 
liberal positions. This interpretation will arise to the extent that conservatism is a 
tendency to resist change, for the point of the Forum is to assist citizens to enquire 
about the status quo to see if change might improve prospects. So the questioning 
posture of the Forum will invite accusations of a bias against conservatives. But if we 
exclude questioning as an act of bias, it may be said that the People’s Forum is not 
biased as it poses questions and offers answer options that invite all points of view to 
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be expressed and discussed. In describing an issue, however, the ballot paper may 
concentrate on evidence that calls for change in order to establish that there is, in fact 
a real issue and to demonstrate its possible significance. This may be needed to 
describe the risk involved in ignoring the issue. Risks or possibilities may be crucial 
parts of the description of an issue, but to someone who is averse to change their 
inclusion may look like bias. Public dispute may be expected to arise over such 
aspects of the Forum, but this should help stimulate citizens to deliberate issues and 
should be anticipated and welcomed by the managers of the Forum. 
Such adverse reactions to the ballot paper will be guided by genetically 
influenced predispositions, so criticism of the People’s Forum is likely to be 
persistent. Alford, Funk and Hibbing (2005) have shown that for the conservative-
liberal spectrum of attitudes, genotype (or ‘nature’) accounts for approximately half 
the variance between individuals and environmental influences (‘nurture’) account 
for the rest. They suggest that renaming the ‘conservative-liberal’ polarity as 
‘absolutist-contextualist’ would enable it to be recognized over a much wider range 
of human activity than politics. ‘Contextualist’ is a tendency to take a context-
dependent rather than a rule-based approach to deciding what type of behaviour is 
appropriate. The description ‘absolutist-contextualist’ appears to match what Slovic 
calls the ‘hierarchist-egalitarian’ polarity of worldview (see Chapter 4/ Issue 
characteristics that create problems.../ 8. Externalizability), which he considers to be 
the most influential in human affairs. Slovic (cited in Bennett 2008, 5) observes that 
people ‚do their best to hold onto their worldviews‛, whether they are hierarchist or 
egalitarian (absolutist or contextualist), so it seems genetics explains much of this 
stubbornness. John Jost (cited in Giles 2008) has shown that people with high scores 
in the personality class of ‚openness‛ are almost twice as likely to be liberals than 
conservatives, that is, egalitarian (contextualist) rather than hierarchist (absolutist). 
Openness includes traits such as an ability to accept new ideas and new experiences, 
a tolerance for ambiguity, regarding change as opportunity rather than a problem 
and thinking about the world as it might be. 
Although genotype is likely to produce some persistent resistance to People’s 
Forums, the work of Shalom Schwartz and colleagues (cited in Jackson 2009, 162-3) 
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indicates that citizen’s responses also depend on circumstances. As the introduction 
of a People’s Forum could significantly change those circumstances it may also 
change the behaviour of citizens. Schwartz (2007) finds two major tensions between 
opposing values: a self-interest–altruism tension and a maintenance of tradition–
openness to change tension. These polarities have been seen in samples from 67 
countries and no evidence to the contrary has been found. The link identified by Jost, 
of ‚openness‛ with the egalitarian (contextualist) disposition indicates that the 
tradition-openness tension may largely be the hierarchist (absolutist)-egalitarian 
(contextualist) polarity. Schwartz provides an evolutionary explanation for the two 
major tensions that he identifies. As Homo sapiens evolved in social groups, 
individuals needed to attend to the interests of both self and group and the struggle 
for survival in a sometimes hostile environment required the abilities to adapt and to 
maintain stability. People are therefore able to strike different balances between self-
interest and altruism and also between interest in change and tradition, according to 
their circumstances. 
 
The important point here is that each society strikes the balance between altruism and 
selfishness (and also between novelty and tradition) in different places. And where this 
balance is struck depends crucially on social structure. When technologies, 
infrastructures, institutions and social norms reward self-enhancement and novelty, then 
selfish sensation-seeking behaviours prevail over more considered, altruistic ones. Where 
social structures favour altruism and tradition, self-transcending behaviours are rewarded 
and selfish behaviour may even be penalized (Jackson 200, 163). 
  
The Forum will change social structure by adding to it an institution that 
facilitates discussion and thought about public affairs and this should shift the 
balance of tensions towards more altruism and openness to change. Although the 
introduction of the Forum may encounter opposition from conservatives, they are 
likely to feel obliged to engage with it in order to be seen to be willing to publicly 
defend their points of view and also to avoid creating a public image of not wanting 
to contribute, both to public discourse and to the monitoring of its progress. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Supporting devices, performance indicators and 
trialling the People’s Forum 
 
 
 
The mission of the People’s Forum is described in Chapter 6 as to improve the 
performance of any democracy by enhancing the quality of its public policy and also 
the legitimacy, or public acceptance, of this policy. These objectives are to be 
achieved by the Forum using two strategies: accelerating the development of public 
opinion and producing political influence for that part of this opinion which is likely 
to be the best developed. To implement these strategies, the People’s Forum is 
designed to work with the activities of existing democratic institutions and activities 
such as the legislature and government, free media, the lobbying and campaigning 
of interest groups and the random sample polling of public opinion. I now consider 
whether, in doing these things that the Forum might be supported by democratic 
innovations that have been either proposed or used. The possibility of these devices 
being supported by the Forum is also considered. 
A preliminary list is then presented, of ways of monitoring the effectiveness of the 
People’s Forum as it operates. Some of these performance indicators would use 
democratic institutions and innovations such as opinion polling, democracy audits 
and the Deliberative Poll®. If, during the introductory phase of the operation of a 
Forum, performance indicators show it has some potential to achieve its mission, the 
public may be encouraged to have more confidence in it, which could help it work 
more effectively and increase the probability that it would become established as a 
political institution. Because of the possibility of such interactions, some devices 
listed here as having a potential to support the People’s Forum also have potential as 
performance indicators. 
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Devices that may work with the People’s Forum for mutual 
support 
 
The two strategies of the People’s Forum will tend to reinforce each other because 
much of whatever development of public opinion it achieves will be registered in its 
results, which means that these will tend to develop political influence - if and as, 
this sophistication becomes widely appreciated (as discussed in Chapter 7/ ‘Function 
5’). Any such political influence would help the Forum further develop mass public 
opinion. This would mainly occur among those voting in the Forum as many will 
discuss or debate its questions as part of their engagement, but the wider public will 
witness some of this activity and may learn from it and be encouraged to join in. This 
development of opinion will be driven by the Forum offering two types of incentive 
for citizens to argue and discuss issues with each other. One type is egoistic; the 
incentive of wanting to shape the Forum’s voting trends, to give their political 
influence, whether potential or real, to one’s views. The other type is solidary; a 
desire of citizens to assist the development of the opinion of their society as 
registered by the People’s Forum, because this has or may develop political influence 
and thereby improve public policy. 
The Forum’s provision of egoistic and solidary incentives for public discourse will 
encourage citizens to form and assist groups that campaign on the issues it treats 
and also other groups that intensively deliberate these issues. Intensive deliberation 
groups may be composed of citizens randomly selected from the electorate, or self-
selected by volunteering to participate, or randomly selected from volunteers. 
Examples of random selection deliberation groups are citizens’ juries, planning cells, 
citizens’ assemblies, Deliberative Polls and Online Deliberative Polls. Some of the 
self-selected groups are the 21st Century Town Meetings run by AmericaSpeaks, 
National Issues Forums and the Study Circles of Everyday Democracy. The third 
type of structure, random selection from volunteers, is employed by consensus 
conferences. As all these forums are designed for intensive deliberation their size is 
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usually limited to a tiny fraction of society, to allow personal intra-group 
communication. They may be considered to execute both of the polity-wide 
strategies of the People’s Forum to some degree, however slight, and thereby to have 
potential to assist it and vice versa. For the first strategy – the facilitation of the 
development of mass public opinion – intensive deliberation forums will have little 
effect as they are primarily restricted to working on the opinions of their members. 
However their representativeness, especially that of strict random sample forums, 
gives them a potential to persuade non-participating citizens to support their 
verdicts because some non-participants may realize that these verdicts are likely to 
be what they would think, if they had the opportunity to deliberate effectively 
(Fishkin 1997, 162; Brown 2006, 211). Such confidence by citizens in a representative 
process has been well developed for law court juries and has also been demonstrated 
for the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform: ‚the CA process 
itself acquired a trustworthy reputation and this gave reason for voters to support its 
recommendation‛ (Ferejohn 2008, 202). Whenever such public trust is achieved by a 
deliberative forum it should gain political influence and thus begin to execute the 
second strategy of the People’s Forum. 
If intensive deliberation forums operate in a society that has a People’s Forum 
and consider issues that the Forum treats, they are likely to produce conclusions 
consistent with the Forum’s voting trend on those issues and which forecast with 
some reliability, what the ultimate conclusion of the People’s Forum would be, after 
it had run those questions for many years. Because intensive deliberation forums are 
likely to have such predictive capacity, their managers might call on all citizens to 
support their results, by voting in alignment with these in the Forum’s polls and by 
calling on politicians to implement the policies being indicated by the Forum’s 
polling trends. Many commentators on public affairs might endorse such calls. In 
this manner, the People’s Forum and intensive deliberation forums should draw 
attention to each other, making both more effective in facilitating the development of 
public opinion and also in developing political influence for the relatively developed 
opinion that they express. This symbiosis may produce a synergy in which the 
combined effect is greater than that of adding the effects of the People’s Forum 
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operating on its own in a society, to the effects the intensive deliberation forums 
would deliver if they were run there without the People’s Forum. 
The most promising types of intensive deliberation panels for synergism with the 
People’s Forum are now briefly described. 
 
Citizens’ juries 
The citizens’ jury comprises a small number of citizens (12 - 24) who are selected 
by stratified random sampling and paid a small honorarium by a sponsoring body 
such as a public authority. It is run by an independent organisation that provides a 
facilitator. It hears evidence, questions witnesses, deliberates over 3-4 days and 
produces a report that the sponsoring authority is expected to respond to. Citizens’ 
juries have been run in the United States by the Jefferson Centre and in the UK by 
several organizations, including the Institute for Public Policy Research.  
Vivien Lowndes, Lawrence Pratchett and Gerry Stoker (2001, 448) report that ‚not 
only are people prepared to join ‘juries’, but the public at large is willing to trust 
their decision-making - even over that of elected representatives.‛ 
 
Planning cells 
Planning cells are the German equivalent of citizens’ juries, being randomly 
selected groups of around twenty-five citizens who advise government authorities. 
They are rather more formal in the way information is provided and also in their 
organization, as they rotate participants between small cells of five to make sure they 
all interact (Smith 2005). 
 
Consensus conferences  
These are small deliberating groups similar to citizens’ juries, but their members 
are largely self-selected, being chosen by socio-demographic criteria from a pool of 
volunteers who have responded to advertisements with written applications. They 
have been run by the Danish Board of Technology since the 1980s. Each conference is 
preceded by a series of pre-conference meetings where the members learn about the 
issue and frame questions. The panel’s recommendations have no binding authority 
  255 
on government, but have sometimes had a direct impact on the legislative process 
(Smith 2005). 
 
The Deliberative Poll® 
This system was devised by James Fishkin and uses a random sample of 250-500 
citizens, which is large enough to make stratification unnecessary. The group begins 
its work with each member completing an opinion poll on the issue to be deliberated 
and then 2-3 days are spent hearing evidence from specialists and deliberating in 
small groups. The work is concluded with a repetition of the same opinion poll of 
the members, which is compared with the pre-deliberation poll. These comparisons 
give clear evidence of participants changing their views during the process, having 
reflected on evidence presented and the views of other participants (Smith 2005).  
The Deliberative Poll® has also been conducted online. In this format deliberation 
is by a random sample of around 500 citizens and runs for 2 hours per week for 4 
weeks. The development of opinion achieved by this version appears to be less 
pronounced than with face-to-face deliberative polling (Smith 2005). 
 
Deliberation Day 
Deliberation Day was devised in 1999 by James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman to 
try to expand the sample of the Deliberative Poll, potentially to the whole electorate. 
This would be a one day public holiday held ten days before major national elections 
to enable registered voters to deliberate pivotal issues in small groups of 15 that 
come together during that day, in plenary sessions of 500. Attendees would be paid 
US$150 for their day’s work of citizenship. This idea has been widely discussed but 
Philippe Schmitter (cited in POWERInquiry 2004, 6) sees a need for ‚much broader 
kinds of mechanisms of deliberation.‛ Nine years previously, Adolf Gundersen 
noted that 
 
whereas Fishkin stresses representative, group processes, or deliberative forums, I stress 
universal, undifferentiated ones. (The difference here is really one of emphasis: the two 
kinds of process are not mutually exclusive. It is just that the latter kind has been too often 
overlooked) (Gundersen 1995, 247, brackets in original).  
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AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meetings 
These meetings are conducted for one day with between 500 to 5,000 citizens who 
are self-selected, as they have volunteered in response to advertisements. Some 
outreach may be used to ensure a reasonable level of participation from disengaged 
citizens. The meeting employs small group dialogue involving 10-12 
demographically diverse citizens and an independent facilitator. These groups are 
connected by computer, voting keypads and large closed-circuit television screens. 
Experts present balanced information and give advice as needed. A clear link to 
decision-makers such as public authorities is established at the outset and their 
representatives attend the proceedings, but the results are not binding on these 
authorities (Smith 2005). 
 
World Wide Views 
This system has been devised by the Danish Board of Technology and its 
partners, in order to extend representative deliberation across the planet. It includes 
design elements from the Deliberative Poll®, AmericaSpeaks’ and the Consensus 
Conference. In each country, citizens are selected as randomly as is feasible and then 
given an invitation to join a WWV group. From those who accept, a group of 100 is 
chosen on the basis of representing the demography of their country in age, gender, 
occupation, education and other respects. Some countries may have several groups 
meeting on different sites and all groups from around the world pool their findings 
via a web tool. The initial application was for a World Wide Views on Global 
Warming, delivering its findings two and a half months before the December 2009 
UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen(WWV 2009; WWV 2010). 
 
National Issues Forums and Study Circles 
These are locally sponsored variable-sized public forums of self-selected 
participants. National Issues Forums are coordinated across the US by the Kettering 
Foundation. Every year its NIF Institute focuses on several major issues by 
publishing issue books, each of which describes three or four approaches to one 
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issue (never just two polar opposites) as a framework for deliberations. Discussions 
are led by trained moderators. The Foundation regularly collates the findings of the 
forums and its reports are published and presented to elected officials to give them 
an insight into the considered views of concerned members of the public. Study 
circles are similar to National Issues Forums and are organized by the Paul J. Aicher 
Foundation’s Everyday Democracy at East Hartford CT (Smith 2005). 
 
Televote 
This name has been applied to two types of forum which culminate in a vote by 
telephone. One type uses self-selected participants and the other a random sample. 
Participants are presented with questions, information, pro and con arguments and 
invited to deliberate on these by themselves and with friends or acquaintances for a 
few weeks before voting. The self-selecting version was invented in the 1970s by 
Vincent Campbell in California, who used newspaper advertisements to invite 
people to take part. In 1978, Ted Becker and Christa Daryl Slaton altered it by using 
random selection to have a representative sample of the public deliberate and vote 
on the Hawaii State Constitutional Convention. Their system has been subsequently 
used on eleven other occasions in Hawaii, New Zealand and California (Slaton 2001).  
 
E-Democracy 
E-Democracy started as the Minnesota Politics and Issues Forum in 1994, running 
internet-based forums for discussing state, national and global political issues. More 
than fifty of these forums now operate across the US, UK and New Zealand. 
Participation is self-selected and a manager lightly moderates the discussion in each 
forum, ensuring that users follow the rules of engagement. On occasions the press 
has covered the online debates of the Minnesota Politics and Issues Forum, which 
indicates it may have an agenda-setting influence. Participants have reported that 
their involvement increases their political interest and knowledge as well as their 
understanding and respect for the views of other citizens (Smith 2005). 
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Civic Commons in Cyberspace 
The Civic Commons in Cyberspace (CCC) was proposed by the UK Institute for 
Public Policy Research in order to extend the Minnesota E-Democracy model from a 
forum facilitating the development of public opinion, to one that empowers this 
opinion and develops it more comprehensively. CCC was designed by Jay Blumler 
and Stephen Coleman, who specify that it be run by a new publicly funded agency 
and should promote, facilitate and summarize online deliberations, with authorities 
expected to react formally to whatever emerges from these public discussions. CCC 
would create a central access point for citizens to deliberate on public issues at all 
levels of government and would provide a one-stop shop for politicians to find out 
about these discussions. It ‚would have a particular interest in exploring new ways 
of consulting intelligently with the broadest possible range of citizens‛ (Blumler and 
Coleman 2001, 16). It may therefore see needs to coordinate citizens’ deliberations by 
staging public events such as polls, so that all who are interested know when to 
engage and can do so in a way that produces a collective choice for a polity. In other 
words, a CCC could have a strong interest in the People’s Forum. CCC has a more 
complex function than the Forum as it would engage in ‚promoting, publicising, 
regulating, moderating, summarizing, and evaluating the broadest and most 
inclusive range of online deliberation‛ (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 17). The Forum 
would not have to continually work at regulating, moderating and evaluating 
deliberations. Evaluation would be done by the annual voting by citizens and the 
regulation and moderation of deliberations would be restricted to the setting of 
guidelines by the way the Forum’s ballot paper is written. These guidelines would 
comprise the selection of issues, the descriptions of issues, the selection of questions 
and the indications given to voters of relationships between issues. The only 
regulation by the Forum of deliberation as it takes place would be alteration of the 
ballot paper in response to public criticisms and updating the range of issues it 
presents. 
A CCC could not function without the active support of a government willing to 
relinquish control of the rules and agenda to an independent body. Public 
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authorities must also be willing to formally respond to the results of citizens’ 
deliberations. The ‚digital divide‛ should not be a problem as the internet makes  
 
it easier for individuals to find and follow what concerns them personally, and by 
lowering the costs of obtaining information, the influence of social status on political 
involvement may be reduced. Citizens and groups with few resources can undertake acts 
of communication and monitoring that previously were the domain mainly of resource-
rich organisations and individuals (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 13). 
 
Citizens’ Assemblies 
The Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform for British Columbia was a 
representative deliberative forum that ran from January to December in 2004. It was 
established by the government of BC with a commitment that it would hold a 
referendum on its findings. The Assembly comprised 160 randomly selected citizens 
with an independent chairman and studied the options for electoral reform in BC. It 
reviewed evidence given at 50 public hearings, received 1603 written submissions 
and deliberated before determining its recommendations by voting. Assembly 
members were assisted by holding meetings at weekends, with childcare and 
payment for their work. 
This process differs from other deliberative forums in that it was on-going for a 
considerable time and had an official undertaking that its recommendations would 
be acted on. As this was to put them to a referendum the wisdom acquired by the 
members of the assembly was partially discarded by having the relatively 
disengaged and uninformed general public make the final choice. Although the final 
vote within the Assembly was near unanimous at 146 to 7, the referendum result 
was 57.7% in favour of the Assembly’s verdict, far higher than the same proposal 
would have secured if it had come from the legislature (Goodin 2008, 269). The 
public exposure of the Assembly’s deliberations and its statistical representation of 
all citizens may have educated some of them about the issue and, as noted above, 
encouraged them to have some confidence in the Assembly’s work and use its 
findings as a heuristic for their vote in the referendum. However these effects were 
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not enough for the Assembly’s extremely strong choice of an STV electoral system to 
be approved by the statutory 60% majority of public votes. 
Ontario followed BC with its own Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, which 
started in September 2006 and finished in May 2007 with a recommendation of 94 
members for, and 8 against, mixed member proportional representation. The final 
result was less impressive than that in BC, for when the Ontario choice was put to a 
public referendum in October 2007 it was rejected by 63 per cent of voters. A forum 
patterned on the citizens’ assembly called the Citizens’ Parliament (newDemocracy 
Foundation 2008) was run in Australia from October 2008 to February 2009 on ‚How 
can Australia’s political system be strengthened to serve us better?‛ This event did 
not have government sponsorship so its conclusions were not put to a referendum. 
 
 
Conclusions on mutual support by the People’s Forum and intensive 
deliberation forums 
 
The use of the internet by E-Democracy and Civic Commons in Cyberspace gives 
them a potentially unlimited reach across both the number of participants and the 
number of issues being treated that resembles the potential of the People’s Forum. 
However, the undertakings of both organisations to actively manage discussions 
makes it difficult for them to handle many issues simultaneously, a problem that the 
People’s Forum would avoid by facilitating deliberation without monitoring or 
controlling the give and take of public debate, as discussed in Chapter 7/ ‘Function 
1’. CCC could be effective at establishing and assisting the People’s Forum because it 
is intended to have an ‚interest in exploring new ways of consulting intelligently 
with the broadest possible range of citizens‛ (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 16). 
However, a major problem with CCC is that of raising the political will to get it 
launched and run. It was proposed early in 2001 but no government has tried it out 
and there seems little chance of private funds being able to initiate it because it relies 
on a commitment by government to heed the public deliberations it reports. A way 
of overcoming this problem may be to use private funds to initiate the People’s 
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Forum first. If money could be found to run a demonstration trial of the Forum in 
some jurisdiction and if this successfully established it as a political institution in 
that situation, then the argument for establishing CCC might be easier to promote, 
for it could be proposed as a mother department that funds the continuing operation 
of the People’s Forum, as well as other functions. These functions include 
promoting, facilitating and summarizing intensive deliberation forums such as 
deliberative polls, consensus conferences and on-line groups, so CCC could help 
these to synergise the work of the People’s Forum, as discussed. Intensive 
deliberation forums could also complement the work of the People’s Forum by 
indicating how the general public would react, if it was able to carefully deliberate, 
to issues that are too short-term for treatment by the Forum. 
If an issue on the People’s Forum ballot paper is especially urgent then those who 
are very concerned about it may decide to accelerate the Forum process by funding a 
random sample intensive deliberation forum to demonstrate what the future 
development of public opinion is likely to be on this issue, if it became better known 
throughout the community. This demonstration might cultivate public confidence 
most effectively if it was performed by a Citizens’ Assembly, in order to extend it 
over time and take submissions from the public. 
Two other innovations that might be considered for operation in conjunction with 
the People’s Forum are pyramidal democracy and the People’s House, as described 
in Chapter 6. Pyramidal democracy would pursue the Forum’s mission of improving 
the quality and legitimacy of public policy by inviting citizens to have confidence in 
the deliberations of chains of representatives that invite specific inputs from all 
citizens. It would do this by employing both strategies used by the People’s Forum. 
The first strategy, development of mass public opinion, would be attempted by 
offering political participation to all citizens in the small intensive deliberation 
groups at the base of the pyramid. The second strategy of giving political influence 
to the most developed part of mass public opinion is executed by the pyramid giving 
this power most directly to the small group of delegates at it apex. The complexity of 
transmission of this influence from all citizens to the few at the top may mean that 
citizens have less incentive to get involved with the first tier of councils than they 
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have to engage with the People’s Forum. As the People’s Forum and pyramidal 
democracy are similar in mission and strategies they might be viewed as alternatives 
to each other rather than as complementary. However the ability of the Forum to 
treat an unlimited number of issues simultaneously means that it should be able to 
assist pyramidal democracy. 
As noted in Chapter 6, the mission of the People’s House is to give a voice to the 
public, curb special interests, counter legislative gridlock and aggregate electors’ 
preferences more equitably. This bears some similarity to the mission of the People’s 
Forum of improving the quality and legitimacy of public policy, but the strategy of 
the House is rather different. Instead of encouraging the development of the opinion 
of the general public and then assisting citizens to gain confidence in the section of 
their opinion that is most likely to be best developed, the People’s House would help 
a random sample of the public to develop its opinions and ask all citizens to have 
confidence in these. Such confidence would depend mainly on public awareness of 
three features: that the sample is very representative; that it deliberates carefully; 
and perhaps that it is large enough to give most citizens some prospect of being able 
to have meaningful contact with at least one of its members. 
The strategies of the People’s Forum and the People’s House it might be 
compared by viewing the Forum as aiming mostly at improving the quantity and 
quality of participation while the House aims mostly at improving the quality of 
representation. These two institutions could therefore complement each other. If 
they were both operating in a polity, the Forum’s strategies should assist politicians 
to endorse the well developed policies of the House by assisting them to be better 
understood and accepted by citizens. At the same time, the House would help the 
Forum by advocating, within the legislature, specific parts of the broad spectrum of 
policy that the Forum would be slowly developing over successive polls. 
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Performance indicators for the Peoples’ Forum 
 
If the Peoples’ Forum is tried out, it will be useful to check how well it works. The 
direct way to do this is to assess the Forum’s achievement of its mission and the 
indirect way is to assess the implementation of its strategies. Performance indicators 
may therefore be any means of assessing the following four aspects. 
 
Achievement of the mission of the People’s Forum: 
i.   improving the quality of public policy; 
ii.   improving the legitimacy of public policy; 
 
Execution of the strategies of the People’s Forum: 
iii. accelerating the development of mass public opinion, and; 
iv. producing political influence for that part of public opinion that is relatively well 
developed. 
 
Assessing the achievement of mission should be a more reliable way of indicating 
performance than assessing execution of strategies. It is, of course, very difficult to 
reliably assess changes in these four parameters. Possible ways of doing this are now 
suggested. 
 
Indicators of achievement of mission (indicator classes i & ii) 
The following four types of assessment might indicate how well an operating 
People’s Forum appears to improve the quality and legitimacy of public policy. 
  
1 Democracy indices. A few broad changes might be monitored in the quality and 
legitimacy of the public policy of a democracy after it has commenced using a 
People’s Forum by observing trends in its democracy index as assessed by 
organisations such as the US-based Freedom House, Democratic Audit in the UK 
and The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. The latter monitors five 
categories of democratic function for each country: electoral process and pluralism; 
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functioning of government; political participation; democratic political culture; and 
civil liberties. Each of these categories is analysed into several sub-categories 
(anywhere from eight to fourteen) and for each sub-category the country’s 
performance is given a rating. Some of these sub-categories concern the legitimacy of 
public policy, for example ‚Public confidence in government‛ and ‚Public 
confidence in political parties‛ (in the category ‚Functioning of government‛). It 
may be possible to use some of these democracy index components by comparing 
the rates of change they show in categories or sub-categories before the introduction 
of the People’s Forum, against those attained after its introduction. 
 
2 Polls of public opinion. Some of the assessments of sub-categories for democracy 
indices are derived from mass public opinion polling within the polity being 
assessed. Polling of this type might be done in a more detailed manner than that 
currently employed by democracy index researchers to ascertain citizens’ 
perceptions of the quality and legitimacy of government policies on specific issues, 
both before and after a People’s Forum is introduced. 
 
3 Polls of expert opinion. Surveys asking questions similar to those for indicator 2 
may be posed, not to the general public, but to experts in public policy, such as 
academics and executives of interest groups to give another indicator of the quality, 
but not legitimacy, of policy. 
 
4 Intensive deliberation forums. Intensive deliberation forums that are either self-
selected or random samples could assess the effect of the People’s Forum on the 
quality of public policy. The findings of the random sample types would also 
indicate the potential for the legitimacy of the public policies being developed by a 
People’s Forum. This would be a potential that might be realized after extensive and 
protracted public debate on those issues. 
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Indicators of performance in executing the first strategy (indicator type iii) 
Indications of changes in or acceleration of, the development of mass public 
opinion by an operating People’s Forum should be given by the following devices. 
 
5 Polls of public opinion. Records of mass public opinion polling before and after the 
advent of a People’s Forum on specific questions that it covers. These may show 
whether the Forum appeared to change the rate of change of this opinion on these 
questions. 
 
6 Polls of expert opinion. The results of polls of specialists in mass public opinion on 
particular issues (such as political scientists and the executives of interest groups) on 
their perceptions of the effect of a People’s Forum on the development of mass 
public opinion on questions that it has run and in which they have expertise. This 
performance indicator is similar to that of indicator 3 but it focuses on the 
development of mass public opinion under the People’s Forum instead of its effect 
on the quality of public policy. 
 
Indicators of performance in executing the second strategy (indicator type iv) 
The following indicators should show the extent to which an operating People’s 
Forum is generating political influence for relatively well developed public opinion, 
as registered by People’s Forum polls. 
 
7 Forum turnout. The percentage of electors that vote in a People’s Forum. A 
percentage close to zero would indicate negligible influence, but only a small 
percentage, say 5%, in combination with good ratings for indicator 8 below, may 
indicate considerable influence for the opinion expressed in People’s Forum poll 
results. The figure of 5% is suggested as should be a large part of the section of the 
community that is knowledgeable about political issues, as discussed in Chapter 2/ 
Ambiguous delegation/ ‘Ignorant directors’. 
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8 Polls of public opinion. Mass public opinion poll ratings of approval and 
disapproval of: 
8.1 the People’s Forum system, 
8.2 People’s Forum poll results and their trends. 
These polls should be conducted on a regular basis, say at least annually, to register 
any trends in approval or disapproval. 
 
 
A small scale trial for the People’s Forum?  
 
It would be very helpful if the effectiveness of the People’s Forum could be 
assessed by trying it out at a small scale that costs much less than the several million 
dollars anticipated for the operational scale, state or national trials recommended in 
Chapter 6/ ‘Initiating and running the Forum’. Any such small scale experiment 
must indicate whether the People’s Forum is likely to achieve its mission at the scale 
of operation for which it is designed, or - as a less conclusive substitute - whether it 
will execute its two strategies at this large scale. As the mission is to improve the 
quality and legitimacy of public policy in a state, or national or multi-national 
jurisdiction it seems unlikely that a small scale trial of the Forum could reliably 
indicate whether it would do this - but could such a trial test the likelihood of it 
being able to execute its strategies? 
For the Forum’s first strategy – accelerating the development of mass public 
opinion across a large jurisdiction – such a trial might use three randomly selected 
groups of the same size to represent the behaviour of the members of a large 
jurisdiction. Two of these groups would be selected at the beginning of a period of 
perhaps five years, during which one of them would be exposed to the Forum’s 
distinctive ‘deliberative’ technique, which is based on offering group members an 
annual vote on a Forum ballot paper. The other group would be offered one vote at 
the beginning of this period on the same ballot paper and would then have no 
further input into the trial. At the end of the trial period, a third group of the same 
size would be randomly selected from those members of the large jurisdiction who 
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have not previously voted on that ballot paper and they would be offered one vote 
on it, with no opportunity to deliberate before voting. This vote would be compared 
with the final and contemporaneous vote of the sample group that had been 
participating in the annual vote over the five year period, to see if there is a 
significant difference between them. Any such difference should arise from the 
deliberative influence of the Forum’s process on the members of the sample that was 
exposed to the opportunity to vote over the five year period. The vote of the sample 
group that only voted once, at the beginning of the period, would be compared with 
the vote of the group that only voted once, at the end of the period, to indicate the 
changes in opinion that occurred over the large jurisdiction without any influence 
from the Forum. 
However this comparison cannot test the Forum’s effectiveness because only part 
of its deliberative technique can be applied to a small group. This part comprises 
three main components: the way the ballot paper is written together with its very 
large menu of issues for potential voters to choose from; a regular and spaced vote 
such as an annual poll, which provides publicized periods for deliberation, feedback 
on attitudes and then redeliberation; and voluntary voting, which helps to promote 
communication about issues as citizens urge each other to vote. The part of the 
Forum’s deliberative technique that cannot be applied to a small group is a large part 
of it. This part of the technique is to offer to the members of a group the possibility or 
probability that their voting will have political influence. Awareness of this will 
motivate some members to try to use this influence by publicly arguing about the 
issues presented by the poll, in the course of which some may think and learn more 
than they otherwise would have done. Awareness of a possibility of political 
influence cannot arise in the members of a group that is too small to have such 
influence. This discouragement would be strengthened by the types of issues that the 
Forum would deal with. As these issues are persistent, long term problems, many of 
which are interrelated and of fundamental importance, they can only be influenced 
by large jurisdictions. It is therefore only members of large groups that can imagine 
that they might influence this type of policy and could thereby be motivated in this 
way by Forum polls to deliberate. The factors that may encourage members of large 
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groups to imagine they could influence policy are discussed in Chapter 7/ Elements 
of the design</ ‘Function 5<’. As members of small groups will not be as motivated 
by a Forum poll to think about issues as members of very large groups are likely to 
be, a trial of the Forum in a small group is likely to underestimate the Forum’s 
potential to execute its first strategy of accelerating the development of public 
opinion. 
To run a small scale test of the effectiveness of the People’s Forum in executing its 
second strategy, that of producing political influence for the part of public opinion 
that is likely to be relatively well developed, one randomly selected experimental 
group appears necessary. If this sample accurately represents the many members of 
a large jurisdiction, it might be expected to simulate their behaviour. Such simulation 
requires the People’s Forum to be run for this sample group over several years, with 
a sequence of polls at regular intervals of a year or at least several months. As the 
vote is voluntary, only those in this sample who are interested in any of the many 
issues on the ballot paper would be expected to vote, as is envisaged for an 
operational scale Forum. The results of these trial polls would therefore be taken as 
representing the views of those in that sample group with relatively well developed 
views on the issues presented. However the members of this group may all feel 
obliged or stimulated by the attention given to them (in being randomly selected and 
personally advised of the availability of a ballot paper) to take an interest in the 
issues presented in this ballot and also to vote in it, regardless of whether they really 
are interested in those issues. This could mean that almost all the members of the 
sample vote in the polls it is offered, so there is little difference between the opinions 
of the whole sample and that large majority of it that chooses to vote. If this happens 
then there can be virtually no granting of political influence by all the members of 
the sample to a small subset of it who vote, for this is virtually a case of the members 
granting themselves this influence. Also, as discussed above, this political influence 
will not even exist for a small group, so such a sample will have nothing to say about 
whether it grants it to its voting members or not. A sample group will therefore not 
execute the second strategy of the Forum, not because the Forum cannot do this but 
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because the group in which it operates in this experimental trial has far too few 
members for them to be able to. 
Small scale trials are therefore very likely to underestimate the potential for the 
People’s Forum to execute both of its strategies in large jurisdictions. Even if such 
trials were not misleading in this way, they would still be somewhat deficient 
because they do not assess the Forum’s capacity to achieve its mission. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
 
As discussed in Part 1, the propensity for democratic dysfunction to cause crucial 
issues to be neglected or mismanaged by existing liberal democratic systems of 
government indicates that correction of this dysfunction is an important and urgent 
problem. Four areas of public policy failure that impact on the management of 
limited natural capital were described in Chapters 4 and 5 to illustrate this: 
overpopulation, global warming, unemployment and growth of wants. There are 
many other important areas concerning public goods where democratic public 
policy may show similar cause of failure, such as in foreign affairs, in the economic 
management that produced the recent global financial crisis and in debilitating 
inequalities within and between nations, but the four cases investigated here indicate 
that governments must be extremely capable in recognizing and executing their 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, the three sources of dysfunction analysed in Part 1 
are liable to impair the ability of governments to execute their responsibility for 
sound intergenerational management of public goods. 
Part 2 proposed the creation of a new political institution, the People’s Forum, to 
correct some of this irresponsibility. A theoretical comparative analysis of this design 
with three others of similar purpose in Chapter 6 concluded that it has considerable 
merit. As this design is based on theoretical predictions of dysfunction from generic 
elements of the structure of liberal democratic governments, it is interesting to give it 
a more practical assessment by briefly checking whether it appears able to address 
general difficulties that are currently being experienced by these governments.  
Ralf Dahrendorf (2000) has drawn on his experience as a social scientist, as a 
founder of the European Community and as a member of the UK House of Lords to 
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identify five major problems for contemporary democracies. The first is that 
democracy works best when the people are strongly involved, which is usually 
when democracy is being fought for. Once it is well established and citizens’ rights 
are generalized, conflicts become less urgent, more diffuse and the people tend to 
disengage. The People’s Forum may be able to counter this diffusion with its careful 
definition of issues and questions and its persistance with these for an extended 
time, so that citizens are assisted to maintain their focus and develop considered 
judgments. 
Dahrendorf’s second difficulty is that political democracy is linked to nation-
states and as their significance is eroded by globalization, government seems less 
relevant. As the Forum should be able to work across international domains it may 
be able to counter this decline, partly by developing an international form of 
democratic governance and also by strengthening the sense of purpose and 
responsibility in each democracy. 
The third concern is a slide towards authoritarianism as national governments try 
to bypass parliaments by consolidating the power of executive systems, which in the 
US is led by the growing power of the presidency. Dahrendorf (2000, 312) describes 
this as  
 
a curious development that has to do with the complexities of government, the need for 
expertise, and the as yet undefined role of the media< these trends need to be deplored 
or reversed, but no new mechanisms have been found to control ostensibly independent 
bodies, rein in quangos, and channel vague expressions of public opinion. 
 
The People’s Forum may provide such a mechanism as it should restore the role of 
‘parliament’ in the sense of creating one for the people. This should also help to 
clarify ‚vague expressions of public opinion.‛ 
Dahrendorf’s (2000, 313) fourth difficulty is the flip side of creeping 
authoritarianism: the apathy of many citizens who are ‚tired of what they regard as 
the democratic game‛. Such disengagement at the bottom strengthens authority at 
the top, but it should be countered by the People’s Forum offering citizens easy but 
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meaningful ways to participate, such as voting once a year on strategic issues and 
engaging as they feel inclined in public discourse on the Forum’s questions. 
Dahrendorf’s final democratic difficulty is that civil society has become less 
cohesive in ways that erode the social base of government. This is partly due to 
democracy overcoming class-based party struggles to produce generalized 
citizenship rights. As these are individual rights they tend to atomize collective 
identity and this challenges us to ensure that tomorrow’s society will have the 
cohesion to function. Here again, the People’s Forum appears to give an answer. By 
providing an arena in which citizens can communicate with each other, it may be 
able to bring them together to select their agenda and to work through it by 
discussing and regularly voting on what they want to contribute to the common 
good. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study offers four contributions to political science and one to ecological 
economics. One contribution to political science is the ‘triple dysfunction’ hypothesis 
about why representative liberal democratic governments presently fail to some 
degree. While the literature provides other explanations of democratic failure, the 
triple dysfunction hypothesis is notable for its systemic reach, simplicity and its 
novel suggestion that much failure is caused by ambiguity in delegation of authority 
and responsibility. This ambiguity presently appears to be neglected in political 
science, perhaps because other effects of electoral systems are influential in more 
noticeable ways, such as the electoral risk the representative runs when choosing her 
mix of acting as a delegate or trustee, while attempting to communicate with electors 
(Young 200). Another of these effects is the risk to the citizen of poor accountability 
when she delegates with insufficient information about representatives’ intentions 
and performance (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Ambiguity in delegation leaves 
democracies vulnerable to neglect and corruption, on issues that demand a finely 
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developed sense of responsibility such as those that concern the long term or 
relationships with external groups. 
The second contribution to political science is an institutional design, the People’s 
Forum, which should be capable of being implemented within existing dysfunctional 
democratic polities and, over time, of remedying the causes of this dysfunction. This 
design would correct ambiguity of delegation, not by issuing explicit instructions to 
citizens and representatives - in the manner of duty statements or position 
descriptions - but by providing on-going incentives for citizens and representatives 
to perform different roles. It would also build their respective capacities to perform 
effectively in these roles. 
The third contribution of this project to political science is the modification of 
Graham Smith’s (2009) framework for comparing the capabilities of democratic 
institutions to produce a framework for comparing the capabilities of new designs of 
democratic government. These designs may be constructed in several ways: as an 
existing design of government with one or more new institutions added to it; an 
existing form with one or more institutions eliminated from it; a combination of 
these; or a fundamentally new form, such as pyramidal democracy or some form of 
sortition. Graham Smith’s framework has thus been adapted for holistic or systemic 
comparisons of how effective different institutions might be in contributing to the 
performance of democratic government. The theoretical comparison that was made 
with this framework gives some support to the triple dysfunction hypothesis as it 
indicates that the design developed in the present theoretical study to correct this 
dysfunction - the People’s Forum - is the most likely of the four designs compared, to 
function effectively. A substantial empirical test of the triple dysfunction requires the 
Forum to be implemented in a sub-national or national polity, with large-scale 
involvement over a time period of at least five years. Such a trial is clearly a costly 
enterprise in the context of academic research and well outside the scope of the 
present study. It is nonetheless eminently feasible in the context of existing public 
and private resources dedicated to enhancing public participation in democratic 
government and in relation to the benefits that may flow from better democratic 
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management of public goods, such as natural capital. The performance indicators 
suggested in Chapter 8 may help to assess such a trial. 
The fourth contribution to political science offered by the present study is that the 
development of the People’s Forum is formalized as a widely applicable and novel 
method for the design of political institutions. This method is a contribution towards 
correcting a ‚paucity of literature specifically on design issues in the study of social 
institutions‛ (Goodin 1996, 31). The theoretical comparative testing of the People’s 
Forum presented in this thesis suggests that this method is robust. Further 
theoretical and empirical testing of the method is planned in future phases of this 
research and is welcomed from others. Such tests should also indicate whether the 
strategies of the method have potential to counter the tendency in political theory for 
specialization to obscure the significance or relevance of theoretical information. 
The contribution made here to ecological economics is the argument pursued in 
Chapter 5 that liberal democratic governments have a long term tendency to destroy 
their citizens’ quality of life through systematically poor management of natural 
capital, or size of population, or both. The triple dysfunction of existing liberal 
democratic government does this by neglecting the public good of the per capita 
availability of natural capital, so this availability is progressively destroyed. This 
neglect produces a bias in government policy to macro-allocate public natural capital 
from the ecological system to the economic subsystem. In this subsystem it is private 
natural capital and some of it is then micro-allocated to private investment and 
consumption. In this way, macro and micro-allocation continually diminish the 
availability of natural capital, partly by reducing its quantity and partly by inflating 
wants for its use. Sooner or later, this decline in availability becomes a chronic 
erosion of citizens’ quality of life and ecological viability. 
This argument for integrating the concerns of ecological economics into the study 
of democratic institutions develops four conceptual claims in addition to that of 
triple dysfunction. The first of these claims is that provisions of public and private 
goods continually compete with each other, so under provision of public goods may 
be considered an over provision of private goods. This means that the triple 
dysfunction hypothesis that democracies have a structural tendency to under-
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provide public goods is also a hypothesis that they have a bias to over provide 
private goods. The second claim is that one form of this private goods bias is a bias 
by democratic government to supply the wants of citizens, rather than to manage 
these wants in the context of the provision of public goods. The third claim is that 
this supplying of personal wants inflates them, through adaptation and status 
rivalry, both of which are encouraged by sales promotion. This inflation of wants by 
supplying them leads to the fourth claim that it feeds back to continue the inflation 
because inflating wants stimulates greater efforts to increase supplies. 
The limitation of this study is that its contributions to political science and 
ecological economics are theoretical. Although the argument of the thesis has been 
developed in the light of secondary empirical data in the literature, the hypothesis of 
democratic dysfunction and the proposed institutional remedy have been tested by 
theoretical means only. However, it is contended that theory is a necessary basis for 
empirical experiment and this work sets up a novel and promising platform for 
future empirical research. The comparison of four innovative forms of democratic 
government undertaken in this study indicates that the People’s Forum warrants an 
operational trial. This judgment could be checked by reviewing the capability 
assessments entered into the evaluation framework that produced this conclusion 
and also by reviewing the validity of the framework itself. Effort might also be put 
into devising more promising institutional designs and the method proposed here 
could be used for this purpose.  
If the People’s Forum is to be tested, this would require running it for several 
years in either a province or a nation. The trial could be made more conclusive by 
concurrently running other democratic innovations to see if this produced 
synergistic/mutually supportive interaction. Intensive deliberation forums may be 
the most effective of such innovations and to consider which to use, and in which 
combinations, they could be separated into two classes: self-selected or open 
intensive forums such as National Issues Forums, Study Circles, AmericaSpeaks and 
Minnesota E-Democracy and random sample or closed intensive forums such as 
deliberative opinion polls, online deliberative polling, consensus conferences, 
planning cells and citizens’ assemblies. Self-selected intensive forums could make 
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some contribution by assisting in very limited ways to develop mass public opinion 
on questions posed by the People’s Forum’s ballot paper. Randomly selected 
intensive forums might contribute more widely by giving some political influence to 
Forum polls through publishing findings on Forum questions that show what the 
mass public would think if it had the opportunity to deliberate fully. In addition, 
self-selection and random sample intensive forums may provide performance 
indicators that monitor the effectiveness of a Forum as it operates. If these indicators 
show good (poor) performance their publication may help (hinder) the performance 
of the Forum. Self-selection and random sample panels may indicate whether the 
Forum’s mission of improving public policy is being achieved and random sample 
panels may indicate whether the mission of legitimacy for this policy is being 
accomplished  
The urgent need for competent democratic government has been stressed by 
eminent American environmental scientist, James Speth (cited in Else 2008, 48). 
 
My conclusion is that we’re trying to do environmental policy and activism within a 
system that is simply too powerful. It’s today’s capitalism, with its overwhelming 
commitment to growth at all costs, its devolution of tremendous power into the corporate 
sector, and its blind faith in a market riddled with externalities< The only solution is to< 
figure out what needs to be done to change today’s capitalism< We need a new political 
movement in the US to drive this< The economy we have now is an inherently rapacious 
and ruthless system. It is up to citizens to inject values that reflect human aspirations 
rather than just making money< But groups, whether they’re concerned about social 
issues, social justice, the environment, or effective politics, are failing because they’re not 
working together.  
 
The People’s Forum is put forward as a possible basis for a ‚new political 
movement‛ that helps ‚citizens to inject values that reflect human aspirations‛ so 
that government has the vision and strength to ‚change today’s capitalism‛. The 
Forum’s design invites all citizens to think about and contribute to public policy. It 
appreciates that any of them may have talents, interests, knowledge, sensitivities and 
sense of civic responsibility that could be useful in this enterprise. Its open and 
  277 
careful approach may inspire citizens with hope as it helps them work together 
towards a safer and more fulfilling future. 
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